Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects post-exploitation command execution originating from a compromised explorer.exe process. The rule identifies processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or conhost.exe spawned by an explorer.exe instance that has previously loaded the malicious 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll' module, correlating this activity with the established 'tailcat.exe' command-and-control tunnel.
Detects post-exploitation command execution originating from a compromised explorer.exe process. The rule identifies processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or conhost.exe spawned by an explorer.exe instance that has previously loaded the malicious 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll' module, correlating this activity with the established 'tailcat.exe' command-and-control tunnel.
Detects a suspicious pattern where an inbound Microsoft Teams call or chat from an untrusted external guest tenant is followed within 30 minutes by a credential, MFA, or account-recovery action on the target user's account in Entra ID. This behavior is indicative of a vishing-over-Teams attack where an adversary impersonates IT support to facilitate unauthorized account recovery or MFA bypass.
Detects a suspicious execution sequence associated with the SectopRAT loader. The rule monitors for ReportDump.exe being launched from a ProgramData directory by common scheduling or service host processes, followed immediately by the loading of a malicious sdkcra.dll library.
This rule detects the suspicious pattern of a process reading a 'pool.db' file followed immediately by the loading of .NET Common Language Runtime (CLR) modules (clr.dll or mscoreei.dll). This behavior is characteristic of fileless execution chains where a secondary payload is retrieved and executed directly in memory.
Detects cloud service principals identified as AI agents or assistants performing sensitive API operations such as IAM policy modifications or storage configuration changes. This pattern may indicate that an AI service account has been compromised or misused to perform reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or persistence, exceeding its intended scope of operation.
Detects successful authentication events by a service principal (e.g., an AI agent or automated application) that have been flagged by Azure AD Identity Protection as having anomalous risk characteristics, such as unfamiliar locations, unexpected travel patterns, or unfamiliar sign-in features.
Detects attempts to inject code into an AI agent orchestrator process by monitoring for suspicious CreateRemoteThread events. This rule is designed to identify potential process hijacking attacks by malicious actors seeking to bypass application-layer controls, while excluding common legitimate security monitoring tools that may exhibit similar behavior.
Detects anomalous behavior by an AI agent identity by monitoring for off-hours activity, significant statistical spikes in task invocation volumes compared to a 30-day baseline, or the execution of task categories not previously associated with that specific agent. Such behaviors may indicate account hijacking or unauthorized command injection.
Detects attempts to bypass AI agent safety guardrails by using obfuscated payloads (Base64/hex) or known jailbreak/roleplay trigger phrases. The rule specifically monitors sequences where an initial prompt is blocked by safety filters and is immediately followed by a structurally similar, potentially re-encoded prompt that is subsequently allowed, indicating an active filter evasion attempt.
Detects the execution of the Graphalgo RAT second-stage payload. The rule identifies the spawning of a detached 'go run .' process, which performs an ephemeral key exchange using a hardcoded public key before C2 establishment. It also correlates this activity with parent processes common in software build environments (npm, terraform, go) to differentiate malicious staging from developer activity.
This rule detects the suspicious use of signed Windows binaries (rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, mshta.exe, msiexec.exe) to execute remote content via URLs or scripts, or when triggered by common office applications and browsers. This behavior is often indicative of living-off-the-land (LotL) techniques used for download/execution of payloads or bypassing security controls.
Detects the use of legitimate Windows binaries (LOLBins) certutil.exe and bitsadmin.exe for suspicious activities such as downloading files via URL or decoding encoded files. This rule explicitly excludes known legitimate administrative activity originating from Microsoft Configuration Manager (SCCM).
Detects the execution of known Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBins) such as mshta, certutil, regsvr32, rundll32, and msiexec, where the command-line arguments contain suspicious patterns indicative of script execution or remote file fetching. These behaviors are consistent with T1218 (System Binary Proxy Execution) to bypass security controls by utilizing trusted, signed binaries to execute malicious code.
Detects the assignment of special, highly privileged rights (e.g., SeDebugPrivilege, SeImpersonatePrivilege) to standard user accounts using Windows Security Event ID 4672. This activity, without an associated new logon event, is a common indicator of access token manipulation or impersonation techniques (such as those used by tools like Incognito) to gain elevated system privileges.
Detects suspicious cross-process access patterns targeting trusted system processes (svchost.exe, explorer.exe, notepad.exe) by utilizing broad process access rights (such as PROCESS_VM_WRITE and PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD). This behavior is characteristic of process injection techniques like process hollowing, often employed by loaders and malware to execute code within the context of a legitimate process.
Detects the abuse of Windows signed binaries (LOLBins) rundll32.exe and regsvr32.exe for proxy execution. Rundll32.exe activity is monitored for the use of javascript: pseudo-protocol or comsvcs.dll for MiniDump operations, while regsvr32.exe activity is monitored for Squiblydoo-style remote scriptlet execution via /i:http and other suspicious flag combinations.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command-line arguments often used by adversaries for obfuscation, evasion, or in-memory code execution, such as encoded commands, hidden windows, and downloading external content.
Detects a single user account performing NTLM network logons (LogonType 3) to 3 or more distinct hosts within a short time period. This pattern is commonly associated with lateral movement techniques such as Pass-the-Hash, where an attacker uses compromised credentials to spread across a network.
This rule detects the use of native Windows utilities certutil.exe and bitsadmin.exe for potentially malicious purposes. Specifically, it flags certutil.exe being used for decoding or cached URL operations, and bitsadmin.exe being used to initiate file transfers from remote URLs or network paths. These tools are commonly abused by attackers for file staging, ingress tool transfer, and deobfuscation of malicious payloads.
Detects instances where a signed executable loads an unsigned, invalid, or revoked DLL that shares the same base filename, located outside of standard Windows system directories (System32, SysWOW64, WinSxS). This behavior is characteristic of DLL search-order hijacking and side-loading attacks often employed by loaders and malware such as Cobalt Strike.
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