Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects unauthorized access to Windows camera or microphone consent store registry keys by either a suspected Kothamine agent masquerading as 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe' or an injected 'explorer.exe'. The rule correlates these registry access events with the presence of specific Kothamine-related file artifacts (MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll and tailcat.exe) on the same host within a 24-hour window to minimize noise.
Detects unauthorized access to Windows camera or microphone consent store registry keys by either a suspected Kothamine agent masquerading as 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe' or an injected 'explorer.exe'. The rule correlates these registry access events with the presence of specific Kothamine-related file artifacts (MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll and tailcat.exe) on the same host within a 24-hour window to minimize noise.
Detects unauthorized access to Windows camera or microphone consent store registry keys by either a suspected Kothamine agent masquerading as 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe' or an injected 'explorer.exe'. The rule correlates these registry access events with the presence of specific Kothamine-related file artifacts (MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll and tailcat.exe) on the same host within a 24-hour window to minimize noise.
Detects an exploitation chain in RouterOS where an attacker triggers an SSH rekey before authentication completes, forcing the SSH server into a post-authentication state. This allows the attacker to execute arbitrary commands over an unauthenticated channel, leading to unauthorized creation, modification, or reconstruction of sensitive system and configuration files.
Detects repeated file creation or modification events involving the specific file 'bot_log.txt' in directory paths containing '\Temp\' on endpoints where 'msedge_proxy.exe' is also running. This pattern is indicative of potential data staging or logging activities by an unauthorized proxy or tunnel process.
This rule detects a multi-stage Business Email Compromise (BEC) attack involving executive impersonation via look-alike domains, followed by the creation of suspicious inbox rules (forwarding/deletion) by the victim, and concurrent external communication (Teams/Zoom meeting invites) from a newly created account. It correlates these activities to identify sophisticated payment fraud campaigns.
Detects unauthorized data staging activities using archival utilities followed by data exfiltration to known public cloud storage providers. The rule specifically excludes hosts experiencing mass file renaming activity, focusing on extortion-only scenarios where data is stolen without encryption.
Detects potential browser-based infostealer activity where a non-standard process, launched from temporary or user-download directories, accesses sensitive browser data files (cookies, login data) followed by a suspicious outbound network connection to a previously unseen domain, matching common patterns for LummaStealer or Vidar malware.
Detects a sequence of activity indicative of data exfiltration preparation. This rule identifies the creation of multiple large archive files (.zip, .rar, .7z) in temporary or staging directories on an endpoint, followed by a network connection transferring a significant volume of data to an external, non-private IP address within a 30-minute window.
Detects unauthorized access to unauthenticated Docker registry API endpoints on port 5000. This rule identifies catalog enumeration and the pulling of malicious container images associated with the CARBONATO botnet, including the retrieval of image manifests and configuration files that expose sensitive environment variables and credentials.
Detects network activity associated with the RatHat Android malware, specifically identifying C2 data exfiltration API calls over FRP (FRP/Go Agent) tunnels and WebSocket handshake traffic for command-and-control communication.
Detects the use of the 'getevent' utility on Android/Linux systems to monitor and capture raw input events from '/dev/input'. This technique is often used by mobile malware to perform keylogging by intercepting touch or physical keystroke event streams, bypassing standard application-level input handling.
This rule detects potential staging activity for ClickFix or Vidar malware campaigns. It identifies the creation of files or folders in directories mimicking Windows Diagnostics infrastructure (WDI) or known payload paths, correlated with the execution of suspicious PowerShell commands or archive-related utilities within a 30-minute window on the same device.
Detects the ChainScript RAT agent (executing as node.exe from specific masquerading directory paths) scanning for and enumerating cryptocurrency wallet files, browser-stored wallet extensions, and related sensitive configuration data.
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to read or copy sensitive browser data files (e.g., Cookies, Login Data, Local Storage) often targeted by info-stealing malware such as Vidar, LummaC2, or RedLine. The rule filters out legitimate browser-related processes and adds security context by requiring evidence of unsigned code, execution from suspicious locations (Temp/Downloads), or associated outbound network activity to reduce false positives.
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to read or copy sensitive browser data files (e.g., Cookies, Login Data, Local Storage) often targeted by info-stealing malware such as Vidar, LummaC2, or RedLine. The rule filters out legitimate browser-related processes and adds security context by requiring evidence of unsigned code, execution from suspicious locations (Temp/Downloads), or associated outbound network activity to reduce false positives.
Detects automated mailbox monitoring (mailbox access cadence) followed by searches for sensitive finance-related keywords (e.g., invoice, payment, wire, ACH). This pattern is characteristic of a 'Box Monitor' or 'Inbox Monitor' actor, which maintains persistence via API polling to exfiltrate financial information from a compromised account.
Detects evidence of account persistence and potential mailbox manipulation following an anomalous sign-in event in Google Workspace. The rule identifies suspicious post-compromise activity such as the addition of new MFA methods, new OAuth application grants, or mailbox forwarding/inbox rules, which are consistent with the reuse of captured authenticated sessions.
Detects the behavior of LunexStealer targeting cryptocurrency wallets. The rule monitors for the enumeration of known crypto wallet files and browser-stored extension data, followed closely by the creation of a 'wallet.zip' archive by the same process, which is indicative of staged data collection for exfiltration.
Detects the behavior of LunexStealer targeting cryptocurrency wallets. The rule monitors for the enumeration of known crypto wallet files and browser-stored extension data, followed closely by the creation of a 'wallet.zip' archive by the same process, which is indicative of staged data collection for exfiltration.
Detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) activity by identifying a successful interactive MFA-protected sign-in followed within 15 minutes by a non-interactive (refresh token) sign-in for the same user from a different IP address, ASN, or User-Agent. This pattern is indicative of session hijacking where an attacker reuses a stolen session token.
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