Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the use of the WinGet 'configure' command to process PowerShell DSC configuration files. This method can be abused to execute arbitrary PowerShell code within a Script resource without explicitly invoking powershell.exe, potentially bypassing certain monitoring or security controls focused solely on the PowerShell executable.
Detects HTTP and TLS activity associated with the DSCourier malware, specifically identifying attempts to retrieve configuration files disguised as common non-executable extensions (.jpg, .txt) or utilizing non-standard network ports like 8443, which are characteristic of this threat's command and control behavior.
Detects the download and subsequent extraction of the Python embeddable zip package to directories under 'C:\Users\Public'. This activity is consistent with techniques used by threat actors, such as APT37, to establish a covert Python runtime environment on a compromised host for further malicious operations.
Detects the use of Windows command shell variable substring expansion to obfuscate commands. Adversaries use this technique to build malicious command lines dynamically, making them less visible to standard keyword-based detection mechanisms by storing parts of strings in environment variables and reassembling them using substring notation (e.g., %var:~start,length%).
Detects the execution of the Windows ftp.exe binary using the -s parameter (or -s"": syntax) to execute a script file. This behavior is commonly associated with attackers using LOLBAS (Living Off the Land Binaries and Scripts) techniques to execute hidden or obfuscated scripts from mounted virtual hard disks (VHD) to facilitate malicious backdoor execution.
Detects the use of the Windows command shell 'copy' utility to concatenate separate files, such as 'header.doc' and 'body.doc', into an executable file named 'Windowsupdate.exe'. This technique is commonly used by adversaries to reassemble malicious payloads that were split to evade signature-based detection or bypass security controls.
Detects the execution of AutoIt3.exe or AutoIt-related scripts (.a3x, .au3) spawned by mshta.exe. MSHTA is a legitimate utility that can be abused to proxy the execution of malicious code, and in this context, it may be used to launch AutoIt scripts to evade security controls or execute payloads.
Detects potential Casbaneiro banking trojan activity characterized by a user accessing a known Latin American banking domain via a web browser, followed within 10 minutes by a suspicious process (RegSvcs.exe or mobsync.exe) establishing an outbound network connection, which is consistent with command-and-control (C2) behavior often seen in this malware family.
Detects memory allocation (VirtualAlloc/AllocateVirtualMemory) or protection (VirtualProtect/ProtectVirtualMemory) API calls performed with 'EXECUTE_READWRITE' permissions where the call stack is missing, unbacked, or contains unknown modules. This behavior is highly indicative of code injection techniques where an adversary attempts to execute shellcode or reflectively load a payload into memory while attempting to hide the origin of the execution.
Detects reflective or beacon-style in-memory process injection where an injection-type action occurs in a target process, but no corresponding file creation event is recorded by the initiating process. This behavior is indicative of fileless malware loaders or reflective COFF-based execution, commonly used in adversary techniques like BOF (Beacon Object File) execution to bypass static disk-based security controls.
Detects the use of PowerShell to remove the 'Zone.Identifier' NTFS Alternate Data Stream (ADS) from files. This stream is responsible for the 'Mark-of-the-Web' (MOTW) which triggers security warnings in Windows, including SmartScreen and Protected View. Adversaries use this technique to evade security controls on downloaded malicious files.
Detects malicious PowerShell command chains often used in ClickFix campaigns. These commands typically move zip files from the user's Downloads directory to a temporary folder, extract them using the tar utility, and execute an embedded PowerShell script using conhost in headless mode. This technique is designed to bypass AMSI command-line inspection by offloading the actual payload execution to an extracted, unmonitored script.
Detects the use of MSBuild.exe to compile and execute inline code or tasks. The rule identifies suspicious command-line patterns (such as Task/CodeTaskFactory), execution from non-standard directories (Temp, AppData, Downloads, etc.), and subsequent network or child process activity originating from these MSBuild instances, indicating potential defense evasion or code execution.
Detects the use of MSBuild.exe to compile and execute inline code or tasks. The rule identifies suspicious command-line patterns (such as Task/CodeTaskFactory), execution from non-standard directories (Temp, AppData, Downloads, etc.), and subsequent network or child process activity originating from these MSBuild instances, indicating potential defense evasion or code execution.
Detects the use of MSBuild.exe to compile and execute inline code or tasks. The rule identifies suspicious command-line patterns (such as Task/CodeTaskFactory), execution from non-standard directories (Temp, AppData, Downloads, etc.), and subsequent network or child process activity originating from these MSBuild instances, indicating potential defense evasion or code execution.
Detects the execution of control.exe or rundll32.exe with command line arguments pointing to .cpl files located in non-standard, user-writable directories such as Temp, AppData, Downloads, or Users/Public. This is a common technique used by adversaries to proxy execution of malicious payloads while bypassing standard path restrictions.
Detects execution of the Microsoft .NET utility InstallUtil.exe with command-line arguments typically used to execute arbitrary code or bypass application whitelisting. The rule monitors for common bypass switches such as /logfile, /LogToConsole=false, or /U, while filtering out executions from standard Windows directories to identify potential malicious usage of this signed binary proxy.
Detects the execution of Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe, which are trusted Windows .NET binaries, from non-standard or user-writable directories (such as Temp, AppData, Downloads, or User profiles). Adversaries often abuse these binaries to proxy the execution of arbitrary malicious code (DLLs) by bypassing application control policies.
Detects the execution of command-line sequences associated with the second stage of ClickFix-style malware (often linked to AMOS or fake-Xcode campaigns). This rule looks for the concatenation of hex decoding (xxd), AES decryption (openssl), decompression (gunzip), and subsequent evaluation (eval) of a shell variable, which is a signature pattern for decrypting and executing malicious payloads in memory.
Detects the loading or file presence of the malicious kernel driver 'Alinubx.sys' (formerly 'CcProtect.sys'), which is utilized by attackers for Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks to terminate security software processes from kernel mode.
This rule detects the presence and execution of known suspicious files (hashes provided) or specific malicious artifacts, such as 'hmn_hook.dll' being loaded, or the execution of binaries named 'auto.exe' and '78324.exe' associated with specific command-line arguments. It monitors file events, image loads, and process creation to identify potential malware activity.
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