Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects processes making three or more successful outbound network connections within an hour to known code or text sharing sites like Pastebin, GitHub, or Gist. This activity can be indicative of data exfiltration, command and control (C2) communication, or staging of malicious code.
Udm Mail Raw Ip Https
YARA-L
This rule detects network connections made by processes commonly associated with mail collection, archiving, or data export (e.g., mail, archive, collector, export, rclone, winscp, curl executables). The detection specifically looks for these processes making HTTPS connections where the command line contains keywords related to email data files (.pst, .ost) or email processing (aspose.email, mailbox). The rule aims to identify potential exfiltration or collection of email data over HTTPS.
This rule detects PowerShell executing a payload deceptively named as a JPEG image file, specifically 'sysupdate.jpeg', followed by subsequent outbound network activity. This behavior is indicative of the SilentCanvas campaign.
This rule detects the combination of a Node.js process reading a JavaScript file with a 24-character hexadecimal filename, immediately followed by outbound network communication to known command and control (C2) IP addresses associated with the 'easy-day-js' campaign. This behavior is indicative of the Mastra NPM supply chain compromise.
Correlates pythonw.exe network connections with HTTP POST characteristics (if Deep Packet Inspection data available) for data exfil. This rule specifically looks for network connections initiated by 'pythonw.exe' to known malicious domains ('brokeapt.com', 'pan.ssffaa19.xyz').
Correlates the dropping of 'install-persistent.php' within a 'woocommerce' folder with a subsequent network connection to the C2 IP '194.76.217.28' on custom port '2871' within a one-hour window. This activity is indicative of a supply chain compromise targeting ShapedPlugin, where backdoored pro plugins are distributed via official channels.
Detects patterns indicative of double extortion ransomware attacks, specifically the staging of large volumes of archived data followed by suspicious command and control (C2) communications. The rule identifies the creation, modification, or movement of multiple large archive files (RAR, 7z, ZIP, TAR, GZ, CAB) in common temporary or system directories, and correlates this activity with outbound network connections to known C2 indicators such as Tor/I2P/VPN/proxy services or non-RFC1918 IP addresses.
This rule detects potential data exfiltration attempts or sensitive information disclosure through Microsoft Copilot Enterprise Search. It specifically looks for 'URLClick' actions from 'Microsoft Copilot Enterprise Search' where the raw event data contains a 'q=' parameter (indicating a query) and also contains keywords like 'extract', 'embed', or 'img'. This combination suggests that a user might be attempting to extract or embed content, potentially sensitive, via a Copilot search query, which could lead to data leakage.
Detects a sender transmitting many attachment-bearing messages or a large aggregate attachment volume to external recipients within thirty minutes. This could indicate data exfiltration or a compromised account being used to send spam or malware.
Detects Python transmitting a newly created archive or JSON collection through requests, urllib, aiohttp, or a custom socket. This behavior is associated with the InvisibleFerret malware.
Detects attempts to exfiltrate environment variables by piping the output of 'env' or 'printenv' commands into 'curl'. This technique can be used by adversaries, such as the Miasma malware, to quickly steal sensitive API keys or other credentials stored in environment variables.
Detects an unsigned game-related process creating an archive and initiating cloud-storage network activity without an interactive cloud client. This rule specifically looks for network events where the process name contains 'bird', 'rok', 'game', 'update', 'python', or 'ruby' (case-insensitive) and the command line includes terms like 'zip', 'archive', 'upload', 'multipart', 'cloud', 'dropbox', or 'pcloud'.
Detects a non-OneDrive client invoking createUploadSession after creating staged command output or archives, indicative of GraphWorm activity.
Detects patterns indicative of double extortion ransomware attacks, specifically the staging of large volumes of archived data followed by suspicious command and control (C2) communications. The rule identifies the creation, modification, or movement of multiple large archive files (RAR, 7z, ZIP, TAR, GZ, CAB) in common temporary or system directories, and correlates this activity with outbound network connections to known C2 indicators such as Tor/I2P/VPN/proxy services or non-RFC1918 IP addresses.
Detects an administrative content rule that combines strategic research or defence collection terms with an external BCC, forward, or redirect destination. GTIG reported that the Patroit rule matched subjects related to medical research, Chikungunya, artificial intelligence, cyber programmes, Indo-Pacific operations, defence, and uncrewed systems before silently forwarding the messages.
Detects bulk export of CRM customer data for collection and theft
Detects the legitimate Microsoft .NET build component MSBuild.exe initiating outbound network connections to public IP addresses. This activity is a known LOLBin technique for establishing command and control (C2) or exfiltrating data. Threat actors have been observed abusing MSBuild.exe for host reconnaissance data exfiltration and C2 communications.
Detects outbound network connections to the attacker-controlled infrastructure
used in the June 2026 Mastra npm supply chain attack (easy-day-js campaign).
IP 23.254.164.92 served the second-stage payload; 23.254.164.123 was the C2
exfiltration server for the cross-platform infostealer.
used in the June 2026 Mastra npm supply chain attack (easy-day-js campaign).
IP 23.254.164.92 served the second-stage payload; 23.254.164.123 was the C2
exfiltration server for the cross-platform infostealer.
This rule identifies devices that send a large volume of data (over 100 MB) over HTTPS ports (443 or 8443) within a one-hour window. This activity could be indicative of data exfiltration, unauthorized large file transfers, or other suspicious network activity.
Detects a high volume of successful network connections to multiple unique cloud storage services (Dropbox, Box.com, OneDrive) from a single device and user account within an hour. This could indicate data exfiltration or unauthorized access to cloud storage.
Detects large file transfers over FTP data channel for exfiltration
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