Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Hacktool Ruler
Sigma
This events that are generated when using the hacktool Ruler by Sensepost
Detects chromium based browsers starting in headless and debugging mode and pointing to a user profile. This could be a sign of data stealing or remote control
Detects execution of renamed Remote Utilities (RURAT) via Product PE header field
Detects early-stage collection and reconnaissance activities targeting sensitive email data prior to exfiltration via Exchange cmdlets. This rule identifies the use of 'New-MailboxSearch' and 'Get-Recipient' cmdlets, which can be leveraged by adversaries to discover and collect email-related information. Detection covers both endpoint PowerShell execution and cloud audit logs for Microsoft Exchange Online.
Detects when the Notepad++ updater (gup.exe) makes DNS queries to domains that are not part of the known legitimate update infrastructure.
This could indicate potential exploitation of the updater mechanism or suspicious network activity that warrants further investigation.
This could indicate potential exploitation of the updater mechanism or suspicious network activity that warrants further investigation.
This rule detects unauthorized or suspicious direct access to sensitive SAP tables (such as USR02, which contains user credentials) when initiated specifically via an RFC (Remote Function Call) logon connection. This helps identify potential data exfiltration attempts or unauthorized reconnaissance of sensitive SAP security data.
Detects the use of the macOS native ditto command to compress files and directories into a .zip archive. This technique is frequently used by macOS stealers, such as Miolab and AMOS, to quietly stage collected sensitive documents (PDFs, TXTs, RTFs) and profile data before exfiltrating it to a remote command-and-control server, avoiding the need to drop noisy third-party archiving tools.
Detects direct access to highly sensitive SAP tables (USR02, PAYR, P0002) via RFC logon. This specifically monitors for potential theft of user hashes (USR02), payroll data (PAYR), or personal employee information (P0002).
Detects when the Notepad++ updater (gup.exe) creates files in suspicious or uncommon locations.
This could indicate potential exploitation of the updater component to deliver unwanted malware or unwarranted files.
This could indicate potential exploitation of the updater component to deliver unwanted malware or unwarranted files.
This rule detects emails that contain keywords related to 'civil id' in English or Arabic and subsequently extract potential Civil ID numbers from the email body. It then validates the extracted numbers based on birth month and day, and categorizes the risk level based on sender's domain and attachment count. This could indicate data exfiltration or sensitive information exposure.
Detects indicators of the TeamPCP LiteLLM supply chain compromise. This includes the creation or modification of specific malicious files (litellm_init.pth, tpcp.tar.gz, sysmon.py, sysmon.service), execution of commands related to persistence (systemctl for sysmon.service), data archiving (tar for tpcp.tar.gz), or direct execution of the backdoor (sysmon.py). It also identifies network connections or DNS queries to known command and control (C2) domains (models.litellm.cloud, checkmarx.zone) and HTTP requests to checkmarx.zone. Furthermore, the rule detects unauthorized AWS API calls (ListSecrets, GetSecretValue, DescribeParameters) made using the 'python-urllib' user agent, which is indicative of custom scripting rather than standard boto3 usage.
This rule detects a multi-stage exfiltration technique observed on macOS systems, specifically targeting the AMOS malware. It correlates process execution events related to archiving (using 'ditto'), splitting files (using 'split'), and network connections involving 'curl' with specific headers or to known malicious infrastructure. The rule looks for a combination of these activities, indicating data staging and subsequent exfiltration in chunks.
AI is becoming a key part of detection and response, but it’s important not to overlook simpler techniques that are still effective.
In this article, I share a practical example of how Powershell clipboard commands can be abused, based on a real scenario. It covers how basic activities related to Get/Set-Clipboard can be leveraged in ways that may go unnoticed.
The following KQL (which can be configured as Detection Rule) help s to identify this type of activity in your environment.
In this article, I share a practical example of how Powershell clipboard commands can be abused, based on a real scenario. It covers how basic activities related to Get/Set-Clipboard can be leveraged in ways that may go unnoticed.
The following KQL (which can be configured as Detection Rule) help s to identify this type of activity in your environment.
This rule detects activities associated with the 'CTRL' Russian .Net access framework. It looks for a combination of a hidden PowerShell stager, UAC bypass attempts via registry modification (ms-settings), and the launch of fodhelper.exe. Additionally, it requires the presence of at least one of the following: disguised registry payload storage, FRP configuration file staging, keylogger artifact creation, named pipe creation ('ctrlPipe'), RDP tampering artifacts, or PowerShell commands related to Windows Defender exclusion changes.
Detects information stealer malware with encrypted configuration parsing
Detects information stealer malware with encrypted configuration parsing
Detects significant file creation in 'C:\ProgramData\data\' used by The Gentlemen as a staging area for data consolidation before exfiltration via rclone or WinSCP SFTP connections.
Detects the creation of specific log files (`ldapd*.1.gz`, `ldapd*.2.gz`) in the `/var/log/` directory. This behavior is indicative of the UNC3886 threat actor utilizing backdoored SSH clients and daemons to harvest and store XOR-encrypted credentials.
Detects the specific OpenSSL command line arguments used by TeamPCP to encrypt stolen credentials before exfiltration. This rule looks for executions of 'openssl' with AES-256 encryption flags ('enc -aes-256-cbc' or 'enc -aes-256') and the use of a file to pass the encryption password ('-pass file:').
Detects the creation or manipulation of the specific archive file (tpcp.tar.gz) used by TeamPCP to bundle stolen credentials. This rule monitors command line activity, cloud process execution, and file system events for references to 'tpcp.tar.gz'.
Detects ShadowSniff info-stealer based on strings, PDB path, and behavioral indicators.
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