Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
3,613 detections
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Detects unauthorized access to web browser credential stores (e.g., Login Data, Cookies) by non-browser processes, such as scripting engines (PowerShell, WScript) or common LOLBins (MSBuild, InstallUtil). This behavior is indicative of credential theft or data exfiltration attempts by malicious software, including stealers like PureLog.
Detects access to sensitive cryptocurrency wallet files (e.g., wallet.dat, keystore) by processes typically associated with LOLBins (Living-off-the-land Binaries) like PowerShell, MSBuild, or non-executable utilities. This activity is indicative of credential theft or data staging for exfiltration of cryptocurrency assets.
This rule detects potential data staging activity associated with the REMUS malware. It correlates Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) queries for antivirus information (e.g., 'AntiVirusProduct', 'WbemLocator') with subsequent file creation events in non-standard directories. This behavior is indicative of an adversary preparing or staging system profile data for exfiltration.
Detects HTTP requests containing potential session, handoff, or access tokens within the URI pattern commonly associated with ORAX Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing infrastructure. The rule specifically targets requests routed to wildcard subdomains that mimic legitimate deployment or service endpoints, indicating an attempt to harvest authentication tokens from victims.
Detects potential abuse of the Microsoft Graph API by correlating device-code authentication events with subsequent high-volume activity, such as mail or file enumeration, from the same account within a short window. This pattern is indicative of ARToken-style token proxying, where an attacker intercepts an OAuth device-code token to gain unauthorized access to an user's resources.
Detects instances where a process not associated with standard web browsers accesses, copies, or modifies sensitive browser files such as cookies, local storage, or session tokens. This behavior is highly indicative of information-stealer malware (e.g., Vidar, Lumma, RedLine) attempting to exfiltrate session data for account hijacking.
Detects activity associated with a potential RMM (Remote Monitoring and Management) agent communicating with known malicious infrastructure and accessing sensitive files like credentials or IDs. This often indicates an adversary leveraging legitimate RMM tooling for post-compromise activity or exfiltration.
Detects infostealer malware (e.g., Vidar, Lumma, RedLine) that specifically searches for Claude/Anthropic session cookies, API tokens, and generic browser-based credential storage artifacts.
Detects potential account compromise by identifying a specific sequence of behavior: reconnaissance of sensitive users (HR/Payroll) via Microsoft Graph API calls, followed by the creation of inbox rules (e.g., forwarding) by the same user account within a 12-hour window.
Detects the creation of inbox rules (e.g., move, delete, stop processing) on M365 accounts, followed by the transmission of emails with subjects related to 'direct deposit'. This pattern is frequently observed in Business Email Compromise (BEC) campaigns where attackers automate the concealment or exfiltration of sensitive payroll-related communications.
Detects network proxy requests indicative of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing kits. The rule monitors for specific URL patterns associated with malicious JavaScript delivery, administrative panels, and connections to known malicious infrastructure hosting phishing activities.
Detects a suspicious spike in MailItemsAccessed operations occurring across multiple distinct tenant organization IDs within a 60-second window, using the same ClientAppId. This behavior is indicative of automated, centralized credential abuse or mailbox collection tools (often associated with campaigns like Storm-2755) rather than legitimate, isolated user or service-level activity.
Detects Microsoft 365 sign-in activity consistent with adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) token theft. The rule identifies successful sign-ins with multi-factor authentication, immediately followed by a new session attempt for the same user within 30 minutes from a different device, IP address, or location.
Detects instances where processes other than standard web browsers attempt to access sensitive browser data files, such as cookies, login data, and browser state files. This behavior is a common indicator of credential theft or browser session hijacking, often performed by stealer malware like OnyxC2.
Detects instances where processes other than standard web browsers attempt to access sensitive browser data files, such as cookies, login data, and browser state files. This behavior is a common indicator of credential theft or browser session hijacking, often performed by stealer malware like OnyxC2.
Detects the creation of an email inbox rule that includes both a concealment/deletion action and an external forwarding destination, occurring within 4 hours of a high-risk or compromised device-code authentication event. This pattern is indicative of account takeover where an attacker establishes persistence and exfiltration while hiding their activity.
Detects automated post-compromise mailbox reconnaissance following an anomalous OAuth device code sign-in that exhibits high-risk indicators. The rule identifies programmatic access to a high volume of mail items within a short window following suspicious token issuance, which is characteristic of automated scanning or data exfiltration tooling.
Detects access or interrogation of the WinGet configuration history database (config.db) by non-standard or user-supplied Python scripts, which may indicate an attempt to enumerate installed package configurations or extract sensitive information from the local configuration state.
Detects the creation of files in the Windows Temp directory that match specific naming patterns associated with UnixStealer, including tool executables, database files, stolen data archives, and debug logs. These artifacts are characteristic of the tool's staging and activity tracking behaviors.
Detects network activity associated with the FlowerStorm/Storm-1167 phishing campaign. The rule monitors for credential exfiltration to a specific malicious URI (e.g., /google.php) containing login parameters, as well as the delivery of spoofed Microsoft sign-in pages from the associated phishing infrastructure.
Detects unauthorized access to VPN configuration files associated with common VPN providers (CyberGhost, NordVPN, ExpressVPN). This behavior is characteristic of the Hannibal Stealer, which attempts to exfiltrate these files to compromise user VPN sessions and credentials. The rule filters out legitimate process access to minimize false positives.
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