Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects outbound HTTP requests to the Telegram Bot API associated with the malicious 'indexed-btree' npm package. The rule specifically monitors for hardcoded Telegram bot tokens and chat IDs used for data exfiltration.
Detects outbound HTTP requests to the Telegram Bot API associated with the malicious 'indexed-btree' npm package. The rule specifically monitors for hardcoded Telegram bot tokens and chat IDs used for data exfiltration.
Detects outbound HTTP requests to the Telegram Bot API associated with the malicious 'indexed-btree' npm package. The rule specifically monitors for hardcoded Telegram bot tokens and chat IDs used for data exfiltration.
Detects outbound network traffic attempting to exfiltrate data to Slack or Telegram APIs using hardcoded bot tokens or channel identifiers associated with the 'indexed-btree' malware campaign.
Detects anomalous process activity that reads sensitive developer secrets (such as Anthropic, OpenAI, Gemini, or Hugging Face API keys) from common configuration or environment files, followed by an outbound network connection to a non-private IP address. This behavior is consistent with credential harvesting and exfiltration tactics used in supply chain attacks to hijack AI services.
Detects anomalous process activity that reads sensitive developer secrets (such as Anthropic, OpenAI, Gemini, or Hugging Face API keys) from common configuration or environment files, followed by an outbound network connection to a non-private IP address. This behavior is consistent with credential harvesting and exfiltration tactics used in supply chain attacks to hijack AI services.
Detects outbound network traffic matching known SectopRAT C2 patterns. The rule monitors for established TCP connections to a specific malicious IP address with a payload size exceeding 300 bytes, consistent with the exfiltration of AES-encrypted JSON credential or wallet data. It includes threshold logic to limit alerts to once per source IP every 60 seconds.
Detects outbound network traffic matching known SectopRAT C2 patterns. The rule monitors for established TCP connections to a specific malicious IP address with a payload size exceeding 300 bytes, consistent with the exfiltration of AES-encrypted JSON credential or wallet data. It includes threshold logic to limit alerts to once per source IP every 60 seconds.
Detects outbound network traffic matching known SectopRAT C2 patterns. The rule monitors for established TCP connections to a specific malicious IP address with a payload size exceeding 300 bytes, consistent with the exfiltration of AES-encrypted JSON credential or wallet data. It includes threshold logic to limit alerts to once per source IP every 60 seconds.
Detects outbound network traffic matching known SectopRAT C2 patterns. The rule monitors for established TCP connections to a specific malicious IP address with a payload size exceeding 300 bytes, consistent with the exfiltration of AES-encrypted JSON credential or wallet data. It includes threshold logic to limit alerts to once per source IP every 60 seconds.
Detects the execution of VelvetCake modular scripts by PowerShell, which involves downloading and executing scripts from %TEMP% via Invoke-Expression, and monitoring the C:\Users\Public directory for file staging and subsequent exfiltration. This rule captures the tactical loop of script execution, output file creation, and exfiltration preparation often observed in Operation Conflict Compass activity.
This rule detects anomalies in outbound network data transfer by comparing the current daily volume of data sent to external, non-private IP addresses against the historical average for those specific sources. It alerts when the daily volume exceeds 500MB and shows a significant spike (3x or more) compared to historical baseline data or when no historical data is available for a new source connection.
This rule detects potential exfiltration of sensitive files, specifically 'cert.pem' and 'private.key', via HTTP POST requests to the '/api/adbk/upload' endpoint. This pattern is characteristic of the RatHat malware attempting to exfiltrate device credentials to a Command and Control (C2) server.
Detects specific command-and-control (C2) communication patterns associated with the VelvetCake malware. The rules identify initial authentication with a hardcoded password string, module enumeration requests, and session termination signals transmitted over TCP.
Detects specific command-and-control (C2) communication patterns associated with the VelvetCake malware. The rules identify initial authentication with a hardcoded password string, module enumeration requests, and session termination signals transmitted over TCP.
Detects specific command-and-control (C2) communication patterns associated with the VelvetCake malware. The rules identify initial authentication with a hardcoded password string, module enumeration requests, and session termination signals transmitted over TCP.
Detects outbound network traffic (TLS and DNS queries) directed towards AWS S3 endpoints, which may indicate the use of s5cmd or similar tools for unauthorized data exfiltration to cloud storage.
Detects the execution of the s5cmd utility using 'cp' or 'sync' commands directed towards S3 storage paths. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized data exfiltration to attacker-controlled cloud storage, a tactic identified in intrusions associated with the 'Ransom Busters' group.
Detects HTTP POST requests to the Telegram Bot API (/sendPhoto) containing patterns indicative of data exfiltration. The rule identifies suspicious message content, such as URLs leading to VK.com or reconnaissance data like Shodan host links and IP location query templates, suggesting the use of Telegram as a Command and Control (C2) channel for exfiltrating sensitive information.
Detects outbound HTTP requests to the Telegram Bot API that indicate the exfiltration of sensitive camera credentials or snapshots. The rules identify specific API endpoints such as '/sendPhoto' and the presence of Markdown-formatted text containing 'Login:', 'Password:', and 'Model:' fields within the request body.
This rule detects PowerShell script execution that interacts with the GitHub API, specifically targeting the upload of files or JSON data to repository endpoints. The logic looks for commands related to file system access, inclusion of 'api.github.com', and references to 'SmartUploader' or 'uploaded_files.json'. It further filters for activity occurring within standard user directories and enforces a check to ensure the GitHub repository name matches the local hostname, which is a common indicator of automated exfiltration scripts.
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