Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects PHP script execution interacting with the Microsoft Exchange Web Services (EWS) API, which may indicate web shell usage, email collection, or exfiltration activity.
Detects a burst of uploads to Box from a single account. Where mass download suggests
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
Detects potential data exfiltration to popular public paste-sites and code-sharing services (such as Pastebin, Paste.ee, Hastebin, Ghostbin, ControlC, Dpaste, Rentry.co, Privatebin) using HTTP POST or PUT requests based on upload frequency and volume thresholds.
Detects a burst of uploads to Box from a single account. Where mass download suggests
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
Detects a burst of uploads to Box from a single account. Where mass download suggests
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
Detects processes that make outbound API calls to known Large Language Model (LLM) domains while simultaneously performing high-volume network connection attempts or scanning-like fan-out activity across multiple public IP addresses.
The following analytic detects outbound connections to commonly abused file sharing and pastebin-style hosting domains.
It leverages Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense logs and focuses on allowed connections (action=Allow) where the url field matches a list of known data hosting or temporary storage services.
While many of these platforms serve legitimate purposes, they are frequently leveraged by adversaries for malware delivery, data exfiltration, command and control (C2) beacons, or staging of encoded payloads.
This analytic is valuable for identifying potential abuse of legitimate infrastructure as part of an attacker's kill chain.
It leverages Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense logs and focuses on allowed connections (action=Allow) where the url field matches a list of known data hosting or temporary storage services.
While many of these platforms serve legitimate purposes, they are frequently leveraged by adversaries for malware delivery, data exfiltration, command and control (C2) beacons, or staging of encoded payloads.
This analytic is valuable for identifying potential abuse of legitimate infrastructure as part of an attacker's kill chain.
Detects one account downloading many files through GoAnywhere Managed File Transfer.
MFT platforms sit between organisations and hold exactly the data worth stealing —
payment files, payroll, partner exchanges — and have been the target of mass
exploitation campaigns precisely because they are internet-facing and rarely watched.
Onboarding: GOANYWHERE-MFT is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 850).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='GOANYWHERE-MFT' and action='DOWNLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, distinct_count(file)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 20
MFT platforms sit between organisations and hold exactly the data worth stealing —
payment files, payroll, partner exchanges — and have been the target of mass
exploitation campaigns precisely because they are internet-facing and rarely watched.
Onboarding: GOANYWHERE-MFT is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 850).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='GOANYWHERE-MFT' and action='DOWNLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, distinct_count(file)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 20
Detects one user triggering DLP repeatedly in a short window. A single violation is
usually a mistake; a pattern is either someone systematically working around the
control or an attacker testing which channels are permitted before using the one
that is.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-DLP is ingested via Syslog (XML) (Bloo extractor 805).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='TRELLIX-DLP'
and action in ('THREAT_DETECTED', 'THREAT_BLOCKED')
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 10
usually a mistake; a pattern is either someone systematically working around the
control or an attacker testing which channels are permitted before using the one
that is.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-DLP is ingested via Syslog (XML) (Bloo extractor 805).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='TRELLIX-DLP'
and action in ('THREAT_DETECTED', 'THREAT_BLOCKED')
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 10
Detects repositories being downloaded. Source code is intellectual property and
frequently contains embedded secrets, infrastructure detail and the logic of the
security controls themselves. Bulk download by one actor is the clearest signal of
code theft, whether by a departing engineer or a compromised account.
Onboarding: GITHUB is ingested via GitHub connector (Bloo extractor 870).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/github-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=github where sourcename='GITHUB' and action='REPOSITORY_DOWNLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby target
| select target, distinct_count(repositoryid)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 5
frequently contains embedded secrets, infrastructure detail and the logic of the
security controls themselves. Bulk download by one actor is the clearest signal of
code theft, whether by a departing engineer or a compromised account.
Onboarding: GITHUB is ingested via GitHub connector (Bloo extractor 870).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/github-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=github where sourcename='GITHUB' and action='REPOSITORY_DOWNLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby target
| select target, distinct_count(repositoryid)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 5
Detects an unusual volume of externally directed mail from one sender. Mail is a
high-capacity exfiltration channel that is permitted by default, and a compromised
mailbox sending outward in bulk is both data loss and, where the content is phishing,
damage to the organisation's sending reputation.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE'
and action='EMAIL_SENT_EXTERNAL'
| duration 1h
| groupby sender
| select sender, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 100
high-capacity exfiltration channel that is permitted by default, and a compromised
mailbox sending outward in bulk is both data loss and, where the content is phishing,
damage to the organisation's sending reputation.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE'
and action='EMAIL_SENT_EXTERNAL'
| duration 1h
| groupby sender
| select sender, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 100
Detects a single Box account downloading an unusually high number of distinct files
in a short window. This is the clearest signal of data theft from cloud storage,
whether by a departing employee or an attacker using a compromised account.
Baseline per role before deployment: sales and legal teams legitimately pull large
document sets, while most users download a handful of files a day.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='DOWNLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user
| select user, distinct_count(file)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 50
in a short window. This is the clearest signal of data theft from cloud storage,
whether by a departing employee or an attacker using a compromised account.
Baseline per role before deployment: sales and legal teams legitimately pull large
document sets, while most users download a handful of files a day.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='DOWNLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user
| select user, distinct_count(file)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 50
Detects a Box file or folder being made publicly accessible. Public sharing turns an
internal document into an internet-reachable URL, and is both a common accidental
data exposure and a deliberate low-friction exfiltration route that generates no
outbound traffic from the corporate network.
The Visibility field carries the change, which makes this directly detectable rather
than inferred.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX'
and lower(visibility) like '%public%'
| groupby user, file, visibility, srcip
internal document into an internet-reachable URL, and is both a common accidental
data exposure and a deliberate low-friction exfiltration route that generates no
outbound traffic from the corporate network.
The Visibility field carries the change, which makes this directly detectable rather
than inferred.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX'
and lower(visibility) like '%public%'
| groupby user, file, visibility, srcip
Detects a Box account accessed from a source address with no prior history, followed
by substantial download activity. The combination is far stronger than either signal
alone: a new location by itself is routine for mobile users, and downloads by
themselves are routine for everyone.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='DOWNLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 25
by substantial download activity. The combination is far stronger than either signal
alone: a new location by itself is routine for mobile users, and downloads by
themselves are routine for everyone.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='DOWNLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 25
Detects a burst of uploads to Box from a single account. Where mass download suggests
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
Detects a burst of uploads to Box from a single account. Where mass download suggests
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
Detects a burst of uploads to Box from a single account. Where mass download suggests
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
Detects a burst of uploads to Box from a single account. Where mass download suggests
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
Detects a burst of uploads to Box from a single account. Where mass download suggests
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
Detects potential data exfiltration activity where a device first exhibits usage of a remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool, followed by the execution of known data transfer or exfiltration utilities such as WinSCP or Rclone.
Detects the sequential relationship of data staging using tools like WinRAR and subsequent exfiltration using tools like Rclone, WinSCP, or FileZilla on a single host within a 24-hour window.
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