Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
18,128 detections
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Detects potential process injection attempts (e.g., Early Bird APC injection or process hollowing) where a process is spawned in a suspended state, followed shortly by a remote-thread or QueueUserAPC injection primitive targeting that same process. The rule correlates process creation events with subsequent API calls while excluding known legitimate patterns like .NET runtime operations, system updaters, and EDR/AV security components.
Detects potential process injection attempts (e.g., Early Bird APC injection or process hollowing) where a process is spawned in a suspended state, followed shortly by a remote-thread or QueueUserAPC injection primitive targeting that same process. The rule correlates process creation events with subsequent API calls while excluding known legitimate patterns like .NET runtime operations, system updaters, and EDR/AV security components.
Detects the ClosedQuorum 'unhook' evasion technique where a process patches ntdll's EtwEventWrite to suppress ETW telemetry, occurring within a 5-minute window of the same process initiating outbound network connections to known LLM C2 provider APIs or Discord webhooks used for AI-arbitrated decision cycles.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with encoded commands (e.g., -EncodedCommand or -enc) combined with common download cradle indicators such as IEX, Net.WebClient, or DownloadString. This combination is highly indicative of fileless malware execution, initial access payload staging, or defense evasion techniques often employed by threat actors to bypass command-line monitoring.
Detects the abuse of the built-in Windows utility 'certutil.exe' to download remote files using URL cache functionality or to deobfuscate base64-encoded payloads. This is a common LOLBin (Living-off-the-Land Binary) technique used in phishing loaders, malware delivery, and post-exploitation toolkits.
Detects potential AWS IAM privilege escalation attempts by identifying suspicious modifications to IAM policies, roles, or trust relationships, as well as unauthorized role assumption events. This rule monitors for activities such as attaching high-privilege policies (e.g., AdministratorAccess), creating new policy versions, and modifying trust policies to allow unexpected principals, which are common indicators of post-compromise activity designed to expand access within an AWS environment.
Detects the execution of legitimate developer utilities msbuild.exe, regasm.exe, and regsvcs.exe in manners consistent with malicious proxy execution. This includes the use of inline tasks in project files, remote network-sourced project files, or specific command-line arguments (such as /codebase or /unregister) that suggest the abuse of these binaries to execute arbitrary code or bypass application control mechanisms, while excluding known legitimate developer-related parent processes and build workflows.
Detects the creation of a remote thread in a process by another process, excluding self-injection. This behavior is a common indicator of process injection techniques used to execute code within the address space of a target process.
Detects execution of PowerShell or Python scripts characterized by common patterns found in AI-generated code, including specific obfuscation techniques (base64, string manipulation), boilerplate error handling structures, verbose comments, and generic variable naming conventions. High scores indicate a higher probability of automated or obfuscated script execution.
Detects autonomous AI coding-agent processes (e.g., Claude Code, Cursor, Aider) spawning shell or git processes to perform potentially destructive actions such as recursive file deletion, forced git pushes, database manipulation, or unauthorized access to sensitive credential files, indicating agentic 'excessive agency' or compromise.
Detects the use of PowerShell to remove the 'Zone.Identifier' NTFS Alternate Data Stream from a file, effectively bypassing Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) security protections. This behavior is often associated with the 'Unblock-File' cmdlet and is used by adversaries to execute downloaded malicious files without security warnings.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving the execution of Node.js scripts initiated by system script proxies (wscript, cscript, msiexec) within specific paths, often associated with subsequent installation of VBScript agents or direct network communication with a known command-and-control IP address.
Detects instances where browser processes (Chrome or Edge) are spawned by smartscreen.exe and subsequently access sensitive browser storage files such as Login Data, Cookies, or Local State. This pattern is indicative of a process injection or masquerading chain used to extract credentials or session data.
This rule detects rundll32.exe executing a DLL from the ProgramData directory and subsequently establishing five or more outbound network connections to external IP addresses over non-standard ports (excluding 80 and 443) within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of a potential malware beaconing or data staging activity using a proxy binary to evade detection.
Detects anomalous file activity associated with the PaperCut application (pc-app.exe), characterized by the creation of numbered binary chunks (.bin) followed by the creation of a status log file (pcxboot_l.txt) and the subsequent deletion of the binary chunks. This behavior is indicative of an in-memory Java payload loader pattern used to evade detection.
This rule detects suspicious activity originating from the PaperCut 'pc-app.exe' process. It monitors for the creation or execution of a file named 'mscopilot.exe' within the non-standard directory 'C:\Microsoft.Office365\'. The rule matches based on a known malicious SHA1 hash or the specific file-write-then-execute behavior within a one-hour window, indicating potential AdaptixC2 loader activity.
Detects non-SYSTEM processes enabling SeDebugPrivilege or SeImpersonatePrivilege shortly before launching a process as the SYSTEM user. This behavior is highly indicative of token manipulation and impersonation techniques (e.g., Potato-family exploits) used to elevate privileges from a standard or administrative account to SYSTEM.
Detects the 'ClickFix' attack pattern where explorer.exe (typically via a Run dialog interaction) spawns a command shell (PowerShell, cmd, or mshta) using obfuscated flags combined with execution indicators (download/execution), which then subsequently spawns a secondary child process. This chain provides high-confidence evidence of malicious intent compared to isolated process executions.
Detects the 'ClickFix' attack pattern where explorer.exe (typically via a Run dialog interaction) spawns a command shell (PowerShell, cmd, or mshta) using obfuscated flags combined with execution indicators (download/execution), which then subsequently spawns a secondary child process. This chain provides high-confidence evidence of malicious intent compared to isolated process executions.
Detects execution of regsvr32.exe with command-line arguments that include a remote URL ('/i:http...') combined with silent, unregistered, and notification-free execution flags ('/s', '/u', '/n'). This behavior is characteristic of the 'Squiblydoo' technique, where attackers use Regsvr32 to execute arbitrary scriptlets from remote servers to bypass application whitelisting.
Detects the abuse of signed Windows system binaries regsvr32.exe and rundll32.exe for proxy execution, defense evasion, and credential access. The rule identifies suspicious command-line patterns including Squiblydoo (regsvr32 with remote scriptlets), rundll32 executing JavaScript via mshtml.dll, rundll32 performing LSASS credential dumping via comsvcs.dll, and the loading of DLLs from untrusted user-writable locations like Temp or Downloads folders.
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