Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects potential persistence attempts via registry modifications involving rundll32.exe. The rule monitors for two patterns: registry keys associated with shell commands for specific file types triggering rundll32.exe, and registry 'Run' keys using a 'Locked' value name with a custom URI handler, often indicative of malware or suspicious persistence mechanisms.
Detects mshta.exe spawning suspicious child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or reg.exe) that are characteristic of the ReverseRAT backdoor. The rule identifies common discovery commands or persistence attempts via Registry Run keys triggered from mshta.exe.
Detects instances where a user account registers a new Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) method (such as TOTP or Authenticator app) shortly (within 30 minutes) after a high-risk or potentially anomalous sign-in event. This pattern is commonly associated with adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing attacks where an attacker captures an authenticated session and uses it to enroll a secondary, attacker-controlled MFA device for persistent account access.
The following analytic identifies when an O365 email recipient receives and then deletes emails related to password or banking/payroll changes within a short period.
This behavior may indicate a compromised account where the threat actor is attempting to redirect the victims payroll to an attacker controlled bank account.
This behavior may indicate a compromised account where the threat actor is attempting to redirect the victims payroll to an attacker controlled bank account.
Detects coordinated usage of 'xattr' to manipulate the com.apple.quarantine attribute and 'chmod' to grant executable permissions on sensitive macOS system or library paths. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass Gatekeeper or bypass execution restrictions on malicious payloads placed in system directories.
Detects the presence of prompt-injection framing and malicious intent instructions within the first few lines of source code files. These strings are designed to deceive LLM-based SAST or code review tools into ignoring, misclassifying, or bypassing security analysis of malicious code.
This rule detects PowerShell commands that attempt to reassemble a Base64-encoded payload from multiple concatenated variable fragments. It specifically looks for patterns where filler characters ('*' or '?') are stripped from the payload before it is passed to the [Convert]::FromBase64String method. This technique is commonly used to evade static string analysis and signature-based detection.
Detects the Windows Character Map utility (charmap.exe) loading suspicious modules such as amsi.dll or clr.dll followed by a process execution involving PowerShell or an unidentified command string, which is indicative of DLL side-loading or process hollowing techniques for malicious code execution.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with encoded commands that explicitly perform base64 string decoding using 'FromBase64String'. This pattern is frequently used to obfuscate scripts or payloads, often seen in downloader stagers or malicious scripts to bypass security controls.
Detects execution of rundll32.exe from non-standard locations or utilizing specific exported DLL functions often associated with bypassing application whitelisting, executing scripts, or proxying malicious code execution.
This rule detects potential usage of Hidden VNC (hVNC) tools by monitoring for specific command-line arguments (such as 'hvnc-input', 'hvnc-desktop', or 'HVNC_Telegram') and Windows events related to the creation or switching of desktops (e.g., 'CreateDesktop', 'SwitchDesktop'). hVNC is a common technique used by malware to establish a hidden remote desktop session for unauthorized access and control without alerting the user.
Detects usage of the Windows certutil.exe utility with flags commonly used by adversaries to download files from remote URLs or decode base64 encoded files. These techniques are often utilized for ingress tool transfer or deobfuscating malicious payloads.
Detects instances where a trusted, system-protected executable loads a DLL file from a user-writable or temporary directory that is not digitally signed or has an invalid signature. This is a common indicator of DLL side-loading or DLL hijacking, where an adversary attempts to execute malicious code by placing a malicious DLL in a location searched by a legitimate process.
Detects the use of the BITSAdmin command-line utility to perform file downloads or add files to a transfer job. Adversaries may abuse the Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) for downloading malicious files while evading detection or maintaining persistence.
Detects instances where PowerShell scripts perform Base64-encoded operations related to cryptographic functions and shortly thereafter establish network connections to known or suspect domains associated with C2 activity.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command-line arguments (hidden window, no profile, encoded command) initiated by wscript.exe or mshta.exe. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to execute obfuscated malicious payloads while proxying the execution through legitimate Windows utilities.
Detects a sequence of events consistent with credential dumping of sensitive Windows registry hives (SAM, SYSTEM, SECURITY). The attack involves querying shadow copies using vssadmin, creating a symbolic link to the shadow copy volume via mklink, and copying the hive files from that location. Cleanup attempts using rmdir are also monitored.
This rule detects rundll32.exe executing a DLL from the ProgramData directory and subsequently establishing five or more outbound network connections to external IP addresses over non-standard ports (excluding 80 and 443) within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of a potential malware beaconing or data staging activity using a proxy binary to evade detection.
Detects a sequence of multiple process injection-related API calls (VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread) initiated by a process. This rule monitors for patterns indicating cross-process memory manipulation which is commonly used to inject malicious code into other processes. It specifically looks for API calls interacting with kernel32.dll and filters out known Microsoft security products.
Detects a dual persistence mechanism where an adversary establishes both an identically-named Registry Run key and a Scheduled Task, both masquerading as legitimate Canon or Stardock configuration software. These artifacts are configured to launch side-loaded host binaries (COTFileReadApp.exe or DeElevate64.exe) to maintain persistence on a Windows host.
Detects a loader module and a corresponding RIFF/WAVE file that utilizes steganography to conceal a secondary malicious payload. The loader extracts the payload from the WAV file using specific offsets and XOR decoding, then executes it in memory. This pattern is characteristic of a DLL sideloading chain involving WMPCL.dll and WPFLocalizeExtension.dll.
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