Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects installation of password filter DLLs to intercept plaintext passwords
Detects execution of tools known to manipulate Windows access tokens
Detects thread hijacking using SuspendThread and SetThreadContext
Detects use of raw sockets for implementing socket filter backdoors
Detects mshta.exe executing HTA applications for LOLBin proxy execution
Detects the loading of 'borlndmm.dll' from unusual directories, an activity associated with OnyxC2 stealer DLL side-loading techniques, where the malicious DLL is typically inflated via binary padding to evade detection.
A detection triggered on endpoint events where common system binaries (e.g., mshta.exe, powershell.exe, cmd.exe) were launched by user-facing parent processes (explorer.exe, chrome.exe, msedge.exe, firefox.exe, iexplore.exe) and executed suspicious command-lines. The pattern matches the evolving technique used in ClickFix-style campaigns whereby malicious pages dynamically place payloads into the clipboard and prompt users to paste or execute them.
Detects hard deletion of mailbox data to remove forensic email evidence
Detects execution of tools known to manipulate Windows access tokens
Detects thread hijacking using SuspendThread and SetThreadContext
Detects SyncAppvPublishingServer used for PowerShell proxy execution
Detects the execution of known Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBins) such as certutil.exe, msiexec.exe, regsvcs.exe, and regasm.exe when their command line contains suspicious keywords like 'download', 'http', or 'encode'. This activity can indicate an attempt to download malicious payloads or bypass security controls.
This rule detects the execution of script interpreters (such as PowerShell, cmd, bash, python, etc.) where the command line contains non-ASCII characters, specifically Cyrillic, Arabic, or Chinese Unicode characters. This pattern can be indicative of obfuscation techniques used by adversaries to evade detection or to target specific regions.
Using Shimache as source
File running from Recycle Bin
File running from Recycle Bin
This rule correlates successful VPN authentication events with the subsequent execution of tools commonly associated with ransomware staging activities within a 6-hour window. It aims to detect initial access via VPN followed by preparatory actions for ransomware deployment. The rule specifically looks for VPN logins from 'Check Point' devices and process executions of 'rclone.exe', '7z.exe', 'powershell.exe', 'wevtutil.exe', 'vssadmin.exe', or 'nltest.exe'.
This rule watches a notarised Flutter app wait before calling home and then running shell commands. Delayed contact helps malware evade sandbox checks during install. Behaviour after the delay is the real threat. Ask the person who used the computer whether they installed new software or clicked a link, and involve your security team if the answer is unclear.
This rule detects multiple (3 or more) logon attempts using the 'RunAs' feature (Event ID 4648) for accounts containing 'Admin' or 'SYSTEM' in their username within a one-hour window. This could indicate an adversary attempting to escalate privileges or execute code as a privileged user.
This rule detects files commonly associated with endpoint detection and response (EDR) evasion techniques being staged within 'test' subfolders under a user's 'Documents' directory. The presence of such files (executables, DLLs, PowerShell scripts, or binaries) with names indicating 'loader', 'bypass', 'edr', 'inject', 'payload', 'agent', or 'defender' suggests an attacker is preparing to deploy or test EDR evasion tools on the workstation. This activity could precede a larger attack.
This rule detects events generated by Microsoft Defender for Endpoint's Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules in either Audit or Block mode.
(**Toggle by commenting out line 94/95. Default is both Audit & Block**).
It covers all 19 ASR rules by matching ActionType patterns or falling back to GUIDs found in AdditionalFields. The rule extracts the friendly name of the ASR rule, the mode (Audit/Block), and relevant process information.
This rule is especially noisy when ran over an entire environment. It's recommended to scope using Audit/Block, Machine Group, and filtering to the rules you want by commenting others out.
(**Toggle by commenting out line 94/95. Default is both Audit & Block**).
It covers all 19 ASR rules by matching ActionType patterns or falling back to GUIDs found in AdditionalFields. The rule extracts the friendly name of the ASR rule, the mode (Audit/Block), and relevant process information.
This rule is especially noisy when ran over an entire environment. It's recommended to scope using Audit/Block, Machine Group, and filtering to the rules you want by commenting others out.
Detects enabling of reversible password encryption in Active Directory
Detects MSBuild used with inline task to execute arbitrary code
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