Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network connections to known Generative AI API endpoints (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Mistral) from devices that have not exhibited such activity in the past 30 days. This rule excludes common browser processes and email/messaging clients to identify potentially anomalous or unapproved use of AI services.
This rule detects potential data exfiltration by monitoring for anomalous user behavior across integrated SaaS applications. It flags accounts that perform high-frequency read, search, or view activities across three or more monitored SaaS platforms (Confluence, Jira, Slack, Google Workspace, Microsoft 365, or Bitbucket) within a 5-minute window, followed immediately by an upload or post activity to an external, non-integrated domain.
This rule detects potentially suspicious data exfiltration activities by identifying a pattern where a user authenticates or interacts with the Microsoft Purview service, followed closely (within 15 minutes) by a connection to an external domain that the organization has not established a historical communication pattern with in the last 30 days. This behavior may indicate an adversary is attempting to exfiltrate session tokens or sensitive data to an external server.
Possible O365 credential exfil via HTTP PUT to attacker-controlled S3 bucket
Detects the ChainDrop/Shai-Hulud 2.0 "Run Copilot" secrets-laundering technique: a CI workflow step dumping toJSON(secrets) to a format-results.txt artifact, followed by GitHub Actions artifact-API downloads using scraped ghs_ runner tokens and git ref deletion used to cover tracks.
Detects the execution of the LimeWire P2P file-sharing application within 30 minutes of the creation of sensitive files, such as LSASS memory dumps, NTDS.dit, or SAM/SYSTEM/SECURITY registry hives, on the same host. This temporal correlation suggests the potential exfiltration of sensitive credential material via P2P file-sharing.
Detects network connections to known Generative AI API endpoints (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Mistral) from devices that have not exhibited such activity in the past 30 days. This rule excludes common browser processes and email/messaging clients to identify potentially anomalous or unapproved use of AI services.
This rule detects high-volume file access or download operations in SharePoint or OneDrive, performed by non-browser user agents (e.g., Python, PowerShell, cURL, Go). An elevated volume of such actions within a short timeframe is indicative of automated, scripted interaction, which may represent malicious data exfiltration, automated content scraping, or potential account compromise.
WhiteCobra Operation Solidity Pro - Telegram Bot API exfiltration upload
Detects unusually large outbound data transfers (over 500MB) that may indicate data exfiltration preceding Chaos ransomware deployment, consistent with STAC4749 incidents where data was likely stolen before encryption.
Persistent multi-day exfil retry with per-package tracking ID beacon
This rule detects rapid, high-volume outbound network requests to a single remote host from common web browsers (msedge.exe, chrome.exe, outlook.exe, firefox.exe). It identifies suspicious behavior where a browser performs at least 10 requests to 10 distinct URLs in a 30-second window, which is indicative of potential per-keystroke exfiltration or automated data scraping.
This rule detects rapid, high-volume outbound network requests to a single remote host from common web browsers (msedge.exe, chrome.exe, outlook.exe, firefox.exe). It identifies suspicious behavior where a browser performs at least 10 requests to 10 distinct URLs in a 30-second window, which is indicative of potential per-keystroke exfiltration or automated data scraping.
This takes the earliest available snapshot per agent instead of comparing two states. If an agent is born already carrying MCP access and org-wide sharing there is no baseline to drift from, so this needs its own check rather than a diff.
TOKYOCORE RansomAgent User-Agent HTTP Traffic to Public File Hosting Service
Detects a process running from a path ending in svchost32.exe performing an unusually high volume of file open/read/rename/write operations or transferring a large total byte volume within a 1-hour window, consistent with CornFlake bulk file collection/exfiltration nearing its documented throttle limits.
Detects unusually large outbound data transfers (over 500MB) that may indicate data exfiltration preceding Chaos ransomware deployment, consistent with STAC4749 incidents where data was likely stolen before encryption.
Detects unusually large outbound data transfers (over 500MB) that may indicate data exfiltration preceding Chaos ransomware deployment, consistent with STAC4749 incidents where data was likely stolen before encryption.
Outbound HTTP exfiltration to mangorbit.com C2 subdomains
Larva-24009 HeptaX C2 beacon to shared infrastructure (get-command/index/new-upload/post_proc)
Detects likely exfiltration of encrypted synced passkey (WebauthnCredentialSpecifics) blobs to external C2 infrastructure, correlated with a prior non-browser read of Chrome's Sync Data LevelDB store, consistent with the collection-and-exfiltration stage of a Pass-ta-key credential-theft chain. Excludes traffic destined to Google's own domains.
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