Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

18,128 detections

This rule detects suspicious command-line activity indicative of process injection techniques. It looks for the presence of API calls like 'VirtualAlloc', 'WriteProcessMemory', and 'CreateRemoteThread' in conjunction with keywords such as '.dll', '.exe', or 'shellcode' within Security Event ID 4688 (a process creation event). A count of two or more such occurrences within an hour for a given computer and user triggers an alert.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
5 months ago
006
This rule detects modifications to critical boot sector files (bootsect, bootmgr, BOOTCODE, MBR) on the C: or X: drives. It specifically looks for these modifications when initiated by processes other than common system processes like 'system', 'csrss.exe', or 'explorer.exe'. The rule counts modifications within one-hour bins and triggers if one or more modifications are observed.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
5 months ago
006
Detects multiple instances of a non-SYSTEM or non-LOCAL SERVICE account using 'RunAs' to execute processes as highly privileged accounts (admin, system, root) within a short timeframe. This could indicate an attempt at privilege escalation or token impersonation.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
5 months ago
006
This rule detects suspicious process activity indicative of process injection, specifically looking for the creation of remote threads combined with memory allocation, writing to process memory, and loading of DLLs. It monitors Security Event ID 4688 (a process creation event) and filters for command-line arguments containing functions commonly used in process injection techniques such as 'CreateRemoteThread', 'VirtualAllocEx', 'WriteProcessMemory', 'GetProcAddress', and references to '.dll' or 'LoadLibrary'. A count of such events within an hour is then used to identify potential injection attempts.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
5 months ago
006
This rule detects attempts to clean up artifacts associated with the Amos Stealer by monitoring for the deletion of known staging paths. Specifically, it looks for the execution of 'rm' commands targeting '/tmp/osalogging.zip' or '/tmp/sync'. This activity suggests an adversary is trying to remove traces of their presence after data exfiltration or staging.
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Kaung Khant Ko@kaungkhantko
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Detections.ai Community
5 months ago
006
Detects PowerShell command-line executions that utilize the '-enc' (encoded command) parameter, combined with common Base64 encoded string prefixes. This technique is frequently used by adversaries to obfuscate malicious PowerShell scripts and evade detection.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
5 months ago
006
This rule detects potential process injection attempts by monitoring Windows Security Event ID 4688 (A new process has been created) for specific keywords in the command line. The keywords 'CreateRemoteThread', 'WriteProcessMemory', 'VirtualAllocEx', 'SetWindowsHookEx', and 'LoadLibrary' are commonly associated with various process injection techniques. The rule summarizes these attempts by computer, user, and hourly intervals.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
5 months ago
106
Detects files with suspicious double extensions (e.g., .exe.txt, .dll.txt) or .scr extension, which can indicate an attempt to masquerade malicious executables or scripts as benign text files or screensavers. The rule excludes files in the System32 directory to reduce false positives.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
5 months ago
106
Detects anomalous external network connections originating from specific Windows binaries (LockAppHost, makecab, Magnify) targeted by DeepLoad's APC injection technique. These native binaries rarely initiate external public network connections.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
5 months ago
004
This rule detects the creation of suspicious files, specifically .lnk files or files containing 'JUNCTION' in their name, within the 'AppData\Local\Temp' directory. It further refines the detection to look for paths that contain '..\', indicating a recursive or unusual directory structure, which can be used to hide malware or evade detection.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
5 months ago
006
Detects attempts by Electron or Node.js applications to establish persistence by creating or modifying Run or RunOnce registry keys. The rule specifically looks for applications located within the AppData\Local directory, which is a common technique for malware or unwanted applications to maintain execution across system reboots. This rule leverages UDM for principal and target context to aid in correlation.
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Daniel Jeremiah@daniyyell
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Detections.ai Community
5 months ago
003
Detects attempts by Electron or Node.js applications to establish persistence by creating or modifying Run or RunOnce registry keys. The rule specifically looks for applications located within the AppData\Local directory, which is a common technique for malware or unwanted applications to maintain execution across system reboots. This rule leverages UDM for principal and target context to aid in correlation.
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Daniel Jeremiah@daniyyell
Google SecOps
5 months ago
203
Detects the loading of 'tpsvcloc.dll' from the 'Windows Fonts' directory by a ThinPrint-related signed host. This behavior is indicative of potential DLL side-loading or hijacking, as 'tpsvcloc.dll' is typically associated with ThinPrint software and should not be loaded from the Fonts directory. The rule focuses on identifying this specific anomalous module load event.
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Daniel Jeremiah@daniyyell
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Detections.ai Community
5 months ago
003
This rule detects modifications to the Windows Registry related to the 'hola_monitor_svc' service. Specifically, it looks for registry keys containing 'services\hola_monitor_svc' and registry value data or process command lines that include 'holamonitorservice.exe'. This activity indicates the configuration or presence of the Hola Monitor Service, which could be associated with the Hola VPN application.
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Daniel Jeremiah@daniyyell
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Detections.ai Community
5 months ago
003
Targets Aspose.Email DLL loading by a user-writable or masquerading executable rather than an approved mail application. The UDM rule retains principal and target context for correlation.
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Daniel Jeremiah@daniyyell
Google SecOps
5 months ago
303
Detects disabling of PowerShell command history logging to impair forensics
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Darshan Thummar@Mighty
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Detections.ai Community
5 months ago
408
Detects potential use of steganography to hide C2 commands in image files
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Darshan Thummar@Mighty
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Detections.ai Community
5 months ago
108
Detects Pass-the-Hash attacks using NTLM authentication over SMB
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Darshan Thummar@Mighty
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Detections.ai Community
5 months ago
508
This rule detects the use of LdrCallEnclave, a function often associated with shellcode execution, when initiated by Python or an executable located in a user-writable temporary directory (e.g., Temp, AppData, ProgramData). The detection focuses on processes whose image name matches 'python', 'python3', or any executable name followed by '.exe', and whose path contains common temporary or user-writable directories. The rule specifically looks for 'ldrcallenclave' in the command line arguments, indicating potential malicious activity such as process injection or shellcode execution.
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Daniel Jeremiah@daniyyell
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Detections.ai Community
5 months ago
003
This rule detects the creation of a file named 'notepadplusplus.dll' within the Microsoft Windows roaming profile path (AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows). This activity is suspicious as Notepad++ DLLs are not typically found in this location and could indicate an attempt at DLL side-loading or other forms of execution hijacking.
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Daniel Jeremiah@daniyyell
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Detections.ai Community
5 months ago
103
This rule detects the presence of the RawWNPF rootkit by searching for references to '\device\rawwnpf' or 'rawwnpf' in process command lines. It focuses on process events and provides causality fields for investigation.
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Daniel Jeremiah@daniyyell
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Detections.ai Community
5 months ago
003
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