Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
18,128 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
6,549
6,208
1,473
1,005
661
Contributors
3,555
2,652
2,153
2,087
1,515
Categories
7,572
3,901
1,465
1,393
1,330
Platforms
13,733
1,392
1,319
824
738
Products / Services
3,828
3,137
2,448
912
908
MITRE Techniques
18,128
15,653
12,600
8,411
6,235
CVEs
19
18
17
16
14
IDS Classtypes
305
51
24
23
22
IDS Protocols
308
136
13
10
10
Detects privilege escalation attempts utilizing PowerShell's Start-Process cmdlet with the 'RunAs' verb. This technique can be used by malware like Lucid Stealer's UAC module to elevate privileges.
Detects GRE encapsulation used to bypass network address translation controls
Detects CMSTP used with INF files for UAC bypass and code execution
Detects execution of Electron application ASAR packages for code execution
Detects the modification of file permissions on critical Windows boot files (bootmgr, ntoskrnl.exe, winload.exe, winload.efi, winload) using `takeown.exe` or `icacls.exe`. This activity is a known precursor to BLUERABBIT's destructive wiping phase, where it attempts to render systems unbootable.
This rule detects potential Pass-the-Hash (PtH) attacks by looking for multiple successful network logons (LogonType 3) using NTLM authentication for the same user from the same IP address. A count of 5 or more such events is considered suspicious.
This detection captures the initial self-infection mechanism of ClickFix campaigns before secondary payloads are downloaded. It identifies PowerShell execution matching the ClickFix clipboard pattern, specifically launching with hidden window styles and executing base64-encoded strings via Invoke-Expression (IEX).
This rule detects the execution of potentially unwanted programs (PUPs) from common temporary or user-specific download directories. It specifically looks for processes with filenames indicative of PUPs (e.g., 'pua.exe', 'adware.exe', 'pup.exe', 'unwanted.exe') originating from 'Temp', 'AppData', or 'Downloads' folders. The rule aggregates these events per device per hour and alerts if one or more such executions occur, indicating potential user-initiated installation or drive-by download of unwanted software.
This rule detects the delivery of a malicious XSL (Extensible Stylesheet Language) script via HTTP to a client. The detection is based on the HTTP URI containing ".xsl" (case-insensitive) and the file data containing "<msxsl:script" (case-insensitive). This pattern is indicative of an attempt to use XSLT for proxy execution, often associated with techniques like WMIC (Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line) for defense evasion.
This rule detects potential multi-factor authentication (MFA) bypass attempts for privileged accounts. It identifies instances where an administrative user attempts 10 or more sign-ins from 3 or more unique devices within a 5-minute window, specifically when the authentication method is 'Push notification to app' and the result type is '0' (success). This behavior could indicate an adversary attempting to bypass MFA for a privileged account.
Detects attempts to unload, disable, or remove kernel drivers, which could indicate a rootkit or other malicious activity trying to hide its presence or impair system defenses. The rule specifically looks for process creation events (EventID 4688) where the command line contains keywords related to driver manipulation ('unload driver', 'disable driver', 'remove driver') and also references kernel components ('.sys', 'kernel').
This rule detects suspicious command-line activity indicative of direct kernel object manipulation, often associated with kernel-mode rootkits. It looks for processes executing commands containing keywords related to direct kernel access (e.g., 'directl', 'kernel call', 'ntoskrnl', 'hal.dll') in conjunction with keywords suggesting privilege escalation or driver loading (e.g., 'setprivileges', 'loaddriver', 'createremotethread'). Such combinations can signify attempts to install or interact with malicious kernel drivers or rootkits.
This rule detects the presence of executables with names commonly associated with legitimate Windows system processes (e.g., system32.exe, winlogon.exe, svchost.exe) but located in non-standard directories outside of 'System32' or 'syswow64'. This behavior is indicative of masquerading, where an attacker attempts to hide malicious executables by naming them after legitimate system processes and placing them in unusual locations to evade detection.
This rule detects modifications to registry keys (EventID 4657) where the new value contains strings commonly associated with Command and Control (C2) configurations, such as 'C2', 'beacon', 'callback', 'command_server', 'c2_ip', or 'control_server'. This could indicate an adversary establishing or modifying C2 communication channels via the registry.
This rule detects modifications to specific registry keys that are commonly used for persistence by malware. The rule looks for Event ID 4657 (A registry value was modified) and checks if the ObjectName corresponds to known malicious registry paths related to Run keys, RunOnce, or service configurations. This indicates an attempt to establish persistence or alter system behavior for malicious purposes.
This rule detects when two or more files with suspicious names (e.g., 'update.exe', 'temp.exe', 'setup.exe') are created within a short timeframe (1 hour) in common user-writable directories such as 'Temp', 'AppData', 'Downloads', or 'Public'. This pattern can indicate the dropping of malicious payloads or staging of files by an adversary.
This rule detects potential thread hijacking attempts by looking for the presence of specific Windows API calls, 'SuspendThread' and 'SetThreadContext', within HTTP client-to-server traffic. These API calls are commonly used in thread hijacking techniques to manipulate the execution flow of a legitimate process, often to inject and execute malicious code. The rule specifically looks for these strings within file data transmitted over HTTP, suggesting an attempt to deliver a payload that utilizes these functions.
This rule detects attempts to bypass macOS Gatekeeper by removing the 'com.apple.quarantine' extended attribute from downloaded files. It specifically looks for HTTP responses containing the string 'com.apple.quarantine' in the file data, indicating a potential attempt to modify or remove this attribute during or after a download.
This rule detects the negotiation of an export-grade cipher suite during a TCP connection to port 443 (HTTPS). Specifically, it looks for the byte sequence '|00 1B|' at a depth of 2 bytes within the TCP payload, which corresponds to a specific cipher suite identifier often associated with weaker, export-grade cryptography. This could indicate an attempt to downgrade encryption for easier interception or exploitation.
This rule detects the use of the 'chattr +i' command over a network connection to port 22 (SSH). The 'chattr +i' command on Linux is used to make a file immutable, meaning it cannot be modified, deleted, or renamed, even by the root user. This behavior can be indicative of an attacker attempting to prevent forensic analysis or hinder system recovery by protecting their malicious files or modifying critical system files.
This rule detects the creation of a new service account key within Google Cloud Platform (GCP) via the 'iam.googleapis.com' API. Specifically, it looks for HTTP POST requests to URIs containing 'serviceAccounts' and 'keys'. This activity can be indicative of privilege escalation, where an attacker creates a new key for an existing service account to gain persistent access or elevate their privileges.
Page 434 of 864