Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects when a Bandizip executable loads an unsigned dynamic-link library (DLL) from outside the standard installation directory, where the Bandizip process was launched by explorer.exe, potentially indicating DLL side-loading.
Detects successful non-interactive sign-ins by Entra ID service principals from an IP address and location never seen in the prior 14 days, helping to identify potentially compromised application credentials used from unfamiliar locations.
Detects Gryxa staging behavior where files are written across 2 or more distinct toolkit directories (such as WinRTCS, WER .wucache, and Diagnosis .etlcache) within a 1-hour window on a single device.
Behavioral hunt for accounts whose non-interactive sign-ins over 30 days are dominated (>=95%) by a single IP using a scripted client (python/aiohttp/httpx/urllib) with no browser. Scripted now requires BOTH no browser AND a scripted user agent, and Microsoft ASN egress is excluded.
Detects potential bootkit activity or unauthorized modifications to the EFI system partition by correlating non-standard .efi file writes with subsequent execution of boot configuration utilities like bcdedit or mountvol within a 30-minute window.
Detects known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with the Ebury Linux backdoor, including specific file hashes, implants like libkeyutils.so.1.10.2, malicious IP connections, and associated network/email artifacts using Microsoft Defender XDR advanced hunting.
Detects the execution of rm commands using force flags to delete multiple critical appliance, system, and web server log files simultaneously on Linux hosts.
Detects HTTP requests to the PeopleSoft PSEMHUB servlet using alternate
encodings such as the percent-encoded path %50SEMHUB. ShinyHunters/UNC6240 mass-exploit
Oracle PeopleSoft CVE-2026-35273 against internet-facing systems and encode the path to
defeat literal WAF signatures for /PSEMHUB/ (T1190, T1027).
encodings such as the percent-encoded path %50SEMHUB. ShinyHunters/UNC6240 mass-exploit
Oracle PeopleSoft CVE-2026-35273 against internet-facing systems and encode the path to
defeat literal WAF signatures for /PSEMHUB/ (T1190, T1027).
This rule detects suspicious driver loading from user-writable paths, kernel driver service creation, disabling of driver signing, loading of Linux kernel modules, and the usage of LD_PRELOAD for rootkit functionality.
Detects PowerShell launched hidden and non-interactive with an insecure execution policy and Base64 decode-and-execute, or a script combining Base64 decode-and-execute with browser history collection and WMI shadow copy enumeration, as seen in the Midnight Blizzard (GTG-20006) stager.
Detects a single application or service principal performing a password reset, a license assignment, and a privileged role grant within a one-hour window. This sequence matches Storm-3119 admin-panel abuse of a compromised tenant client secret through an app-only flow in Microsoft 365 or Entra ID.
Detects PowerShell execution involving Base64 decoding or certutil decoding combined with writing files to the AppData directory using .NET I/O methods or PowerShell cmdlets.
Detects administrative login to the FortiWeb console from an address without prior
history. Console access permits policy change and signature control, so compromise
of the WAF administrator is equivalent to removing the WAF for every application
behind it.
Onboarding: FORTIWEB is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 115).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='FORTIWEB' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip
history. Console access permits policy change and signature control, so compromise
of the WAF administrator is equivalent to removing the WAF for every application
behind it.
Onboarding: FORTIWEB is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 115).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='FORTIWEB' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip
Detects a file creation event for any executable inside the "tmphtml" staging
directory beneath the AOMEI Backupper installation path, where the creating process
is Backupper.exe. The application stages popup resources here before relocating them
to html\; a genuine promotional bundle contains no executables, so an .exe written
to this path indicates a tampered bundle.
directory beneath the AOMEI Backupper installation path, where the creating process
is Backupper.exe. The application stages popup resources here before relocating them
to html\; a genuine promotional bundle contains no executables, so an .exe written
to this path indicates a tampered bundle.
Detects a file creation event for any executable inside the "tmphtml" staging
directory beneath the AOMEI Backupper installation path, where the creating process
is Backupper.exe. The application stages popup resources here before relocating them
to html\; a genuine promotional bundle contains no executables, so an .exe written
to this path indicates a tampered bundle.
directory beneath the AOMEI Backupper installation path, where the creating process
is Backupper.exe. The application stages popup resources here before relocating them
to html\; a genuine promotional bundle contains no executables, so an .exe written
to this path indicates a tampered bundle.
Detects the execution of rm commands using force flags to delete multiple critical appliance, system, and web server log files simultaneously on Linux hosts.
Detects the execution of rm commands using force flags to delete multiple critical appliance, system, and web server log files simultaneously on Linux hosts.
Detects the WinLol Rust dropper staging a DLL sideload by writing a copy of Microsoft OneDrive.exe and a proxy version.dll into a user temp directory by a non-OneDrive, non-installer process.
Users who received a delivered phishing email and then signed in from an IP not seen for them in the prior 30 days within 24 hours. Hunting query, not an alert.
Detects the Cisco AsyncOS content scanner / AMP service writing files into
sensitive system directories such as /etc, /root or /boot. CVE-2026-76519 uses a relative
path traversal in AMP attachment handling so a crafted email makes the root-running scanner
write attacker-chosen files wherever it likes. Writes outside the expected spool and
Content Scanner Tools directories are the core exploitation artifact.
sensitive system directories such as /etc, /root or /boot. CVE-2026-76519 uses a relative
path traversal in AMP attachment handling so a crafted email makes the root-running scanner
write attacker-chosen files wherever it likes. Writes outside the expected spool and
Content Scanner Tools directories are the core exploitation artifact.
Detects mshta.exe executing a remote HTA payload over HTTP/HTTPS, the initial fileless execution stage of ACR Stealer's Campaign 2. The retrieved HTA contains VBScript loaders that ultimately deploy obfuscated PowerShell and steganography-assisted in-memory shellcode.
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