Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
18,128 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
6,549
6,208
1,473
1,005
661
Contributors
3,555
2,652
2,153
2,087
1,515
Categories
7,572
3,901
1,465
1,393
1,330
Platforms
13,733
1,392
1,319
824
738
Products / Services
3,828
3,137
2,448
912
908
MITRE Techniques
18,128
15,653
12,600
8,411
6,235
CVEs
19
18
17
16
14
IDS Classtypes
305
51
24
23
22
IDS Protocols
308
136
13
10
10
Detects phishing messages that deliberately mix writing systems/scripts or use homoglyphs in the Subject line as ONE corroborating signal within a broader, multi-signal phishing pattern. This is the only translation that implements true sender-novelty checking via baseline lookups (a sending domain must be new to both the specific recipient and the organization as a whole to add risk). A weighted score (script-mixing=2, homoglyph=3, phishing vocabulary=2, sender-novelty=1, threshold=6) requires multiple corroborating signals before firing. Note: unlike the SPL/S1QL/CQL/CortexQL translations, this version does not strip brand/product tokens before the script check.
Detects phishing messages that deliberately mix writing systems/scripts/homoglyphs in the Subject line as ONE corroborating signal within a broader, multi-signal phishing pattern. Hardened against false positives: brand/product tokens (e.g. Microsoft, PayPal) are stripped before the Latin-script check so a lone brand mention in non-Latin correspondence doesn't count as mixed-script; a weighted score (script-mixing=2, homoglyph=3, high-confidence phishing vocabulary=2, threshold=6) means no two of the three signal categories can reach the threshold alone — all three must co-occur before the rule fires.
Detects phishing messages that deliberately mix writing systems/scripts/homoglyphs in the Subject line as ONE corroborating signal within a broader, multi-signal phishing pattern. Hardened against false positives: brand/product tokens (e.g. Microsoft, PayPal) are stripped before the Latin-script check so a lone brand mention in non-Latin correspondence doesn't count as mixed-script; a weighted score (script-mixing=2, homoglyph=3, high-confidence phishing vocabulary=2, threshold=6) means no two of the three signal categories can reach the threshold alone — all three must co-occur before the rule fires.
Detects phishing messages that deliberately mix writing systems/scripts/homoglyphs in the Subject line as ONE corroborating signal within a broader, multi-signal phishing pattern. Hardened against false positives: brand/product tokens (e.g. Microsoft, PayPal) are stripped before the Latin-script check so a lone brand mention in non-Latin correspondence doesn't count as mixed-script; a weighted score (script-mixing=2, homoglyph=3, high-confidence phishing vocabulary=2, threshold=6) means no two of the three signal categories can reach the threshold alone — all three must co-occur before the rule fires.
Detects an suspicious progression of activities originating from identified AI assistant/agent processes. The rule monitors for a chain of behaviors occurring within a 15-minute window: execution of an AI agent/tool, followed by host discovery (network/system enumeration), access to sensitive local credential files, archival of data, and outbound network communication to common file-sharing/exfiltration platforms.
Detects an suspicious progression of activities originating from identified AI assistant/agent processes. The rule monitors for a chain of behaviors occurring within a 15-minute window: execution of an AI agent/tool, followed by host discovery (network/system enumeration), access to sensitive local credential files, archival of data, and outbound network communication to common file-sharing/exfiltration platforms.
This rule detects potential AI prompt injection attacks delivered via email. It identifies users clicking external links directed at AI platforms (like OpenAI, Claude, or Perplexity) that contain suspicious URL parameters or instructions designed to manipulate or override the AI's standard behavior. It correlates the web request with a subsequent process execution on the host that includes suspicious keywords in the command line, suggesting an attempt to automate or exploit the AI assistant through local system interaction.
This rule detects potential AI prompt injection attacks delivered via email. It identifies users clicking external links directed at AI platforms (like OpenAI, Claude, or Perplexity) that contain suspicious URL parameters or instructions designed to manipulate or override the AI's standard behavior. It correlates the web request with a subsequent process execution on the host that includes suspicious keywords in the command line, suggesting an attempt to automate or exploit the AI assistant through local system interaction.
This rule detects potential AI prompt injection attacks delivered via email. It identifies users clicking external links directed at AI platforms (like OpenAI, Claude, or Perplexity) that contain suspicious URL parameters or instructions designed to manipulate or override the AI's standard behavior. It correlates the web request with a subsequent process execution on the host that includes suspicious keywords in the command line, suggesting an attempt to automate or exploit the AI assistant through local system interaction.
Detects the loading of a known malicious 7z.dll file within the 'Traiolx Custom Utils' directory. This behavior is indicative of DLL sideloading used by LegionLoader to achieve code execution under the guise of a legitimate application.
Detects the loading of a known malicious 7z.dll file within the 'Traiolx Custom Utils' directory. This behavior is indicative of DLL sideloading used by LegionLoader to achieve code execution under the guise of a legitimate application.
Detects the presence of a suspicious or known malicious 'Normaliz.dll' file located within the 'Traiolx Custom Utils' directory, indicative of a DLL sideloading attempt.
Detects instances where msiexec.exe, the Windows Installer utility, spawns cmd.exe to execute a batch file named 'xupdate.bat' located within the 'AppData\Roaming\Traiolx Custom Utils\' directory. This behavior is indicative of malicious persistence or execution mechanisms, often associated with loaders like LegionLoader that leverage installer binaries for evasion.
Detects the creation of temporary files with names starting with 'MSI' and ending in '.tmp' within the system's temporary directory. Legitimate installations typically perform these actions via the 'msiexec.exe' process; therefore, files created by other processes may indicate suspicious payload staging or activity by malware attempting to masquerade as MSI installer components.
Detects the creation of files with the .ent extension within the Microsoft Internet Explorer directory. This behavior is associated with the NarwhalRAT malware, which uses this specific file extension and location to store AES-encrypted configuration files, likely for persistence or subsequent execution by the malware.
Detects the execution of 'userscreen.exe' (a renamed pythonw.exe used by NarwhalRAT) loading 'user32.dll'. This behavior is associated with the use of ctypes in Python to perform window enumeration via EnumWindows, specifically used by the malware to identify and monitor KakaoTalk application windows.
This rule monitors for execution of suspicious files or processes and network communication associated with known malicious indicators (hashes, domains, and IP addresses) typically used by specific threat actors for command and control (C2) and payload delivery.
This rule detects the deletion of critical Windows Defender security files (such as drivers and executables) by the System process. This behavior is highly indicative of an attempt to tamper with or disable security features on a host.
Detects sign-in activity using the OAuth 2.0 device code flow, followed by subsequent authentication attempts from the same account originating from anomalous, previously unseen geographic locations or using unfamiliar applications. This pattern is indicative of a device code phishing attack where an adversary lures a user into authorizing a malicious device or application and subsequently hijacks the resulting session to access resources from a different location.
Detects the creation of a local user account and its subsequent addition to the local Administrators group via PowerShell cmdlets (New-LocalUser, Add-LocalGroupMember) triggered by the ConfigurationRemotingServer.exe process. This activity is indicative of abuse of the WinGet Desired State Configuration (DSC) 'Script' resource to establish persistent administrative access.
Detects the execution of the Python interpreter (pythonw.exe) renamed to 'codeflush.exe' residing in non-standard paths like '\Public\Music\MusicLibrariesPackage\'. This behavior is characteristic of adversaries attempting to camouflage malicious Python scripts or binaries as legitimate files to evade detection.
Page 62 of 864