Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects suspicious manipulations of default accounts such as 'administrator' and 'guest'. For example 'enable' or 'disable' accounts or change the password...etc
Detects the enabling of the Windows Recall feature via registry manipulation. Windows Recall can be enabled by deleting the existing "DisableAIDataAnalysis" registry value.
Adversaries may enable Windows Recall as part of post-exploitation discovery and collection activities.
This rule assumes that Recall is already explicitly disabled on the host, and subsequently enabled by the adversary.
Adversaries may enable Windows Recall as part of post-exploitation discovery and collection activities.
This rule assumes that Recall is already explicitly disabled on the host, and subsequently enabled by the adversary.
'This hunting query looks for new Service Principals running queries that have not previously been seen running queries.'
Detects the enabling of the "EnablePeriodicBackup" registry value. Once enabled, The OS will backup System registry hives on restarts to the "C:\Windows\System32\config\RegBack" folder. Windows creates a "RegIdleBackup" task to manage subsequent backups.
Registry backup was a default behavior on Windows and was disabled as of "Windows 10, version 1803".
Registry backup was a default behavior on Windows and was disabled as of "Windows 10, version 1803".
Detects the enabling of the Windows Recall feature via registry manipulation. Windows Recall can be enabled by setting the value of "DisableAIDataAnalysis" to "0".
Adversaries may enable Windows Recall as part of post-exploitation discovery and collection activities.
This rule assumes that Recall is already explicitly disabled on the host, and subsequently enabled by the adversary.
Adversaries may enable Windows Recall as part of post-exploitation discovery and collection activities.
This rule assumes that Recall is already explicitly disabled on the host, and subsequently enabled by the adversary.
Detects processes loading "System.Drawing.ni.dll". This could be an indicator of potential Screen Capture.
StrRAT is a Java-based remote access tool which steals browser credentials, logs keystrokes and take remote control of infected systems. It also has a module to download additional payload onto to the infected machine based on C2 server command. Additionally, this threat also has a ransomware encryption/decryption module which appends .crimson extension.
This query can be used to detect instances of a malicious insider creating a file archive and then emailing that archive to an external "competitor" organization.
'This hunting query looks for clients running queries that have not previously been seen running queries.'
Original Sigma Rule: https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/master/rules/apt/apt_judgement_panda_gtr19.yml.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
Action "PnpDeviceConnected" reports the connection of any plug and play device.
Read more online on event 6416: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-6416.
Query #1: look for rare one-time devices connected to a specific machine.
Read more online on event 6416: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-6416.
Query #1: look for rare one-time devices connected to a specific machine.
'This hunting query uses Application events from the "MSSQL$MICROSOFT##WID" provider to collect SQL statements run against an AD FS database (e.g Windows Internal Database (WID)).
A threat actor might want to extract the AD FS data configuration settings with a SQL statement or modify it with an UPDATE SQL statement.
In order to use this query you need to create a server audit and database audit specification on your AD FS database.
Reference: https://github.com/Azure/SimuLand/blob/main/3_simulate_detect/credential-access/exportADFSTokenSigningCertificate.md
Reference: https://o365blog.com/post/adfs/
'
A threat actor might want to extract the AD FS data configuration settings with a SQL statement or modify it with an UPDATE SQL statement.
In order to use this query you need to create a server audit and database audit specification on your AD FS database.
Reference: https://github.com/Azure/SimuLand/blob/main/3_simulate_detect/credential-access/exportADFSTokenSigningCertificate.md
Reference: https://o365blog.com/post/adfs/
'
'Under specific circumstances, executing KQL queries can exfiltrate information like access tokens, regarding external data functions like adx().
This query tries to list executed KQL queries that used the adx() function and where an access token might have been exposed to.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/azure-monitor/logs/azure-monitor-data-explorer-proxy
Ref: https://securecloud.blog/2022/04/27/azure-monitor-malicious-kql-query/'
This query tries to list executed KQL queries that used the adx() function and where an access token might have been exposed to.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/azure-monitor/logs/azure-monitor-data-explorer-proxy
Ref: https://securecloud.blog/2022/04/27/azure-monitor-malicious-kql-query/'
Hunting for credential phishing using the "Referral" infrastructure using Defender for Office 365 data
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Motivated miners.
Doublepulsar is a backdoor developed by the National Security Agency (NSA). First disclosed in 2017, it is now used by many malicious actors. Software patches are available.
The following query detects activity broadly associated with campaigns that use DoublePulsar to exploit web servers.
See Detect DoublePulsar execution for a query that detects possible DoublePulsar execution events.
References:
https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/DoublePulsar&threatId=-2147239036
https://www.scmagazine.com/home/security-news/cybercrime/doublepulsar-malware-spreading-rapidly-in-the-wild-following-shadow-brokers-dump/
https://support.microsoft.com/help/4013389/title
Doublepulsar is a backdoor developed by the National Security Agency (NSA). First disclosed in 2017, it is now used by many malicious actors. Software patches are available.
The following query detects activity broadly associated with campaigns that use DoublePulsar to exploit web servers.
See Detect DoublePulsar execution for a query that detects possible DoublePulsar execution events.
References:
https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/DoublePulsar&threatId=-2147239036
https://www.scmagazine.com/home/security-news/cybercrime/doublepulsar-malware-spreading-rapidly-in-the-wild-following-shadow-brokers-dump/
https://support.microsoft.com/help/4013389/title
Intent:
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
Detects the execution of the hdiutil utility in order to mount disk images.
This query correlates Microsoft Defender for Office 365 signals and Microsoft Entra ID identity data to find the relevant endpoint event BrowerLaunchedToOpen in Microsoft Defender ATP.
This event reflects relevant clicks on the malicious URL in the spear-phishing email recognized by Microsoft Defender for Office 365.
This event reflects relevant clicks on the malicious URL in the spear-phishing email recognized by Microsoft Defender for Office 365.
'This hunting query looks for increases in the number of workspaces queried by a user.'
This query monitors for users running Log Analytics queries that contain filters for specific, defined VIP user accounts or the VIPUser watchlist template.
Use this detection to alert for users specifically searching for activity of sensitive users.
Use this detection to alert for users specifically searching for activity of sensitive users.
Detects usage of "rar" to add files to an archive for potential compression. An adversary may compress data (e.g. sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network.
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