Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
18,128 detections
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Flags Intune assignments to “All Devices” or “All Users,” which attackers may abuse for mass deployment.
Identifies inbound remote RPC calls targeting the Remote Registry interface to save registry keys (OpNums 20 and 31). This is frequently abused for remote credential dumping of SAM/LSA secrets.
Detects process injection attempts targeting the OneDrive.Sync.Service.exe process. This behavior is associated with the OceanLotus SPECTRALVIPER backdoor, which uses it to maintain persistence and evade defense mechanisms.
Detects execution chains where a suspicious DLL (autorun.dll) is loaded from user-controlled directories and followed by a silent MSI installation. This pattern is commonly associated with malware staging and secondary payload deployment.
This rule detects attempts to manipulate access tokens via a remote SMB session. Specifically, it looks for the string "ImpersonateLoggedOnUser" within TCP traffic destined for port 445 (SMB). This activity could indicate an attacker attempting to elevate privileges or move laterally by impersonating a logged-on user.
This rule detects potential memory injection attempts on Linux systems via an SSH session. It specifically looks for the strings "/proc/" and "/mem" within TCP traffic directed to an SSH server ($HOME_NET 22). This combination of strings suggests an attempt to access or manipulate process memory, which is a common technique used by attackers for privilege escalation or code injection.
This YARA rule detects Portable Executable (PE) files associated with the Nimplant C2 framework. It identifies Nimplant by looking for specific DLL names (some with common typos), Nim-related source file names (e.g., pixle.nim, urls.nim), Windows API function calls commonly used by malware (e.g., GetComputerNameW, CreateProcess, VirtualProtect), Zlib patterns, TLS callbacks, and specific strings like registry keys and a version string "@NimPlant v1.4". The rule requires the file to be a valid PE file (MZ header).
This rule detects network traffic attempting to exploit a Service Registry ACL weakness remotely. Specifically, it looks for TCP traffic on port 445 (SMB) directed to the home network, containing the string "HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services" (case-insensitive) in the payload. This string is indicative of an attempt to modify or interact with Windows services via the registry, potentially leveraging weak ACLs to establish persistence or execute malicious code.
This rule detects when a single caller successfully updates three or more SQL Server firewall rules within a one-hour window. This behavior could indicate an adversary attempting to open up network access to a SQL database, potentially for data exfiltration, command and control, or further lateral movement.
This rule detects the execution of 'VmwareSampling.exe' with a command line containing 'victimtoolsalla.dll'. This specific combination is indicative of the NIGHTFORGE loader, which often leverages DLL side-loading techniques to execute malicious payloads. The presence of 'victimtoolsalla.dll' suggests an attempt to load a malicious DLL via a legitimate VMware process.
Detects instances where an executable is deleted immediately after execution, a common defense evasion technique used by memory-resident malware like the JDY botnet. This rule specifically looks for shell processes executing 'chmod +x' or 'chmod 777' followed by 'rm' commands, often chained with '&&', ';', or '||', indicating immediate self-deletion after execution.
Identifies PowerShell executing a script block directly from the specific environment variable 'INTERNAL_DB_CACHE', as observed in the Evil MSI Background steganography campaign. This technique is used to hide malicious PowerShell code within an environment variable and execute it, bypassing direct script file detection.
This rule detects an HTML file being served to a client that contains an embedded Base64 encoded executable payload. It specifically looks for the HTML download attribute (<a download=), the 'base64,' string, and the 'TVQAA' string, which is a common signature for the beginning of a Base64 encoded Windows executable (MZ header). The detection is performed on HTTP traffic flowing to the client.
This rule detects HTTP responses containing a payload that appears to be XOR encrypted. It specifically looks for a sequence of at least 200 bytes consisting of non-printable ASCII characters (0x01-0x1f and 0x7f-0xff) within the file data of an HTTP response flowing to the client. This pattern is indicative of XOR encryption, often used by malware to obfuscate its payload.
This rule detects the delivery of a malicious LNK file via HTTP that utilizes icon smuggling. It specifically looks for HTTP responses containing a URI with ".lnk" and the byte sequence "|4C 00 00 00|" at the beginning of the file data, which is characteristic of LNK files. Icon smuggling is a defense evasion technique where a malicious file disguises itself with a legitimate icon to trick users into executing it.
This rule detects attempts to disable the Linux Auditd service via a remote SSH connection. It specifically looks for the string "systemctl stop auditd" within TCP traffic destined for port 22 (SSH). Disabling auditd can be an attempt by an attacker to evade detection by removing system auditing capabilities.
This rule detects the presence of a Right-to-Left Override (RLO) character sequence in the content of an email sent over SMTP. The RLO character (U+202E, represented as E2 80 AE in UTF-8) is often used in phishing or malware campaigns to visually reverse the order of characters in a filename, making an executable file appear to be a benign file type (e.g., 'document.txt.exe' could appear as 'document.exe.txt'). The rule specifically looks for this byte sequence in traffic destined for port 25 (SMTP) and flags it as trojan activity.
This rule detects attempts to clear syslog files by looking for the command 'truncate -s 0' followed by 'syslog' within an SSH session. This activity is often associated with an attacker trying to remove evidence of their presence on a compromised system.
This rule detects the download of a ClickOnce application manifest that contains specific content indicating it might be malicious. It looks for HTTP responses (flow:to_client,established) where the URI contains ".application" (case-insensitive) and the file data contains "asmv1:assembly" (case-insensitive). This combination suggests a ClickOnce deployment, which can be abused to deliver malware.
This rule detects network traffic indicating the deletion of a persistence registry key, specifically 'CurrentVersion\\Run', after an execution. It looks for TCP traffic to the home network on port 445 (SMB) containing both 'CurrentVersion\\Run' and 'RegDeleteKey' (case-insensitive). This behavior is often associated with malware attempting to clean up its persistence mechanisms to evade detection.
This rule detects HTTP traffic where the URI contains both "pcalua" and "-a" (case-insensitive). This pattern is indicative of indirect execution via pcalua.exe, a legitimate Windows utility that can be abused by attackers to proxy execution of other programs, often for defense evasion. The rule specifically looks for this behavior in HTTP requests, suggesting an attempt to download or execute a payload indirectly.
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