Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects unusual communication patterns from executive accounts in Office 365, specifically looking for mail activity, inbox rule creation, or mailbox modifications combined with keywords related to wire transfers, payments, or urgent financial actions. The rule flags scenarios where multiple such activities occur within a short timeframe (3 hours) or if new inbox rules are created, indicating potential deepfake/synthetic impersonation or Business Email Compromise (BEC) attempts.
Detects unusual communication patterns from executive accounts in Office 365, specifically looking for mail activity, inbox rule creation, or mailbox modifications combined with keywords related to wire transfers, payments, or urgent financial actions. The rule flags scenarios where multiple such activities occur within a short timeframe (3 hours) or if new inbox rules are created, indicating potential deepfake/synthetic impersonation or Business Email Compromise (BEC) attempts.
Detects high-volume email campaigns that exhibit characteristics of sophisticated phishing, including spoofed sender domains, urgent subject lines, and multiple URLs in the email body, indicative of credential harvesting attempts. The rule specifically looks for emails delivered to 'Deleted' or 'Junk' folders, from non-company domains that resemble company domains, and containing keywords often used in phishing lures.
This rule detects potential DLL sideloading activity by monitoring process creation events where specific executables ("Setup_File_75.593.2113.exe" or "SystemSettings.exe") are launched with a command line containing "borlndmm.dll". It then correlates this with file events to confirm the presence of "borlndmm.dll" on the same device. This pattern is indicative of the OnyxC2 malware attempting to load a malicious DLL.
This rule detects the execution of ScreenConnect client services or MSI installers when initiated by common scripting or installer processes such as wscript.exe, cscript.exe, powershell.exe, or msiexec.exe. This behavior can indicate the abuse of legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools for malicious purposes, such as initial access, persistence, or remote control by adversaries.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell to create or modify Quality of Service (QoS) policies, specifically looking for the 'New-NetQosPolicy' cmdlet combined with parameters related to bandwidth throttling ('ThrottleRateActionBitsPerSecond') or application targeting ('AppPathNameMatchCondition'). This activity can be indicative of an attacker attempting to disrupt EDR agent connectivity by severely limiting network bandwidth, a technique associated with 'EDRChoker'.
Detects new app installations, expansions of OAuth scopes, or the addition of collaborators to Slack applications. These activities can indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistent access, escalate privileges, or exfiltrate data from Slack by leveraging malicious or compromised applications.
Identifies when DeepLoad target processes (LockAppHost.exe, makecab.exe, Magnify.exe) spawn child processes like shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, whoami.exe, net.exe), indicating successful injection and post-exploitation execution. This behavior is associated with the DeepLoad malware.
This rule detects attempts by PowerShell to modify the Windows Registry to re-enable Windows Script Host. This behavior has been observed with AsyncRAT, which may attempt to repair the script environment if it was disabled by defenders.
Detects fileless Linux malware execution patterns that run payloads from anonymous memory files (memfd_create) or inherited file descriptors under /proc/self/fd without touching disk. Used by Linux backdoors and miners to evade filesystem-based detection.
Detects BPFDoor-style iptables NAT REDIRECT rules used to tunnel traffic from a
legitimate service port to a high ephemeral shell port (42391-43390) without
disrupting the real service for other clients. BPFDoor activates on magic packets, spawns a
bind shell, inserts short-lived PREROUTING redirects for the controller IP, then deletes them.
legitimate service port to a high ephemeral shell port (42391-43390) without
disrupting the real service for other clients. BPFDoor activates on magic packets, spawns a
bind shell, inserts short-lived PREROUTING redirects for the controller IP, then deletes them.
Detects whenever a QoS with throttleRate is created by a Windows Service. This behaviour is normally associated with EDR Supression.
Detects process hollowing technique for code injection
Detects installation of rootkit kernel modules for deep system hiding
Detects Windows token manipulation for privilege escalation
Detects modification of macOS plist files to hide processes or enable autostart
Detects local account RDP logins originating from external IP addresses
Detects the use of 'chattr +i' to make files immutable. This technique is used by malware, such as Miasma payloads, to prevent security tools and administrators from deleting malicious artifacts, hindering incident response and forensic analysis.
Detects process command lines that contain patterns indicative of obfuscated payload execution, specifically the combination of 'eval', 'base64', and '-d'. This technique is frequently used by adversaries to decode and execute memory-resident stages without dropping secondary payloads to disk.
Detects self-deletion commands (e.g., rm -f $0) used by Miasma payloads to remove their execution tracks from disk immediately after running. The rule specifically looks for process command lines containing 'rm', '-f', and either '$0' or '%~dp0', which are common patterns for self-deletion in shell scripts.
Hunts for the fake VPN creating highly randomized, high-entropy directories in %AppData% to store its persistence binaries. This rule specifically looks for folder creation events in the AppData\Roaming directory with a highly randomized, 12 or more character alphanumeric name, and correlates it with a process event from either GlobalProtect or AnyConnect VPN clients.
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