Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
18,128 detections
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Detects unauthorized access attempts to SYSTEM-level processes (winlogon.exe, services.exe) using specific access rights such as PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE or PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION. This behavior is indicative of token stealing or impersonation attempts often utilized by tools like JuicyPotato, RoguePotato, and PrintSpoofer to escalate privileges to SYSTEM.
Detects potential process injection attempts where a browser or Office application attempts to write to the memory or create a remote thread within high-value or trusted system processes like svchost.exe or explorer.exe. This activity is indicative of defense evasion techniques such as DLL or PE injection.
Detects the abuse of common Windows LOLBins (Living Off the Land Binaries) like regsvr32, mshta, certutil, and rundll32 to proxy the execution of remote scripts, DLLs, or malicious payloads, a technique often used to bypass security controls.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command-line flags (EncodedCommand, NoProfile, WindowStyle Hidden, ExecutionPolicy Bypass) combined with either potential Base64-encoded payloads or network-based download cradles (e.g., Invoke-Expression, WebClient).
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user exhibits signs of account compromise—either through impossible travel patterns or the use of OAuth tokens on a new device—followed within one hour by the modification of mailbox settings, such as creating new inbox rules or modifying mailbox permissions, which is a common indicator of persistence and email exfiltration.
Detects the creation of a remote thread (Sysmon Event ID 8) by a process into a set of common host processes (e.g., svchost.exe, explorer.exe) where the starting address of the thread does not map to a known loaded module. This behavior is highly indicative of reflective code injection or shellcode execution within the address space of a remote process.
Detects the use of BITSAdmin to download files to suspicious directories (Temp, AppData, ProgramData) or to register persistent command execution via the /SetNotifyCmdLine parameter. This detection correlates process execution events with BITS Client operational log events to confirm the completion or status of the BITS job.
Detects the presence of zero-width, non-printing, or bidirectional-override Unicode characters in command lines, commonly used for obfuscation or prompt injection.
Detects a fake ClaudeDesktop.exe installer / tampered libcef.dll sideload chain deploying the SectopRAT .NET RAT, requiring multiple corroborating indicators and a PE anomaly consistent with DLL sideloading rather than a single generic string
Detects SectopRAT (Arechclient2) .NET RAT binaries deployed via tampered libcef.dll / JetBrains helper DLL sideloading that harvest browser credentials, cookies, credit card data, and files. Tightened to require combined sideload+family+target indicators plus .NET CLR import evidence, avoiding standalone generic strings.
Detects invisible/non-printing Unicode codepoints (zero-width chars, bidi overrides, variation selectors, Unicode tag characters, and Private Use Area icon-font codepoints) embedded in process command lines - covering both classic command/script obfuscation and the emerging use of hidden codepoints to smuggle AI prompt-injection payloads into content later processed by AI copilots/agents. Tightened to require 2+ high-confidence codepoint hits (or 1 from a known scripting host/LOLBin), and gates Private-Use-Area-only matches (a common legitimate icon-font false-positive source) to scripting hosts with 5+ hits, maps to T1027.018.
Detects the misuse of the legitimate odbcconf.exe utility via the /A switch combined with the REGSVR action. Attackers leverage this behavior to execute malicious DLLs, often utilizing response files or executing from non-standard directories to bypass application control policies.
Detects the assignment of SeDebugPrivilege or SeImpersonatePrivilege to a non-SYSTEM account, followed by the execution of a new process from common service parents (spoolsv.exe, w3wp.exe, dllhost.exe) within the same logon session. This behavior is indicative of privilege escalation attempts using local potato-style exploits (e.g., PrintSpoofer, JuicyPotato) that leverage service tokens for impersonation.
This rule detects the execution of potentially malicious binaries masquerading as legitimate Windows utilities (e.g., Windows Update, Defender, or Phone Link) from within a ScreenConnect temporary directory. This behavior is indicative of a phishing attack where an adversary uses remote access tools to stage and execute malicious payloads on a victim's system.
Detects the execution of MSP360 or generic RMM-labeled binaries originating from common user download directories (Downloads or Temp folders) when the filename mimics common phishing lures such as invoice, e-card, RSVP, or document-related naming conventions. This activity indicates a potential social engineering attempt to execute remote monitoring and management tools.
Detects the abuse of the Windows Scripted Diagnostics framework (sdiagnhost.exe) by the Antino threat actor. The attack leverages sdiagnhost.exe to proxy the execution of a malicious script (result.ps1) that subsequently establishes persistence by creating a Registry Run key (GatherOSStateKit). The rule correlates the execution of the scripted diagnostic package with the specific registry modification event within a 5-minute window.
Detects the abuse of the Windows Scripted Diagnostics framework (sdiagnhost.exe) by the Antino threat actor. The attack leverages sdiagnhost.exe to proxy the execution of a malicious script (result.ps1) that subsequently establishes persistence by creating a Registry Run key (GatherOSStateKit). The rule correlates the execution of the scripted diagnostic package with the specific registry modification event within a 5-minute window.
Detects the abuse of the Windows Scripted Diagnostics framework (sdiagnhost.exe) by the Antino threat actor. The attack leverages sdiagnhost.exe to proxy the execution of a malicious script (result.ps1) that subsequently establishes persistence by creating a Registry Run key (GatherOSStateKit). The rule correlates the execution of the scripted diagnostic package with the specific registry modification event within a 5-minute window.
Detects the abuse of the Windows Scripted Diagnostics framework (sdiagnhost.exe) by the Antino threat actor. The attack leverages sdiagnhost.exe to proxy the execution of a malicious script (result.ps1) that subsequently establishes persistence by creating a Registry Run key (GatherOSStateKit). The rule correlates the execution of the scripted diagnostic package with the specific registry modification event within a 5-minute window.
Detects the abuse of the Windows Scripted Diagnostics framework (sdiagnhost.exe) by the Antino threat actor. The attack leverages sdiagnhost.exe to proxy the execution of a malicious script (result.ps1) that subsequently establishes persistence by creating a Registry Run key (GatherOSStateKit). The rule correlates the execution of the scripted diagnostic package with the specific registry modification event within a 5-minute window.
This rule detects unauthorized or suspicious cross-process access attempts by monitoring relationships between source and target processes. It specifically flags instances where common target processes (e.g., browsers or core system processes) are accessed by a source process that is not on a known allowlist of legitimate parent/child or service-related processes. This pattern is often indicative of process injection or unauthorized memory access attempts.
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