Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects 32-bit Windows PE files packed with UPX that exhibit a zeroed compile timestamp, a characteristic often associated with staged SalatStealer or XenoRAT binaries observed in Operation CameraSwarm.
This rule monitors for execution of suspicious files or processes and network communication associated with known malicious indicators (hashes, domains, and IP addresses) typically used by specific threat actors for command and control (C2) and payload delivery.
Detects instances where an existing, non-interactive SSO session token is reused from a suspicious network location, such as an anonymizing proxy, VPN, or VPS, or triggered by an impossible travel risk event. The rule specifically looks for token usage that lacks a fresh interactive Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) challenge, a common indicator of session token hijacking or 'replay' attacks frequently used in cloud account takeover campaigns.
Detects MFA method resets, security info updates, or new authentication device registrations targeting privileged or administrator accounts in Azure AD/Entra ID audit logs. This activity is often indicative of social engineering campaigns, including AI-driven voice or video deepfake impersonation of employees contacting helpdesk support to gain unauthorized account access.
This rule detects the execution of cmd.exe or powershell.exe where the command line arguments involve the deletion or renaming of specific file names potentially associated with unauthorized activities or malware components. It looks for common command-line utilities (del, ren) being used by command shells on specific files that may indicate artifact cleanup or staging.
Detects Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) spawning common LOLBAS (Living Off the Land Binaries and Scripts) child processes. This behavior is a common indicator of macro-based malware or malicious document exploitation where Office applications are used to execute shell commands or scripts for payload delivery or execution.
Detects the creation of hard links using 'mklink /H' targeting specific paths in ProgramData or linking to specific executable paths in AppData. This behavior is often indicative of adversaries attempting to perform file system manipulation for persistence, defense evasion, or masquerading.
Detects a sequence of suspicious identity activities indicative of a post-account-takeover pivot. The rule identifies a user profile engaging in corporate VPN SAML SSO probing, triggering a MFA enrollment interrupt in Azure, and subsequently accessing multiple Microsoft 365 applications (Azure Portal, OfficeHome, SharePoint) within a 30-minute window.
Detects the execution of rundll32.exe with a command line referencing a DLL file stored in the C:\ProgramData directory. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to execute malicious code while masquerading as legitimate system activity, particularly when initiated by command shell or browser processes.
Detects a sequence of suspicious activities associated with credential dumping and inhibiting system recovery. The rule tracks when a user account executes multiple commands related to volume shadow copies (vssadmin, rmdir, mklink) or attempts to copy sensitive registry files (SAM, SYSTEM, SECURITY) within a 15-minute window on the same device.
Detects instances where a user successfully authenticates via the OAuth Device Code flow using an unmanaged or non-compliant device, followed closely by high-privileged Azure/Graph API administrative actions within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of a device-code phishing attack aimed at bypassing MFA controls, including FIDO2/passkeys, by compromising an active session.
This rule detects a multi-stage Business Email Compromise (BEC) attack involving executive impersonation via look-alike domains, followed by the creation of suspicious inbox rules (forwarding/deletion) by the victim, and concurrent external communication (Teams/Zoom meeting invites) from a newly created account. It correlates these activities to identify sophisticated payment fraud campaigns.
This rule detects potential 'Quishing' (QR code phishing) attempts by identifying email-based phishing detection or malicious URL indicators followed by a user clicking the URL and subsequently authenticating to a corporate system from a mobile device (Android or iOS) within a 30-minute window. This behavior often suggests an adversary successfully harvesting credentials via a QR code link and then using them to gain unauthorized access.
Detects the execution of files related to 'UBPPatch' or 'HTSPnew', specifically looking for PowerShell scripts (.psh) or executables (.exe) that match these potentially non-standard or obfuscated update/patch filenames. The rule also looks for command lines referencing 'Update.Lst', often associated with custom or unauthorized patch mechanisms.
Detects instances where a user successfully authenticates to a cloud service (Azure AD) from an unrecognized ASN, device, or country without performing MFA, followed shortly by high-risk actions such as mailbox rule creation, mass file downloads, or OAuth application registration. This pattern is indicative of session cookie theft or OAuth token replay used to bypass MFA.
Detects suspicious help-desk activity where a user password is reset by an administrator followed shortly by a new MFA factor being enrolled for that same user. This pattern is characteristic of Scattered Spider-style social engineering and vishing attacks to bypass MFA without deploying malware.
Detects suspicious help-desk activity where a user password is reset by an administrator followed shortly by a new MFA factor being enrolled for that same user. This pattern is characteristic of Scattered Spider-style social engineering and vishing attacks to bypass MFA without deploying malware.
Detects the invocation of the C# compiler (csc.exe) by PowerShell, where the command line includes specific references to .cmdline files. This pattern is commonly used in fileless execution techniques to compile and execute malicious code in memory after delivery.
Detects SVG image files that contain embedded HTML or script payloads, often used as an initial delivery vector to smuggle malicious code (such as downloaders or web redirects) into a target environment. This technique has been associated with the delivery of various remote access trojans (RATs).
Detects package publishing or version creation events on npm or PyPI that originate from non-CI/CD service accounts, suggesting the use of stolen registry authentication tokens by unauthorized entities to push malicious package versions.
Detects MSBuild.exe establishing a network connection to a specific remote IP address (212.34.141.103) on port 4521. This behavior is indicative of MSBuild being used to proxy execution of malicious code, often associated with downloading and executing second-stage payloads or beaconing to a command-and-control (C2) server.
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