Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects programmatic file access in Microsoft 365/SharePoint environments where the operation is logged as 'FileAccessed' but the UserAgent indicates a scripting library like python-requests or PowerShell. This behavior is indicative of data exfiltration techniques used by actors like UNC6671 (BlackFile) who stream file content directly to bypass traditional 'FileDownloaded' monitoring.
Detects network connections to the Session P2P exfiltration infrastructure used by the Mini Shai-Hulud campaign.
Detects outbound network connections to known C2 domains associated with the Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain worm, used to exfiltrate stolen credentials from developer machines and CI/CD pipelines.
Detects DNS queries to attacker-controlled infrastructure used by the Mini Shai-Hulud campaign.
The domain git-tanstack.com is attacker-controlled. The filev2.getsession.org endpoint is used
for credential exfiltration via the Session protocol.
The domain git-tanstack.com is attacker-controlled. The filev2.getsession.org endpoint is used
for credential exfiltration via the Session protocol.
Detects multiple threat behaviors associated with the Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain worm campaign. This includes memory scraping for secrets, execution of malicious Node/Bun payloads, connection to known C2 domains, and file operations related to persistence.
Detects the execution of the Windows Bluetooth File Transfer Wizard (fsquirt.exe), which may be abused for data exfiltration or payload delivery over Bluetooth. The rule identifies execution of fsquirt.exe and flags potentially suspicious indicators like specific transfer arguments or execution from non-standard paths.
Detects DNS lookups and outbound network connections to known PhantomRaven command and control (C2) infrastructure, including specific domains and IP addresses. The rule also specifically identifies potential data exfiltration attempts to the '/mozbra.php' endpoint.
High Email Volume to Personal Accounts
Cortex XDR
Detects potential data exfiltration or policy violation by identifying users sending a high volume of emails, large emails, or emails to many unique personal email addresses (e.g., Gmail, Yahoo, Outlook.com) from an Office 365 Exchange Online mailbox. This rule aggregates email activity by sender and flags if any of the defined thresholds are met: total sent data to personal addresses exceeds 25 MB, total messages sent to personal addresses exceeds 10, emails sent to more than 5 unique personal addresses, or any single message sent to a personal address exceeds 25 MB. This is designed to be ran as a scheduled correlation for a day time frame. Thresholds can also be configured to fit your environment. Each user will have a different line that contains all of the matching emails they sent to, the attachments, and subjects of the emails.
Detects HTTP network connections to the specific exfiltration endpoint (mozbra.php) used by PhantomRaven to exfiltrate stolen CI/CD tokens and developer credentials.
This rule detects the creation of files matching the exfiltration pattern used by the Mini Shai-Hulud malware. Specifically, it looks for files named 'results-<timestamp>-<counter>.json' within a 'results' directory, accounting for both Windows and Unix path separators. This pattern is indicative of data staging or exfiltration activities by the malware.
Detects unusual processes accessing the RDP Terminal Server Client Cache folder, indicating potential reconnaissance or staging for exfiltration. Attackers target this cache to exfiltrate and reconstruct image fragments of past remote sessions.
Detects unusual processes accessing the RDP Terminal Server Client Cache folder, indicating potential reconnaissance or staging for exfiltration. Attackers target this cache to exfiltrate and reconstruct image fragments of past remote sessions.
This rule detects network connections from devices to a predefined list of domains commonly associated with data exfiltration services. Monitoring these connections can help identify attempts to transfer sensitive data out of the network.
Detects Windows Explorer (explorer.exe) initiating outbound network connections over port 445 (SMB) to non-private, external IP addresses. This behavior aligns with the zero-click authentication coercion vulnerability (CVE-2026-32202) where Explorer automatically reaches out to a remote UNC path to fetch an icon resource, leaking NTLM hashes.
Detects Windows Explorer (explorer.exe) initiating outbound network connections over port 445 (SMB) to non-private, external IP addresses. This behavior aligns with the zero-click authentication coercion vulnerability (CVE-2026-32202) where Explorer automatically reaches out to a remote UNC path to fetch an icon resource, leaking NTLM hashes.
No description available.
Detects DNS requests to file.io originating from non-browser processes, indicative of data exfiltration, potentially by tools like CompactGopher. The rule identifies DNS requests for file.io or its subdomains, joins them with process information, and then filters out common web browsers to highlight suspicious activity.
Detects a specific combination of HTTP GET, POST, and PUT requests to the GitHub API (api.github.com) within a short timeframe. This sequence matches the behavior of the AdaptixC2 custom listener used by Tropic Trooper, which uses GitHub issues for beaconing/task polling and the contents API for data exfiltration. The detection has been refined to look for specific AdaptixC2 operational keywords ('beat', 'upload', 'download') to reduce noise.
Detects the creation or modification of Power Automate flows that connect to external services commonly used for data exfiltration or command and control, such as webhooks, Gmail, Dropbox, Google Drive, Slack, RSS feeds, custom connectors, or generic HTTP requests/webhooks. This could indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or exfiltrate data from the Power Platform environment.
Detects the execution of common browser executables in headless mode with command-line arguments indicative of data exfiltration, malicious rendering (dump-dom), or external requests (http/data:text/html;base64,). This activity, especially when initiated by non-standard parent processes, can be a sign of automated web scraping, vulnerability scanning, or other malicious automated browser activity.
Detects network connections to known malicious infrastructure domains and IP addresses associated with the Checkmarx supply chain compromise. The compromised KICS images and mcpAddon.js payload use these hardcoded endpoints to exfiltrate stolen credentials and tokens.
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