Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects anomalous sign-in patterns indicative of real-time MFA relay attacks, where a user principal authenticates successfully from multiple distinct IP addresses and geographical locations within a short time window (15 minutes), suggesting the active interception of credentials and MFA challenges by a Phishing-as-a-Service platform.
Detects anomalous sign-in patterns indicative of real-time MFA relay attacks, where a user principal authenticates successfully from multiple distinct IP addresses and geographical locations within a short time window (15 minutes), suggesting the active interception of credentials and MFA challenges by a Phishing-as-a-Service platform.
This rule detects a suspicious monetization pattern where a user account experiences a high-risk sign-in event, followed shortly (within 2 hours) by the creation or modification of inbox rules. This pattern is often indicative of account compromise, where an adversary configures mailbox rules (e.g., forwarding or redirection) to facilitate data exfiltration or financial fraud.
This rule detects a suspicious monetization pattern where a user account experiences a high-risk sign-in event, followed shortly (within 2 hours) by the creation or modification of inbox rules. This pattern is often indicative of account compromise, where an adversary configures mailbox rules (e.g., forwarding or redirection) to facilitate data exfiltration or financial fraud.
Detects a specific concealment behavior attributed to the 'com.corp.mdm' Android implant. The rule monitors for a sequence of events where the application disables its own launcher (main activity) to hide from the app drawer, immediately followed by the initiation of a foreground service that masquerades as a system notification ('Android System' title with 'System service running.' text).
Detects a specific concealment behavior attributed to the 'com.corp.mdm' Android implant. The rule monitors for a sequence of events where the application disables its own launcher (main activity) to hide from the app drawer, immediately followed by the initiation of a foreground service that masquerades as a system notification ('Android System' title with 'System service running.' text).
Detects a specific concealment behavior attributed to the 'com.corp.mdm' Android implant. The rule monitors for a sequence of events where the application disables its own launcher (main activity) to hide from the app drawer, immediately followed by the initiation of a foreground service that masquerades as a system notification ('Android System' title with 'System service running.' text).
Detects a specific concealment behavior attributed to the 'com.corp.mdm' Android implant. The rule monitors for a sequence of events where the application disables its own launcher (main activity) to hide from the app drawer, immediately followed by the initiation of a foreground service that masquerades as a system notification ('Android System' title with 'System service running.' text).
Detects the reflectively-loaded SectopRAT .NET payload by its combination of heavy calli (indirect call) opcode usage for control-flow flattening and its characteristic runtime string-decryption helper method used to resolve the C2 IP/port and other obfuscated strings
Detects the reflectively-loaded SectopRAT .NET payload by its combination of heavy calli (indirect call) opcode usage for control-flow flattening and its characteristic runtime string-decryption helper method used to resolve the C2 IP/port and other obfuscated strings
Detects the reflectively-loaded SectopRAT .NET payload by its combination of heavy calli (indirect call) opcode usage for control-flow flattening and its characteristic runtime string-decryption helper method used to resolve the C2 IP/port and other obfuscated strings
This rule detects potential SectopRAT loader activity by identifying non-.NET-native processes accessing 'pool.db' in the ProgramData directory followed by the immediate loading of .NET CLR libraries (clr.dll or mscoreei.dll). This pattern is indicative of reflective loading of a decrypted .NET payload into memory within a target process.
This rule detects potential SectopRAT loader activity by identifying non-.NET-native processes accessing 'pool.db' in the ProgramData directory followed by the immediate loading of .NET CLR libraries (clr.dll or mscoreei.dll). This pattern is indicative of reflective loading of a decrypted .NET payload into memory within a target process.
This rule detects potential SectopRAT loader activity by identifying non-.NET-native processes accessing 'pool.db' in the ProgramData directory followed by the immediate loading of .NET CLR libraries (clr.dll or mscoreei.dll). This pattern is indicative of reflective loading of a decrypted .NET payload into memory within a target process.
Detects potential activity related to the SectopRAT loader by monitoring the execution sequence of 'ReportDump.exe'. The rule identifies the side-loading of a specific DLL ('sdkcra.dll') followed by the process reading a known configuration or database file ('pool.db') within a short time window, which is indicative of the loader's secondary decryption phase.
Detects potential activity related to the SectopRAT loader by monitoring the execution sequence of 'ReportDump.exe'. The rule identifies the side-loading of a specific DLL ('sdkcra.dll') followed by the process reading a known configuration or database file ('pool.db') within a short time window, which is indicative of the loader's secondary decryption phase.
Detects potential activity related to the SectopRAT loader by monitoring the execution sequence of 'ReportDump.exe'. The rule identifies the side-loading of a specific DLL ('sdkcra.dll') followed by the process reading a known configuration or database file ('pool.db') within a short time window, which is indicative of the loader's secondary decryption phase.
Detects a specific execution sequence associated with the SectopRAT loader. The rule identifies a process named 'ReportDump.exe' reading a payload file 'Activation.Desktop.db' and subsequently loading 'stp_aim_x64_vc15.dll', which is known to trigger malicious shellcode via an exported function.
Detects a specific execution sequence associated with the SectopRAT loader. The rule identifies a process named 'ReportDump.exe' reading a payload file 'Activation.Desktop.db' and subsequently loading 'stp_aim_x64_vc15.dll', which is known to trigger malicious shellcode via an exported function.
Detects the use of the Windows command shell (cmd.exe) to execute a file deletion command following a forced delay using the 'choice' command. This technique is often used by adversaries to facilitate file deletion by introducing a pause, possibly to bypass file locks or to time execution during an intrusion.
Detects the suspicious loading of both 'FrameworkBase.dll' and 'sdkcra.dll' by the 'ReportDump.exe' process within a two-minute window. This behavior is often associated with the execution of specialized tools or potential post-exploitation activity where legitimate processes are abused to load specific modules.
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