Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a multi-stage attack pattern involving a non-MFA login to a Citrix portal, followed by lateral movement, and concluding with ransomware deployment behaviors such as shadow copy deletion, recovery disablement, or the dropping of ransom notes associated with ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware.
This rule detects potential HTML smuggling activity by identifying a browser process writing an executable file named 'config.exe' to the user's Downloads folder without a traditional network download event, followed immediately by Microsoft Defender SmartScreen or Antivirus reporting a warning or scan failure on the file. This behavior is indicative of a payload being reconstructed on the client-side via JavaScript blobs or data URLs, which is a common characteristic of HTML smuggling delivery chains.
Detects HTTP GET requests to Cloudflare Pages subdomains (.pages.dev) ending in '/File_download', often used as a distribution point for malicious HTA (HTML Application) or WSF (Windows Script File) payloads in spearphishing campaigns.
Detects UAT-11587 Stage 1 HTA and WSF stager template: hidden/zero-sized window, fixed Cloudflare Pages tracking beacon with ?track, and WinHttp/MSXML ActiveXObject loading Stage 2 from Cloudflare R2 or CloudFront.
Detects potential lateral movement or compromised account use where a single user identity authenticates to multiple distinct cloud or administrative resources within a short time window (15 minutes). The rule uses a threshold of six or more unique applications or resources to identify anomalous patterns typical of reconnaissance or mass resource access often associated with stolen credentials. Administrative, service, and automation-related accounts are excluded to minimize noise.
Detects potential lateral movement or compromised account use where a single user identity authenticates to multiple distinct cloud or administrative resources within a short time window (15 minutes). The rule uses a threshold of six or more unique applications or resources to identify anomalous patterns typical of reconnaissance or mass resource access often associated with stolen credentials. Administrative, service, and automation-related accounts are excluded to minimize noise.
Detects potential lateral movement or compromised account use where a single user identity authenticates to multiple distinct cloud or administrative resources within a short time window (15 minutes). The rule uses a threshold of six or more unique applications or resources to identify anomalous patterns typical of reconnaissance or mass resource access often associated with stolen credentials. Administrative, service, and automation-related accounts are excluded to minimize noise.
Detects potential lateral movement or compromised account use where a single user identity authenticates to multiple distinct cloud or administrative resources within a short time window (15 minutes). The rule uses a threshold of six or more unique applications or resources to identify anomalous patterns typical of reconnaissance or mass resource access often associated with stolen credentials. Administrative, service, and automation-related accounts are excluded to minimize noise.
Detects the UAT-11587 TestAssembly.dll downloader by its shared AssemblyAttribute GUID b2b3adb0-1669-4b94-86cb-6dd682ddbea3 embedded in .NET metadata across all campaign builds
Detects Antino backdoor binaries (slc.dll and standalone) via embedded AntinoApp application manifest string and Rust PDB path patterns matching GitHub Actions Windows runner structure.
Detects the Kothamine post-installation technique where npm/node spawns PowerShell to reflectively load a .NET assembly stager into memory. This behavior is followed by the PowerShell process spawning anomalous instances of RuntimeBroker.exe or svchost.exe. These spawned processes exhibit suspicious characteristics, such as executing from non-standard file paths, having missing command-line arguments (like the required '-k' for svchost), or having an illegitimate parent process (powershell.exe) instead of standard system parents like services.exe or wininit.exe.
Detects the Kothamine post-installation technique where npm/node spawns PowerShell to reflectively load a .NET assembly stager into memory. This behavior is followed by the PowerShell process spawning anomalous instances of RuntimeBroker.exe or svchost.exe. These spawned processes exhibit suspicious characteristics, such as executing from non-standard file paths, having missing command-line arguments (like the required '-k' for svchost), or having an illegitimate parent process (powershell.exe) instead of standard system parents like services.exe or wininit.exe.
Detects the Kothamine post-installation technique where npm/node spawns PowerShell to reflectively load a .NET assembly stager into memory. This behavior is followed by the PowerShell process spawning anomalous instances of RuntimeBroker.exe or svchost.exe. These spawned processes exhibit suspicious characteristics, such as executing from non-standard file paths, having missing command-line arguments (like the required '-k' for svchost), or having an illegitimate parent process (powershell.exe) instead of standard system parents like services.exe or wininit.exe.
Detects behavior consistent with the Kothamine agent, where a recently dropped DLL in a temporary directory is loaded by a short-lived explorer.exe process. This rule monitors for file creation, subsequent module loading by the explorer process, and ensures the process was spawned in close proximity to the file activity, indicating likely process injection.
Detects behavior consistent with the Kothamine agent, where a recently dropped DLL in a temporary directory is loaded by a short-lived explorer.exe process. This rule monitors for file creation, subsequent module loading by the explorer process, and ensures the process was spawned in close proximity to the file activity, indicating likely process injection.
Detects behavior consistent with the Kothamine agent, where a recently dropped DLL in a temporary directory is loaded by a short-lived explorer.exe process. This rule monitors for file creation, subsequent module loading by the explorer process, and ensures the process was spawned in close proximity to the file activity, indicating likely process injection.
Detects behavior consistent with the Kothamine agent, where a recently dropped DLL in a temporary directory is loaded by a short-lived explorer.exe process. This rule monitors for file creation, subsequent module loading by the explorer process, and ensures the process was spawned in close proximity to the file activity, indicating likely process injection.
Detects the execution of the Kothamine injector by correlating three distinct stages: the use of PowerShell to create an AV exclusion for 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore', the dropping of the 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore' binary into the user's AppData directory, and subsequent process injection (OpenProcess/VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory/CreateRemoteThread) into explorer.exe.
Detects anomalous credential access behavior by identifying instances where a compromised explorer.exe process (injected with the Kothamine payload DLL MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll) accesses browser cookie stores and gaming credential files in quick succession.
Detects post-exploitation command execution originating from a compromised explorer.exe process. The rule identifies processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or conhost.exe spawned by an explorer.exe instance that has previously loaded the malicious 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll' module, correlating this activity with the established 'tailcat.exe' command-and-control tunnel.
Detects post-exploitation command execution originating from a compromised explorer.exe process. The rule identifies processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or conhost.exe spawned by an explorer.exe instance that has previously loaded the malicious 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll' module, correlating this activity with the established 'tailcat.exe' command-and-control tunnel.
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