Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects unusual network connections from processes to legitimate service endpoints that are commonly abused for Command and Control (C2) activities (LOLC2). It specifically looks for connections to services like Telegram, Slack, Discord, GitHub, Google APIs, Pastebin, Dropbox, and others, originating from processes that are not recognized as legitimate applications for those services, and not from common system processes or standard program file paths. This helps identify potential adversary communication channels masquerading as legitimate traffic.
Detects outbound network connections to the known typosquatted C2 domain (`scan.aquasecurtiy.org`) or associated IP address (`45.148.10.212`) used by the TeamPCP threat actor. This infrastructure was utilized during the Trivy supply chain attack for exfiltrating stolen SSH keys, cloud credentials, and CI/CD secrets.
This rule detects outbound network connections to URLs associated with common file sharing services (e.g., Dropbox, Mega, Gofile) or temporary email providers (e.g., Temp-Mail). Such connections can indicate data exfiltration attempts, use of unsanctioned services, or communication with command and control infrastructure.
Detects outbound web requests to the Anthropic API containing the specific beta header required to upload files. This can be abused by attackers to exfiltrate sensitive data from the Claude sandbox to an attacker-controlled Anthropic account.
Detects potential APT10 (Stone Panda) activity by identifying the execution of known remote access tools (RATs) and suspicious use of utilities like WinRAR for password-protected archiving. The rule focuses on processes launched from non-standard directories and unusual parent processes, which may indicate malware execution, lateral movement, or data exfiltration.
Detects HTTP/HTTPS traffic where the User-Agent string is explicitly set to 'MicroStealer/1.0', which is used by the malware when communicating with Discord webhooks or its C2.
This rule detects network connections to a specific Discord webhook URL and another suspicious domain (78smp.com/m/). This pattern is often associated with malware attempting to exfiltrate data or establish command and control (C2) via Discord webhooks, or other suspicious domains.
This rule detects network connections to specific IP addresses and ports (1259, 1269) via UDP, or the presence of a file with a specific SHA256 hash. This combination could indicate command and control (C2) communication or data exfiltration using a custom UDP protocol.
Detects DNS resolution requests to the Operation GhostMail exfiltration subdomains (*.i.zimbrasoft.com.ua) and main domain. DNS exfiltration is the primary channel used by this APT to steal credentials and 2FA codes even when HTTPS is blocked.
Storm-2561 Network IOC Detection
Cortex XDR
Detects outbound network connections from Windows endpoints to known Storm-2561 Command and Control (C2) infrastructure, including a specific C2 IP address and various domains used for credential exfiltration and initial access via spoofed VPN services.
Detects specific log messages written to the iOS Unified Log by the DarkSword implant (GHOSTBLADE). These messages, which include tags like '[DarkSword-WIFI-DUMP]' and '[MAIN]', are unique to the malware and indicate that the data exfiltration modules are running. The GHOSTBLADE implant, used by UNC6353 in the DarkSword campaign, leaves distinct and high-confidence log messages in iOS Unified Logs during its operation. These logs are a clear indicator of a successful compromise.
Detects potential data exfiltration by the BlackBeard backdoor, associated with Boggy Serpens (MuddyWater). The malware abuses the HTTP 'Expires' header in client requests to exfiltrate encrypted system data to its command and control server. The 'Expires' header is a standard response header, so its presence in a request is highly anomalous.
This rule detects the presence of Phoenix malware by identifying known SHA256 hashes of its components or network connections to its command and control (C2) infrastructure. It correlates file events with known malware hashes and network events with known C2 IP addresses.
KQL Query
This rule detects network connections to or from known suspicious IP addresses and requests to known suspicious domains. These indicators are often associated with command and control (C2) activity, malware distribution, or other malicious infrastructure.
Detects network connections to known command-and-control (C2) domains used by malicious AI browser extensions for data exfiltration.
Detects BigQuery queries using CONCAT with CHR functions to dynamically build cross-project paths, bypassing dot filters. High-fidelity indicator of LeakyLooker-style SQL injection.
This rule detects artifacts associated with the APT36 CreepDropper malware, specifically focusing on scheduled task names and staging file markers. It looks for specific strings related to scheduled tasks like 'MicrosoftEdgesUpdatesTasksMachineUAs-Task' and 'MicrosoftEdgesUpdatesTasksMachineUAs-1234-87hy', as well as a staging file named 'ds.png' and other related strings such as 'msedge.exe', 'Task10', and 'System.Reflection.Assembly'. The rule requires at least four of these strings to be present, along with the MZ header, indicating a Windows executable.
Large Azure Blob Downloads
Cortex XDR
Detects an identity downloading an unusually high number of blobs (more than 100) from Azure Storage within a one-hour window. This could indicate data exfiltration or unauthorized bulk access to cloud storage.
This rule detects network connections initiated by specific executables (clawdbot, node, moltbot, openclaw) from a local port (18789, 3000, or 8080) to a remote IP address that is not localhost, not within private IP ranges (10.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16, 172.16.0.0/12), and not within the 17.0.0.0/8 CIDR block. This could indicate command and control (C2) communication or unauthorized data exfiltration by potentially malicious bots or applications.
Detects a web server process spawning tools commonly used for data staging and exfiltration, such as rar.exe, certutil.exe, and type.exe. This behavior is characteristic of the CL-UNK-1068 actor's exfiltration TTP, often performed via a web shell.
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