Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Use this query to find email stealing activities ran by Qakbot that will use "ping.exe -t 127.0.0.1" to obfuscate subsequent actions.
Email theft that occurs might be exfiltrated to operators and indicates that the malware completed a large portion of its automated activity without interruption.
Email theft that occurs might be exfiltrated to operators and indicates that the malware completed a large portion of its automated activity without interruption.
This query was originally published in a threat analytics report about the group known to other security researchers as APT32 or OceanLotus
This tracked activity group uses a wide array of malicious documents to conduct attacks. Some of their favored techniques include sideloading dynamic link libraries, and disguising payloads as image files.
The following query detects network activity that may indicate an attack by this group.
See Detect malicious documents associated with group known as "OceanLotus" for another query related to this group's activity.
This tracked activity group uses a wide array of malicious documents to conduct attacks. Some of their favored techniques include sideloading dynamic link libraries, and disguising payloads as image files.
The following query detects network activity that may indicate an attack by this group.
See Detect malicious documents associated with group known as "OceanLotus" for another query related to this group's activity.
Original Sigma Rule: https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/master/rules/apt/apt_equationgroup_c2.yml.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
Sample query that search for .settingcontent-ms that has been downloaded from the web.
Through Microsoft Edge, Internet Explorer, Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Microsoft Outlook.
For questions @MiladMSFT on Twitter or milad.aslaner@microsoft.com.
Through Microsoft Edge, Internet Explorer, Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Microsoft Outlook.
For questions @MiladMSFT on Twitter or milad.aslaner@microsoft.com.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Solorigate supply chain attack. Please note that these attacks are currently known as the Nobelium campaign.
Microsoft detects the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack implant and its other components as part of a campaign by the Nobelium activity group. Nobelium is the threat actor behind the attack against SolarWinds, which was previously referred to as Solorigate.
Nobelium silently added malicious code to legitimate software updates for Orion, which is IT monitoring software provided by SolarWinds. In this way, malicious dynamic link libraries (DLLs) were distributed to SolarWinds customers.
The following query detects events when Nobelium received a DNS response after launching a lookup request to known command-and-control infrastructure.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
Microsoft detects the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack implant and its other components as part of a campaign by the Nobelium activity group. Nobelium is the threat actor behind the attack against SolarWinds, which was previously referred to as Solorigate.
Nobelium silently added malicious code to legitimate software updates for Orion, which is IT monitoring software provided by SolarWinds. In this way, malicious dynamic link libraries (DLLs) were distributed to SolarWinds customers.
The following query detects events when Nobelium received a DNS response after launching a lookup request to known command-and-control infrastructure.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
This rule detects Okta authentication attempts originating from known VPN providers. Threat actors, particularly those involved in Remote Employment Fraud (REF), often use VPNs to mask their true physical location and evade detection. By identifying connections from a listing of commonly used VPN services, this rule aims to flag potentially suspicious access to Okta accounts. The rule extracts user information, client details, geographical context, and debug data to provide comprehensive insights into the VPN usage.
Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) programs are IT to manage remote endpoints. Attackers have begun to abuse these programs to persist or provide C2 channels.
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) programs are IT to manage remote endpoints. Attackers have begun to abuse these programs to persist or provide C2 channels.
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) programs are IT to manage remote endpoints. Attackers have begun to abuse these programs to persist or provide C2 channels.
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) programs are IT to manage remote endpoints. Attackers have begun to abuse these programs to persist or provide C2 channels.
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) programs are IT to manage remote endpoints. Attackers have begun to abuse these programs to persist or provide C2 channels.
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) programs are IT to manage remote endpoints. Attackers have begun to abuse these programs to persist or provide C2 channels.
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) programs are IT to manage remote endpoints. Attackers have begun to abuse these programs to persist or provide C2 channels.
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) programs are IT to manage remote endpoints. Attackers have begun to abuse these programs to persist or provide C2 channels.
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) programs are IT to manage remote endpoints. Attackers have begun to abuse these programs to persist or provide C2 channels.
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) programs are IT to manage remote endpoints. Attackers have begun to abuse these programs to persist or provide C2 channels.
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Solorigate supply chain attack. Please note that these attacks are currently known as the Nobelium campaign.
Microsoft detects the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack implant and its other components as part of a campaign by the Nobelium activity group. Nobelium is the threat actor behind the attack against SolarWinds, which was previously referred to as Solorigate.
Nobelium silently added malicious code to legitimate software updates for Orion, which is IT monitoring software provided by SolarWinds. In this way, malicious dynamic link libraries (DLLs) were distributed to SolarWinds customers.
The following query detects events when Nobelium received a DNS response after launching a lookup request to known command-and-control infrastructure.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
Microsoft detects the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack implant and its other components as part of a campaign by the Nobelium activity group. Nobelium is the threat actor behind the attack against SolarWinds, which was previously referred to as Solorigate.
Nobelium silently added malicious code to legitimate software updates for Orion, which is IT monitoring software provided by SolarWinds. In this way, malicious dynamic link libraries (DLLs) were distributed to SolarWinds customers.
The following query detects events when Nobelium received a DNS response after launching a lookup request to known command-and-control infrastructure.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
This rule detects attempts to hijack legitimate RDP sessions to establish persistence on the RDP source machine. Specifically, it looks for file creation events where the 'mstsc.exe' process (Microsoft Remote Desktop Connection client) is involved in writing a file to a user's 'Startup' folder. This technique can be used by an attacker to place a backdoor or malicious executable that will run automatically when the user logs into the RDP source machine.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Adwind utilizes Java for cross-platform impact.
Adwind is a remote access tool (RAT) that takes advantage of the cross-platform capabilities of the Java framework. It can check which operating system a target is running and adapt accordingly, allowing it to successfully compromise both Windows and macOS devices.
The query below must be run in Microsoft Defender XDR. This query detects events where a single Java archive, or JAR file, was attached to an incoming email. Since Adwind is distributed as a JAR file, this can help detect the initial access stage of a Adwind attack. Note that, although the behavior detected by this query is typical of attacks that use Adwind malware, unrelated attacks may use the same or similar techniques. Also note that JAR attachments are not necessarily or even often malware, and that further research will be needed to determine if query results are associated with malicious behavior.
See Hiding a Java class file for an additional query that detects behavior associated with Adwind attacks.
Adwind is a remote access tool (RAT) that takes advantage of the cross-platform capabilities of the Java framework. It can check which operating system a target is running and adapt accordingly, allowing it to successfully compromise both Windows and macOS devices.
The query below must be run in Microsoft Defender XDR. This query detects events where a single Java archive, or JAR file, was attached to an incoming email. Since Adwind is distributed as a JAR file, this can help detect the initial access stage of a Adwind attack. Note that, although the behavior detected by this query is typical of attacks that use Adwind malware, unrelated attacks may use the same or similar techniques. Also note that JAR attachments are not necessarily or even often malware, and that further research will be needed to determine if query results are associated with malicious behavior.
See Hiding a Java class file for an additional query that detects behavior associated with Adwind attacks.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Operation Soft Cell.
Operation Soft Cell is a series of campaigns targeting users' call logs at telecommunications providers throughout the world. These attacks date from as early as 2012.
Operation Soft Cell operators sometimes use legitimate web server processes to launch commands, especially for network discovery and user/owner discovery. The following query detects activity of this kind.
Reference - https://www.cybereason.com/blog/operation-soft-cell-a-worldwide-campaign-against-telecommunications-providers
Operation Soft Cell is a series of campaigns targeting users' call logs at telecommunications providers throughout the world. These attacks date from as early as 2012.
Operation Soft Cell operators sometimes use legitimate web server processes to launch commands, especially for network discovery and user/owner discovery. The following query detects activity of this kind.
Reference - https://www.cybereason.com/blog/operation-soft-cell-a-worldwide-campaign-against-telecommunications-providers
Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) programs are IT to manage remote endpoints. Attackers have begun to abuse these programs to persist or provide C2 channels.
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
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