Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects sensitive data exfiltration via git push to remote code repositories
Detects non-browser processes that load 'clr.dll' (indicating in-process .NET/CLR usage) and are sending large volumes of outbound data to Google API domains (sheets.googleapis.com, oauth2.googleapis.com, googleapis.com). This behavior is consistent with the SHEETCREEP threat actor's use of Google Sheets API for command and control (C2) and data exfiltration.
This rule detects outbound POST requests to the Telegram Bot API (api.telegram.org) originating from internal network hosts. The detection specifically looks for requests containing the 'sendMessage' path, which is characteristic of bots transmitting stolen data (such as credentials) or command-and-control communication. It focuses on traffic initiated by common command-line tools like 'python-requests' or 'curl', which are frequently abused by automated malware scripts.
This rule detects suspicious process command lines that indicate potential tunneling activity. It looks for commands containing 'tunnel', '--url', and '--logfile', while excluding legitimate 'cloudflared.exe' processes. This pattern is often used by adversaries to establish covert communication channels or exfiltrate data.
Detects the configuration and usage of personal Microsoft OneDrive accounts on corporate endpoints. This is achieved by monitoring for OneDrive process execution with personal account command-line arguments, OneDrive setup utilities configured with personal tenant identifiers, and file system activity within directory paths associated with personal OneDrive synchronization.
Detects network connections to known ShinyHunters infrastructure, including specific IP addresses and DNS queries for 'azurenetfiles.net', which has been linked to their operations targeting Oracle PeopleSoft servers via gadget chain exploitation.
This rule detects DNS queries with suspicious characteristics that may indicate DNS tunneling, data exfiltration, or command and control activity. It identifies queries with unusually long names, long first labels combined with high entropy, or a high number of subdomains combined with a long first label. Exclusions are made for common legitimate DNS suffixes and specific service-related domains.
Detects malicious browser extension activity related to the StegoAd infostealer. The rule identifies a dual-indicator pattern consisting of outbound network connections to 'mitarchive.info' combined with concurrent read access to browser-specific credential store files (Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Mozilla Firefox) on the same host.
Detects network communication to the malicious domain 'mitarchive.info' from common web browsers (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Brave). This domain is associated with the StegoAd browser extension, which intercepts Google and WordPress login flows to exfiltrate stolen credentials and 2FA codes.
Detects execution of rclone or the creation of an rclone configuration file (rclone.conf) occurring on a host within 24 hours of QEMU virtualization activity. This combination may indicate an adversary using virtualization software for staging or research, followed by data exfiltration via rclone to a remote cloud destination.
This rule detects network connections to known IP addresses associated with the FortiBleed vulnerability exploitation. The rule categorizes the threat based on the specific IP address, indicating potential C2, pentest lab activity, credential validation, or sniffer nodes.
Detects outbound network traffic to api.telegram.org. This pattern is commonly observed in malware such as Sauron ransomware to establish command and control (C2) channels and perform data exfiltration by abusing the legitimate Telegram Bot API.
This rule detects the creation of a 'logs.dat' file, which is often associated with Remcos RAT for data exfiltration, in common user-related directories (AppData, Temp, Users, Documents) with a file size greater than or equal to 100KB. This pattern suggests an attempt to stage or exfiltrate collected data.
Detects network requests from the Firefox browser process containing URI patterns and parameters often associated with data exfiltration or browser-based reconnaissance, including suspicious leakage parameters and local proxy/loopback communication attempts on non-standard ports.
Detects outbound network connections to a known KuinaExtractor (k0to) infostealer C2 server. The rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents for connections to the malicious IP address 103.229.53.18 on port 3000 and correlates them with process information to identify the originating application.
Detects anomalous, high-volume data transfers to Telegram API endpoints (api.telegram.org, specific IP ranges), which is indicative of data exfiltration by malware such as KuinaExtractor. The rule monitors for cumulative outbound traffic exceeding 500MB within a 1-hour session window per process.
Detects outbound network connections to a known KuinaExtractor (k0to) infostealer C2 server. The rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents for connections to the malicious IP address 103.229.53.18 on port 3000 and correlates them with process information to identify the originating application.
This rule detects the use of native network utilities (wget.exe, curl.exe) executing with flags indicative of file uploads (HTTP PUT or POST) targeting archive files (zip, rar, 7z). This behavior is often associated with the direct exfiltration of staged data to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Detects npm postinstall execution with TLS certificate verification bypass characteristic of Sapphire Sleet's supply chain attack. The malicious postinstall script disables certificate validation before contacting C2 infrastructure.
This rule detects a potential AWS S3 bucket name hijacking scenario. It looks for instances where an S3 bucket is deleted and then a new bucket with the exact same name is created within a short time frame (up to 1 hour) by a *different* AWS account. This pattern can be used to hijack S3 replication rule destinations, enabling silent data exfiltration to an attacker-controlled account. The rule also attempts to identify if the original bucket had replication configured.
Identifies native network tools (curl.exe, wget.exe) using HTTP PUT or POST parameters to upload local archive files (zip, rar, 7z) directly to attacker-controlled IPs.
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