Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential lateral movement via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) by identifying a single user account establishing RemoteInteractive (logon type 10) sessions to three or more distinct destination hosts within a 15-minute timeframe. This pattern is indicative of an attacker attempting to traverse a network from a compromised host.
Detects potential Pass-the-Hash (PtH) activity by monitoring for NTLM network logons (Logon Type 3) that are associated with a blank WorkstationName, often indicating spoofing. This pattern is correlated with the assignment of special privileges (EventID 4672) to capture scenarios where stolen NTLM hashes are replayed for lateral movement into a system.
This rule detects potential lateral movement by identifying a single user account authenticating to three or more distinct hosts using NTLM via network (LogonType 3) or impersonation (LogonType 9) logons, which is characteristic of credential-based movement across a network.
Detects NTLM authentication attempts targeting administrative network shares (ADMIN$ or C$) over the SMB protocol. This behavior is a common indicator of lateral movement techniques such as Pass-the-Hash, where an adversary uses captured NTLM hashes to authenticate to remote systems.
Detects instances where a single Kerberos logon session (TargetLogonId) is utilized to authenticate from multiple distinct source hosts or IP addresses within a one-hour window. This behavior is inconsistent with normal Kerberos authentication patterns and is a strong indicator of Pass-the-Ticket (PtT) activity, commonly associated with tools like Mimikatz or Rubeus where a stolen ticket is injected into multiple sessions or systems.
Detects the spawning of cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or powershell_ise.exe by the WMI Provider Host (wmiprvse.exe). This pattern is frequently used for fileless lateral movement, as threat actors leverage WMI (Win32_Process.Create) to execute remote commands which manifests as wmiprvse.exe launching a shell on the target host.
Detects instances where a single Kerberos logon session (TargetLogonId) is utilized to authenticate from multiple distinct source hosts or IP addresses within a one-hour window. This behavior is inconsistent with normal Kerberos authentication patterns and is a strong indicator of Pass-the-Ticket (PtT) activity, commonly associated with tools like Mimikatz or Rubeus where a stolen ticket is injected into multiple sessions or systems.
This rule monitors for two indicators of potentially malicious WinRM activity: first, the execution of suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, rundll32.exe, certutil.exe) originating from the Windows Remote Management host process (wsmprovhost.exe); and second, a 'fan-out' pattern where a single account establishes WinRM/PSRemoting sessions on three or more distinct hosts within a short time window, which is often indicative of automated lateral movement or credential abuse.
Detects instances where a single Kerberos logon session (TargetLogonId) is utilized to authenticate from multiple distinct source hosts or IP addresses within a one-hour window. This behavior is inconsistent with normal Kerberos authentication patterns and is a strong indicator of Pass-the-Ticket (PtT) activity, commonly associated with tools like Mimikatz or Rubeus where a stolen ticket is injected into multiple sessions or systems.
This rule monitors for two indicators of potentially malicious WinRM activity: first, the execution of suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, rundll32.exe, certutil.exe) originating from the Windows Remote Management host process (wsmprovhost.exe); and second, a 'fan-out' pattern where a single account establishes WinRM/PSRemoting sessions on three or more distinct hosts within a short time window, which is often indicative of automated lateral movement or credential abuse.
Detects lateral movement (SMB, RDP, WinRM) performed by a host within 5 minutes of communicating with specific commercial LLM APIs. This rule targets behaviors indicative of automated lateral movement driven by an LLM-based C2, excluding common administrative tools, standard business hours, and frequently used processes.
Detects potential lateral movement or pivot attempts by correlating repeated failed RDP logons (RemoteInteractive) against sensitive targets (Domain Controllers, File Servers, Backup Servers) with concurrent security tool blocks (e.g., Microsoft Defender Antivirus, Exploit Guard) on the originating beachhead device within a 4-hour window.
Detects instances where a single Kerberos logon session (TargetLogonId) is utilized to authenticate from multiple distinct source hosts or IP addresses within a one-hour window. This behavior is inconsistent with normal Kerberos authentication patterns and is a strong indicator of Pass-the-Ticket (PtT) activity, commonly associated with tools like Mimikatz or Rubeus where a stolen ticket is injected into multiple sessions or systems.
This rule monitors for two indicators of potentially malicious WinRM activity: first, the execution of suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, rundll32.exe, certutil.exe) originating from the Windows Remote Management host process (wsmprovhost.exe); and second, a 'fan-out' pattern where a single account establishes WinRM/PSRemoting sessions on three or more distinct hosts within a short time window, which is often indicative of automated lateral movement or credential abuse.
Detects lateral movement (SMB, RDP, WinRM) performed by a host within 5 minutes of communicating with specific commercial LLM APIs. This rule targets behaviors indicative of automated lateral movement driven by an LLM-based C2, excluding common administrative tools, standard business hours, and frequently used processes.
Detects a suspicious sequence where a Python process is spawned by a 'marimo' notebook process, followed immediately by an outbound SSH connection attempt from the same device. This pattern is indicative of automated or scripted lateral movement where a notebook environment is abused as a jump-point for command execution on remote systems.
This rule monitors for two indicators of potentially malicious WinRM activity: first, the execution of suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, rundll32.exe, certutil.exe) originating from the Windows Remote Management host process (wsmprovhost.exe); and second, a 'fan-out' pattern where a single account establishes WinRM/PSRemoting sessions on three or more distinct hosts within a short time window, which is often indicative of automated lateral movement or credential abuse.
Detects the use of the Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line (WMIC) utility to initiate process creation on remote hosts. This is achieved by combining the '/node:' flag (to specify a remote target) with the 'process call create' command. This technique is frequently utilized by adversaries and ransomware operators for lateral movement across a Windows network.
Detects lateral movement (SMB, RDP, WinRM) performed by a host within 5 minutes of communicating with specific commercial LLM APIs. This rule targets behaviors indicative of automated lateral movement driven by an LLM-based C2, excluding common administrative tools, standard business hours, and frequently used processes.
Detects lateral movement (SMB, RDP, WinRM) performed by a host within 5 minutes of communicating with specific commercial LLM APIs. This rule targets behaviors indicative of automated lateral movement driven by an LLM-based C2, excluding common administrative tools, standard business hours, and frequently used processes.
Detects lateral movement (SMB, RDP, WinRM) performed by a host within 5 minutes of communicating with specific commercial LLM APIs. This rule targets behaviors indicative of automated lateral movement driven by an LLM-based C2, excluding common administrative tools, standard business hours, and frequently used processes.
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