Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects scenarios where a user registers a new WebAuthn/Passkey credential and subsequently performs a sign-in from a different network or device shortly after, preceded by a sign-in from a risky or non-passkey-based method. This pattern is often associated with credential abuse or MFA registration hijacking.
Detects Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management (PIM) activations for high-privileged roles (e.g., Global Administrator) that occur outside of defined business hours or are performed without an associated justification or ticket number. This helps identify potentially unauthorized or abnormal use of elevated privileges.
Detects a single user identity performing bulk destructive device actions (wipe, retire, remote lock, or delete) against multiple distinct devices within a short timeframe. This activity is indicative of potential unauthorized access and destructive intent, mirroring techniques observed in large-scale cloud-based identity compromise incidents.
Detects the use of PowerShell's Start-Sleep cmdlet with a duration of 3 minutes or longer within process command lines. This technique is commonly used by malware, such as ClickFix-style droppers, to bypass sandbox time-based analysis by delaying execution until the sandbox timeout period has elapsed.
Detects the execution of Windows Script Host (WScript.exe or CScript.exe) that creates a file or folder starting with 'Libs_' within the 'C:\Users\Public\' directory. This activity is often associated with attackers staging payloads, configuration files, or tools in publicly writable folders to evade detection.
This rule detects instances where Windows script hosts (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) create directories with suspicious naming conventions (starting with 'Libs_' or containing 'Temp Documents') within the 'C:\Users\Public\' directory. This activity is often associated with the staging of malicious payloads or collected data prior to exfiltration or execution.
Detects VBScript droppers that utilize excessive 'WScript.Sleep' delays to bypass sandbox analysis, often combined with error suppression and downloader APIs to execute malicious payloads.
Detects potential AI-targeted cloaking, a technique where a web server serves different content to AI crawlers versus human users, identified by comparing HTTP response sizes or hashes across session logs. The rule uses Microsoft Sentinel's ASIM Web Session schema to correlate web requests, identifying discrepancies that suggest malicious or evasive intent. Covers T1036 & T1027
Detects potential AI-targeted cloaking, a technique where a web server serves different content to AI crawlers versus human users, identified by comparing HTTP response sizes or hashes across session logs. The rule uses Microsoft Sentinel's ASIM Web Session schema to correlate web requests, identifying discrepancies that suggest malicious or evasive intent. Covers T1036 & T1027
Detects rapid, machine-speed, sequential attack-path adaptation by suspected AI agent binaries. The rule monitors for a correlation of four stages occurring within a tight 20-minute window: 1) Failed service connections across three or more distinct protocols (SMB, SSH, HTTP, RDP, WinRM), 2) Credential access attempts (Logon events or execution of known credential-dumping tools), and 3) A lateral movement pivot to a new, previously un-targeted internal destination. The rule specifically keys on the InitiatingProcessId and InitiatingProcessCreationTime to ensure the sequence is attributed to a single process instance, distinguishing it from human manual penetration testing activity. Covers T1190, T1210, T1078
Detects rapid, machine-speed, sequential attack-path adaptation by suspected AI agent binaries. The rule monitors for a correlation of four stages occurring within a tight 20-minute window: 1) Failed service connections across three or more distinct protocols (SMB, SSH, HTTP, RDP, WinRM), 2) Credential access attempts (Logon events or execution of known credential-dumping tools), and 3) A lateral movement pivot to a new, previously un-targeted internal destination. The rule specifically keys on the InitiatingProcessId and InitiatingProcessCreationTime to ensure the sequence is attributed to a single process instance, distinguishing it from human manual penetration testing activity. Covers T1190, T1210, T1078
Detects rapid, machine-speed, sequential attack-path adaptation by suspected AI agent binaries. The rule monitors for a correlation of four stages occurring within a tight 20-minute window: 1) Failed service connections across three or more distinct protocols (SMB, SSH, HTTP, RDP, WinRM), 2) Credential access attempts (Logon events or execution of known credential-dumping tools), and 3) A lateral movement pivot to a new, previously un-targeted internal destination. The rule specifically keys on the InitiatingProcessId and InitiatingProcessCreationTime to ensure the sequence is attributed to a single process instance, distinguishing it from human manual penetration testing activity. Covers T1190, T1210, T1078
Detects a potential ClickFix social engineering attack pattern where a user manually launches a script interpreter (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, mshta) from Windows Explorer followed within 30 minutes by the execution of 'rnpkeys.exe', a known indicator in installer side-load chains.
Detects the loading of 'tdwp.dll' in a process that has previously loaded 'rnp.dll', which is characteristic of the Sauron loader (also known as Remsec) in-memory decryption chain performed by the 'rnpkeys.exe' executable.
Detects a potential ClickFix social engineering attack pattern where a user manually launches a script interpreter (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, mshta) from Windows Explorer followed within 30 minutes by the execution of 'rnpkeys.exe', a known indicator in installer side-load chains.
Detects the creation of files named 'parser.js' or 'loader.js' within hidden or suspicious VSCode directories (e.g., .npm/.vscode/ or AppData/VSCode/). The detection also flags potential signs of malicious intent, such as the existence of a 'package.json' file nearby or the presence of 'tokenapp' in the file path, which are often indicative of the GHAPPIER implant behavior.
Detects the execution of rundll32.exe with a command line containing 'DavWWWRoot', indicating the loading of a DLL from a remote WebDAV share. This is a common technique used by attackers to execute remote malicious code while bypassing local execution policies or attempting to evade local file-based detection.
This rule identifies processes that delete themselves shortly after execution. It joins process creation events with file deletion events on the same device, filtering for cases where the initiating process file name, ID, and hash match the deleted file, and where the deletion occurs within 120 seconds of the process creation. This behavior is commonly associated with malware or adversary tools attempting to remove traces of their activity.
This rule detects the creation of multiple suspicious files within the \Windows\Temp\nb_ directory. The monitored filenames, such as 'agent.json', 'pk.der', 'sleepmask.o', and 'core.pak', are highly characteristic of post-exploitation toolkits, specifically those associated with beaconing, shellcode injection, or modular C2 agents. Detecting these files in temporary locations, especially when appearing in combination, strongly indicates potential adversary activity involving the staging and execution of malicious payloads.
This rule monitors for suspicious process behaviors and module loads, specifically focusing on unusual explorer.exe parentage, the loading of common system DLLs (dbghelp.dll, Secur32.dll) in potentially anomalous contexts, and specific command-line strings that may indicate malicious activity or tools.
Detects the PIVOTPIPE .NET loader, which identifies and extracts a 'core.pak' file containing the RAT payload. The loader performs XOR-decoding and GZIP-decompression to reflectively load the malicious payload into memory using .NET reflection methods, bypassing traditional file-based execution.
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