Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
18,128 detections
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Joins password reset events to subsequent legacy-protocol (IMAP/POP/SMTP/ActiveSync) or non-interactive sign-ins for the same user, catching attackers who pivot to less-monitored protocols immediately after a vished self-service reset.
Detects tenant-level enablement of Microsoft Teams external/federated access or addition of an unfamiliar external domain shortly before a spike in inbound Teams calls to helpdesk/IT-support-tagged users — models CrowdStrike's 2026 Financial Services Threat Landscape Report on 'Mutant Spider,' the most active threat to financial services, whose primary technique is voice phishing over Microsoft Teams impersonating internal IT.
Detects the execution of MSI installers from user-writable directories (e.g., Downloads, Temp, Public) that masquerade as legitimate software applications like Spotify, Zoom, or Microsoft Teams. This behavior is indicative of 'ClickFix' style social engineering lures, where users are prompted to download and execute malicious installers.
Detects compiled LSASS credential-dumper binaries that clone the target process in a suspended state, patch ntdll/amsi/win32kbase hooking regions, and write an in-memory minidump, even when debug/console strings and process ancestry have been scrubbed to evade static and lineage detections
Detects HTTP POST requests directed at common LLM API endpoints (chat completions, model beta) that contain patterns indicative of LLM prompt injection or malicious code generation requests, such as commands for code obfuscation or payload regeneration, specifically where the User-Agent does not match standard browser strings and the request body contains base64 encoded instructions.
Detects the creation of a new local user account named 'ops' or an account with 'full' group privileges on MikroTik RouterOS. This rule is designed to identify potential persistence mechanisms following the exploitation of MikroTrick vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-67279/CVE-2026-86060), often indicated by anomalous prior login patterns.
Detects the presence of an unauthorized administrative account (e.g., 'ops') on MikroTik RouterOS devices following a system 'Flagged' indicator. This rule correlates administrative account creation or modification events with system-reported compromise indicators to identify post-exploitation persistence mechanisms related to known RouterOS vulnerabilities.
This rule detects potentially malicious usage of msiexec.exe where the command line contains obfuscation techniques such as excessive spacing, Unicode character substitution, or suspicious case variations. It specifically looks for activity initiated by common shell processes like explorer.exe or cmd.exe that involves the /package argument or URL-based loading, which is a common indicator of MSI-based payload delivery.
This rule detects unauthorized attempts to extract credentials from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process. It monitors for two distinct techniques: non-standard processes opening handles to lsass.exe with sensitive access rights (credential-dumping) and the use of rundll32.exe to invoke the MiniDump function within comsvcs.dll against lsass.exe.
Detects an outbound network connection initiated by 'rnpkeys.exe' when executing from a non-standard 'ProgramData\keyroll' directory. This behavior is associated with the early stages of a Command and Control (C2) registration sequence, where an encrypted loader initiates network contact before subsequent staged communication.
Detects known components of the Sauron malware, including MSI installers, side-loaded executables (rnpkeys.exe), and malicious DLLs (rnp.dll, tdwp.dll) by matching known SHA-256 file hashes. It also includes a YARA rule for detecting PE binaries containing the string 'Sauron'.
Detects the presence of MSI installer packages associated with the Sauron Loader malware, which stage malicious files (rnpkeys.exe, rnp.dll, and tdwp.dll) into the C:\ProgramData\keyroll directory to facilitate DLL side-loading.
KQL Query
This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving the execution of Node.js scripts initiated by system script proxies (wscript, cscript, msiexec) within specific paths, often associated with subsequent installation of VBScript agents or direct network communication with a known command-and-control IP address.
This rule detects the 'ClickFix' attack pattern, where an adversary tricks a user into copying and pasting a malicious command into a terminal. The command typically involves using 'base64 -D' to decode an attacker-supplied blob directly into a bash interpreter, often initiated by a Terminal emulator and containing strings related to fake reCAPTCHA or robot verification.
Detects DLL side-loading activity where the legitimate-looking process rnpkeys.exe, located in a non-standard ProgramData sub-directory, loads a malicious rnp.dll from the same directory, a behavior observed with the Sauron Loader malware.
Detects the creation of a remote thread targeting the native Windows utility 'attrib.exe'. This behavior is characteristic of code injection techniques, such as those used by the Sauron loader, where malicious shellcode is executed within the context of a legitimate system process to evade detection and maintain persistence.
Detects the Sauron Loader malware utilizing the process rnpkeys.exe as a parent to spawn common LOLBins (Living-off-the-Land Binaries) or execute payloads from temporary directories. This behavior is indicative of a secondary stage execution chain typical of the Sauron Loader.
Detects the execution of the Sauron Loader malware, which utilizes a DLL side-loading chain involving rnpkeys.exe loading rnp.dll or tdwp.dll from a specific ProgramData path, indicating potential malicious activity.
Detects the execution of msiexec.exe performing the installation or staging of specific binary files (rnpkeys.exe, rnp.dll, and tdwp.dll) into the C:\ProgramData\keyroll\ directory, which is a known behavior associated with the Sauron Loader malware.
This rule detects the loading of a specific module named 'tdwp.dll' by the 'rnpkeys.exe' process, where both files are located within a 'keyroll' directory. This pattern is indicative of potential DLL sideloading or execution of unauthorized components where a legitimate-looking process loads a custom, possibly malicious, library from a non-standard location.
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