Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects activities associated with the NotDoor malware used by APT28 for email-based exfiltration. It specifically monitors for the creation of staging files in temporary directories, the use of Outlook.exe to establish external SMTP connections on common mail ports, and the transmission of emails to known adversary-controlled addresses.
Detects network connections from internal endpoints to Filen.io cloud storage domains and subdomains. The rule specifically flags interactions involving common API endpoints for file operations (upload, download, directory listing) as 'Critical' risk, while generic traffic to the domain is classified as 'High' risk.
Detects browser processes connecting to internal IP addresses followed by a connection to an external (non-whitelisted) destination within a 2-minute window. This behavior is indicative of potential data staging or exfiltration, where a web browser is used to access internal resources before transferring data to an external site.
Detects browser processes connecting to internal IP addresses followed by a connection to an external (non-whitelisted) destination within a 2-minute window. This behavior is indicative of potential data staging or exfiltration, where a web browser is used to access internal resources before transferring data to an external site.
Detects high-frequency access to sensitive web paths (e.g., /admin, /vault, /credentials) from common web browsers on a device. This activity may indicate malicious credential harvesting, administrative panel enumeration, or sensitive data exfiltration performed by an adversary or malicious browser extension.
Detects browser processes connecting to internal IP addresses followed by a connection to an external (non-whitelisted) destination within a 2-minute window. This behavior is indicative of potential data staging or exfiltration, where a web browser is used to access internal resources before transferring data to an external site.
Detects incoming network connections to Windows 'Nearby Share' process components from external (non-RFC1918) IP addresses. This activity is potentially malicious as legitimate 'Nearby Share' traffic should typically occur within local networks.
Detects incoming network connections to Windows 'Nearby Share' process components from external (non-RFC1918) IP addresses. This activity is potentially malicious as legitimate 'Nearby Share' traffic should typically occur within local networks.
Detects high-volume outbound network connections (exceeding 10MB) originating from processes associated with AI-driven chatbot or productivity applications (e.g., ChatGPT, Perplexity). This rule identifies potential data exfiltration occurring over legitimate, expected software channels.
Detects unusual processes making multiple connections to Google Sheets or OAuth2 APIs within a short timeframe, excluding known browsers and Google applications. This could indicate unauthorized data access, exfiltration, or command and control activity.
This rule detects DNS queries containing an exceptionally long subdomain label (50 or more characters). Such patterns are often indicative of DNS tunneling techniques where data is encoded within the subdomain portion of a DNS query to bypass network security controls or establish command-and-control channels.
This rule detects outbound FTP traffic containing the 'STOR' command, which is used in the FTP protocol to upload files to a remote server. This behavior is a common indicator of unauthorized data exfiltration.
This rule monitors for FTP 'STOR' commands followed by large data transfers (exceeding 64KB) initiated from internal hosts to external destinations. This pattern is often indicative of data exfiltration using the File Transfer Protocol (FTP).
This rule detects large HTTP POST requests (greater than 10MB) originating from the internal network to external destinations, which may indicate bulk data exfiltration.
Detects the creation or modification of Power Automate Flows that utilize non-Microsoft domains for HTTP or webhook connectors. Adversaries may abuse Power Automate to automate exfiltration or command-and-control tasks by connecting workflows to external malicious endpoints.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests where the Content-Length header indicates a transfer size exceeding 10MB to external (non-HOME_NET) addresses. This pattern is indicative of potential data exfiltration via HTTP.
Detects the use of the FTP STOR command to transfer files with sensitive extensions (.docx, .pdf, .xlsx, .zip, .7z) to external networks. This behavior is indicative of potential data exfiltration via an unencrypted alternative protocol.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests where the Content-Length is at least 10MB and the Content-Type header indicates the transfer of archived data (zip or x-tar). This pattern is often associated with the staging and exfiltration of compressed sensitive data from an internal host to an external network destination.
This rule detects outbound FTP traffic containing the 'STOR' command, which is used in the FTP protocol to upload files to a remote server. This behavior is a common indicator of unauthorized data exfiltration.
Detects the use of legitimate command-line utilities such as rclone, AWS CLI, AzCopy, curl, and wget to upload data to cloud storage endpoints, which is a common technique used for data exfiltration.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands commonly used for host reconnaissance (e.g., whoami, ipconfig, net group, systeminfo) combined with the use of PowerShell to perform an HTTP POST request to a suspicious external IP address (202.182.102.5), suggesting post-compromise reconnaissance data exfiltration.
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