Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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In this query, we are looking for emails containing malware attachment sent by an internal sender
Intent:
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
Use this query to find email stealing activities ran by Qakbot that will use "ping.exe -t 127.0.0.1" to obfuscate subsequent actions.
Email theft that occurs might be exfiltrated to operators and indicates that the malware completed a large portion of its automated activity without interruption.
Email theft that occurs might be exfiltrated to operators and indicates that the malware completed a large portion of its automated activity without interruption.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Trickbot: Pervasive & underestimated.
Trickbot is a very prevalent piece of malware with an array of malicious capabilities. Originally designed to steal banking credentials, it has since evolved into a modular trojan that can deploy other malware, disable security software, and perform command and control (C2) operations.
Trickbot operators are known to use the legitimate Windows process rundll.exe to perform malicious activities, such as reconnaissance. Once a target is infected, the operator will drop a batch file that runs several commands and connects to a C2 server for further action.
The following query detects suspicious rundll.exe activity associated with Trickbot campaigns.
See Office applications launching wscript.exe to run JScript for another query related to Trickbot activity.
Reference - https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266/
Trickbot is a very prevalent piece of malware with an array of malicious capabilities. Originally designed to steal banking credentials, it has since evolved into a modular trojan that can deploy other malware, disable security software, and perform command and control (C2) operations.
Trickbot operators are known to use the legitimate Windows process rundll.exe to perform malicious activities, such as reconnaissance. Once a target is infected, the operator will drop a batch file that runs several commands and connects to a C2 server for further action.
The following query detects suspicious rundll.exe activity associated with Trickbot campaigns.
See Office applications launching wscript.exe to run JScript for another query related to Trickbot activity.
Reference - https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266/
This rule detects rare audio devices used in Zoom meetings by analyzing Zoom logs. It specifically looks for speaker devices that are not commonly observed (e.g., not iPhone, FaceTime, AirPods, or MacBook built-in devices). The intent is to identify unusual device usage that could be indicative of Remote Employment Fraud (REF), where actors might use atypical setups. The rule uses a 'rare' command to find the top 50 least frequent speaker devices after filtering out common ones.
This rule detects rare video devices used during Zoom meetings. The intent is to identify unusual device information that might be associated with actors performing Remote Employment Fraud (REF). The rule filters out common devices like iPhones, FaceTimes, AirPods, and MacBooks to focus on less common camera, speaker, and microphone devices. Detecting this activity requires careful analysis, regular review, and a thorough understanding of the audio and video devices commonly used within an environment.
Show usb mounted and files copied
This rule detects rare input devices (microphones) used during Zoom meetings. It specifically looks for microphone devices that are not commonly observed, while excluding typical devices like iPhones, FaceTimes, AirPods, and MacBooks. The primary goal is to identify unusual device usage that could be indicative of Remote Employment Fraud (REF), where actors might use non-standard equipment. This is a hunting query designed to flag anomalies for further investigation.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Qakbot blight lingers, seeds ransomware
Qakbot is malware that steals login credentials from banking and financial services. It has been deployed against small businesses as well as major corporations. Some outbreaks have involved targeted ransomware campaigns that use a similar set of techniques. Links to related queries are listed under See also.
The following query detects attempts to access files in the local path that contain Outlook emails.
Reference - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/11/06/mitigating-and-eliminating-info-stealing-qakbot-and-emotet-in-corporate-networks/
Qakbot is malware that steals login credentials from banking and financial services. It has been deployed against small businesses as well as major corporations. Some outbreaks have involved targeted ransomware campaigns that use a similar set of techniques. Links to related queries are listed under See also.
The following query detects attempts to access files in the local path that contain Outlook emails.
Reference - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/11/06/mitigating-and-eliminating-info-stealing-qakbot-and-emotet-in-corporate-networks/
Show usb mounted devices and drive letters
This YARA rule detects the Skuld infostealer by identifying specific byte patterns associated with its functionalities. These functionalities include retrieving the MAC address of the infected system, enumerating files (likely for data collection), taking screenshots, and specifically targeting Discord backup codes. The rule looks for a combination of these distinct code patterns within a PE file (indicated by the MZ header).
List all PnP Devices that have been allowed or blocked
Find all alert evidence for a single endpoint. This is handy for exporting to a third-party SIEM.
The following analytic identifies user sessions in Office 365 accessed from multiple IP addresses, indicating potential adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing attacks. It detects this activity by analyzing Azure Active Directory logs for 'UserLoggedIn' operations and flags sessions with more than one associated IP address. This behavior is significant as it suggests unauthorized concurrent access, which is uncommon in normal usage. If confirmed malicious, the impact could include data theft, account takeover, and the launching of internal phishing campaigns, posing severe risks to organizational security.
Detects attempts to record audio using the `arecord` and `ecasound` utilities on Linux systems. This rule specifically looks for the execution of `arecord` with common audio recording flags (`-vv`, `-fdat`) or the `ecasound` utility making a `memfd_create` syscall, which could indicate audio processing or recording.
Count of all Senders and where they were delivered
This rule detects suspicious command-line executions on Windows systems, as identified in a CISA 'Living off the Land' report. The rule looks for specific patterns in process command lines that, while potentially benign in isolation, could indicate reconnaissance, lateral movement, or data staging activities when observed in concert. Examples include the use of 7-Zip for archiving with a password, specific `pcwrun.exe` or `rar.exe` commands, `ping` commands with unusual parameters or output redirection, `dir` commands targeting network shares, `wmic` commands for process creation or `whoami` execution, `net use` commands for IPC shares, `xcopy` for data movement, and PowerShell commands to launch hidden batch files.
The analytic detects the usage of a renamed 7-Zip executable using Sysmon data. It leverages the OriginalFileName field to identify instances where the 7-Zip process has been renamed. This activity is significant as attackers often rename legitimate tools to evade detection while staging or exfiltrating data. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate data exfiltration attempts or other unauthorized data manipulation, potentially leading to significant data breaches or loss of sensitive information. Analysts should validate the legitimacy of the 7-Zip executable and investigate parallel processes for further suspicious activities.
Detects the execution of the "pbpaste" utility on macOS. This utility retrieves the contents of the clipboard and writes them to standard output. Attackers can abuse this utility to collect sensitive data, such as passwords or other confidential information, from the user's clipboard. The rule is designed to hunt for potential malicious use of pbpaste by examining the parent process and command-line arguments for suspicious activity.
Detects file access requests to Windows Outlook Mail data files by uncommon processes. This could indicate a potential attempt to steal credentials or sensitive information from Outlook mailboxes. The rule requires significant baselining to reduce false positives.
Detects the creation of a file with the ".pdf" extension by the "RegEdit.exe" process. This indicates that a user is trying to print/save a registry key as a PDF in order to potentially extract sensitive information and bypass defenses.
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