Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

6,208 detections

This rule detects sign-in attempts originating from IP addresses that have been identified as infected with malware. These malware-infected IP addresses are known to actively communicate with bot servers, indicating a high risk of compromise or malicious activity associated with the sign-in.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0023
Detects when Microsoft Cloud App Security reports an activity originating from a country that has not been recently or ever visited by any user within the organization. This indicates potential unauthorized access or anomalous user behavior from an unusual geographic location.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0023
Detects connections made by Microsoft BITSAdmin to domains using uncommon Top-Level Domains (TLDs). This can indicate command and control activity or data exfiltration where an adversary is attempting to blend in with legitimate traffic but using less common TLDs to avoid common filtering.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
1023
Detects a specific URL pattern containing a specific extension and parameters pointing to an IP address. This pattern was seen being used by RomCOM potentially exploiting CVE-2023-36884. The rule looks for GET requests where the URI contains a file extension like .zip, .asp, .htm, .url, .xml, .chm, .mht, .vbs, or .search-ms, followed by '?d=' and an IPv4 address.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0022
Detects HTTP GET requests for specific file paths associated with the RomCom threat actor, potentially exploiting CVE-2023-36884. These file paths include various file types such as .url, .search-ms, .vbs, .mht, and .asp, which are likely used for initial access or further stages of the attack.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0022
Detects access to a file share with a specific naming schema ('\MSHTML_C7\' and an IP address pattern) that has been observed during exploitation of CVE-2023-36884. This rule looks for Windows Security Event ID 5140 (A network share object was accessed) where the ShareName or ShareLocalPath contains the characteristic string and an IP address.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
1022
This rule identifies user sign-ins originating from anonymous IP addresses, which may indicate the use of VPNs, Tor, or other anonymization services. Such activity can be a sign of an adversary attempting to mask their true location or identity during an access attempt.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0022
This rule detects sign-in attempts originating from IP addresses that Microsoft Entra ID Protection has identified as malicious. These IP addresses are known to be associated with attackers or compromised systems at the time of the sign-in, indicating a high-risk authentication attempt.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0022
This rule detects the use of the `wget` command-line utility to download files into potentially suspicious directories, specifically `/tmp/`. Adversaries often use `wget` for ingress tool transfer, downloading malicious payloads or additional tools to a compromised system. The rule looks for `wget` execution combined with the `-O` or `--output-document` flags, which specify an output file, and the presence of `/tmp/` in the command line, indicating a download to a common temporary directory often abused by attackers.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
2022
This rule identifies execution traces indicative of the XCSSET macOS malware. XCSSET is known to spread via Xcode projects and maliciously modify applications. The rule looks for specific command-line patterns involving 'curl' to suspicious URLs, 'osacompile' and 'plutil' interacting with user and group containers, and 'zip' archiving data from user and group containers. These activities suggest potential command and control communication, persistence mechanisms, and data staging/exfiltration by the malware.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
1022
This rule detects various keywords associated with data transfer and staging activities on Cisco devices. These activities could indicate an adversary attempting to move data onto the device for further exfiltration or to move data off the device. The keywords include common protocols and commands like 'tftp', 'rcp', 'puts', 'copy', 'configure replace', and 'archive tar', which are often used for file transfers and configuration management on network devices.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0022
Detects the presence of default Cobalt Strike certificate in the HTTPS traffic
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0022
Detects the download of executable, script, archive, and document file types from hosts associated with dynamic DNS services. These services are often abused by adversaries for command and control or for hosting malicious content due to their ability to frequently change IP addresses, making them harder to track and block.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
1022
Detects network requests to '/pwndrop/' URI paths, which are indicative of communication with a PwnDrp web server. PwnDrp is a tool developed for red team testing and is also known to be used for malicious activities, typically for command and control or data exfiltration.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
1022
Detects the creation of an Alternate Data Stream (ADS) named ':Zone.Identifier' within the WinGet temporary directory, specifically when the ZoneId is '3' (Internet) and the source URL contains suspicious IP address patterns (e.g., '://1', '://2', etc.). This indicates a file downloaded from the internet via WinGet that might originate from an untrusted or suspicious source, potentially used for defense evasion or persistence.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0022
Detects the creation of an "Active Directory Schema Cache File" (.sch) by an uncommon process. This activity can be indicative of tools performing Active Directory-related operations, potentially for reconnaissance or command and control, such as LDAPFragger. The rule filters out common legitimate processes that create these files.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0022
Detects the use of WebDAV by a client, specifically identifying the 'Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/' user agent during a GET request. This behavior is often associated with 'DownloadCradle' techniques used by adversaries to download malicious content or exfiltrate data.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
1021
Detects HTTP User-Agent strings that end with an equal sign, which can be an indicator of Base64 encoding. This technique is often used by malware to obfuscate C2 communications.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
1021
Detects the execution of the Windows LOLBIN (Living Off The Land Binary) PrintBrm.exe when it is used to create or extract ZIP files. This activity is generally not expected on a normal workstation and can indicate malicious use for data staging or exfiltration.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0021
This rule detects potential Command and Control (C2) communication associated with the Goofy Guineapig backdoor. It specifically looks for HTTP/S requests originating from a user agent string characteristic of the malware ('Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/54.0.2840.71 Safari/537.36') communicating with the domain 'static.tcplog.com'. This combination of user agent and destination domain is indicative of Goofy Guineapig C2 activity.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0020
This rule detects indicators of exploitation related to PaperCut MF/NG vulnerabilities. Specifically, it looks for command-line patterns associated with downloading and executing a malicious MSI installer. The first pattern identifies PowerShell commands using 'Invoke-WebRequest' to download 'setup.msi' with hidden window and no profile. The second pattern identifies 'msiexec' being used to install 'setup.msi' with a specific 'IntegratorLogin' parameter, which is a known indicator of the PaperCut exploitation.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0020
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