Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects individual file access events performed by non-browser python processes. This rule is designed as a proxy to identify automated file collection activities, such as those performed by 'python-httpx', that may be indicative of low-volume data exfiltration when aggregated over time.
Detects evidence of PSNATCH or BASHNATCH tools exfiltrating data to GitHub. The rule identifies suspicious file operations related to an 'SmartUploader' tracking file in standard user directories (AppData, .local/share), monitors for SmartUploader process execution, and flags network connections to api.github.com from processes identified as SmartUploader, bash, or PowerShell.
Detects network activity associated with the Rapuncel malware, including raw TCP exfiltration of files via POST requests to /upload, connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure, and repeated exfiltration retry patterns.
Detects outbound TCP traffic containing system reconnaissance data, such as OS information, computer name, and location, being sent to a known C2 server address. The rule monitors for specific content patterns indicative of an infected host checking in or exfiltrating host configuration details.
Detects outbound SMTP communication to Gmail servers containing specific indicators of compromise (sender, recipient, or subject line) associated with the LucidKnight (LucidRook) malware campaign, indicating potential reconnaissance data exfiltration.
This rule performs a hunting activity across multiple telemetry sources (Network, Email, Endpoint) to detect known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with Anthropic threat intelligence reporting (September 2026). It looks for specific malware file names, command-line patterns, service installations, phishing email addresses, and C2 communication URLs.
Detects high-frequency, automated interactions with popular AI assistant web interfaces (e.g., Gemini, Perplexity, Claude, Copilot) from common browser processes. This pattern often indicates unauthorized automated data submission or scraping, which may follow or facilitate automated exfiltration of browser-resident data.
Detects high-frequency, automated interactions with popular AI assistant web interfaces (e.g., Gemini, Perplexity, Claude, Copilot) from common browser processes. This pattern often indicates unauthorized automated data submission or scraping, which may follow or facilitate automated exfiltration of browser-resident data.
This rule monitors for high-frequency download or access events of files associated with AI development, such as model weights (.pt, .ckpt, .safetensors, .h5, .onnx, .pkl, .pb), checkpoints, and research datasets from cloud storage. It triggers when an account accesses or downloads 20 or more unique AI-related files within a 60-minute window, which is indicative of unauthorized data exfiltration of intellectual property.
Detects rapid access to multiple Microsoft 365 collection applications (Office, OneDrive, Teams) by a user account from specific AWS EC2 IP ranges identified as associated with the TeamFiltration tool. This behavior is consistent with automated exfiltration of email, chats, and files.
This rule detects network upload operations (HTTP POST or similar requests ending in '/upload') to a specific external IP address (2.26.126.50). It specifically monitors for processes other than common web browsers, and filters for connections where significant data volume (greater than 10KB) is transferred or the data size is unknown.
Detects behavior associated with the TeamFiltration backdoor, where a user account downloads a file from OneDrive, modifies or replaces that file, and re-uploads it within a short timeframe (30 minutes). This pattern is consistent with the 'taint shared content' technique used to distribute malicious files through legitimate cloud storage.
Detects behavior associated with the TeamFiltration backdoor, where a user account downloads a file from OneDrive, modifies or replaces that file, and re-uploads it within a short timeframe (30 minutes). This pattern is consistent with the 'taint shared content' technique used to distribute malicious files through legitimate cloud storage.
Detects behavior associated with the TeamFiltration backdoor, where a user account downloads a file from OneDrive, modifies or replaces that file, and re-uploads it within a short timeframe (30 minutes). This pattern is consistent with the 'taint shared content' technique used to distribute malicious files through legitimate cloud storage.
This rule detects malicious activity associated with the Bazinga macOS backdoor, specifically focusing on the clearing of TCC privacy permissions, the staging of keychain and browser data using 'ditto', and the subsequent exfiltration of this data to a remote host via 'curl'.
Detects the creation or modification of Microsoft Power Automate flows that integrate internal Microsoft 365 services (SharePoint, OneDrive, Exchange) with external communication or exfiltration targets (HTTP requests, external email addresses, or common external web services). This behavior is often indicative of automated data exfiltration.
Detects the creation or modification of Microsoft Power Automate flows that integrate internal Microsoft 365 services (SharePoint, OneDrive, Exchange) with external communication or exfiltration targets (HTTP requests, external email addresses, or common external web services). This behavior is often indicative of automated data exfiltration.
Detects the creation or modification of Microsoft Power Automate flows that integrate internal Microsoft 365 services (SharePoint, OneDrive, Exchange) with external communication or exfiltration targets (HTTP requests, external email addresses, or common external web services). This behavior is often indicative of automated data exfiltration.
Detects the creation or modification of Microsoft Power Automate flows that integrate internal Microsoft 365 services (SharePoint, OneDrive, Exchange) with external communication or exfiltration targets (HTTP requests, external email addresses, or common external web services). This behavior is often indicative of automated data exfiltration.
This rule monitors network traffic for requests directed at a specific domain ('luizestrelhashapr.online') and path ('/google_api/b83fa72d.css'), which is identified in threat intelligence as an indicator of browser history exfiltration.
Detects the creation or modification of Microsoft Power Automate flows that integrate internal Microsoft 365 services (SharePoint, OneDrive, Exchange) with external communication or exfiltration targets (HTTP requests, external email addresses, or common external web services). This behavior is often indicative of automated data exfiltration.
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