Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
3,119 detections
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Yara rule that detects Moisha ransomware.
Yara rule that detects GwisinLocker ransomware.
Detects suspicious addition to BitLocker related registry keys via the reg.exe utility
This YARA rule detects the RedAlert ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns within the executable. The patterns correspond to functions involved in setting up the environment, finding files to encrypt, encrypting files, and making configuration changes, which are characteristic behaviors of the RedAlert ransomware.
Yara rule that detects RedAlert ransomware.
This YARA rule detects the Acepy ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns associated with its core functionalities: finding files to encrypt, performing the encryption process, and dropping a ransom note. The rule requires all three patterns to be present within a Windows executable file (indicated by the MZ header) to trigger a detection.
This rule detects the BlueLocker ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns related to its file encryption and file finding routines, as well as its cryptographic context creation. The rule looks for three distinct parts of the encryption process ($encrypt_files_p1, $encrypt_files_p2, $encrypt_files_p3), two parts of the file finding process ($find_files_p1, $find_files_p2), and a pattern for creating the cryptographic context ($create_crypt_context). All these patterns must be present for a detection to occur, indicating the presence of the BlueLocker ransomware.
Yara rule that detects Acepy ransomware.
Yara rule that detects BlueLocker ransomware.
This Yara rule detects the PoliceRecords ransomware. It identifies specific byte sequences related to file encryption, file discovery, desktop manipulation (likely for displaying a ransom note or changing wallpaper), and the dropping of a ransom note. The rule looks for these distinct patterns within executable files (identified by the 'MZ' header).
Yara rule that detects PoliceRecords ransomware.
Yara rule that detects WsIR ransomware.
This rule detects the EAF ransomware by identifying specific bytecode patterns associated with its file encryption, file finding, and file destruction functionalities. The rule looks for a combination of patterns related to encrypting files, locating files on the system, and destroying executable files, indicating the presence and activity of the EAF ransomware.
This rule detects the GoodWill ransomware by identifying specific bytecode patterns related to file encryption, AES encryption routines, file system enumeration, and remote connection activities. The rule looks for a combination of these patterns within a file, indicating the presence of the ransomware.
Yara rule that detects WaspLocker ransomware.
Yara rule that detects Cincoo ransomware.
Yara rule that detects FarAttack ransomware.
This YARA rule detects the Nokoyawa ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns related to its functionality. The rule looks for patterns associated with enumerating shares, finding files, and encrypting files, which are common behaviors of ransomware. The rule requires all three sets of patterns ($enum_shares, $find_files_p*, and $encrypt_files) to be present, along with the MZ header (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D), indicating an executable file.
Yara rule that detects Venom ransomware.
Yara rule that detects Nokoyawa ransomware.
Yara rule that detects NB65 ransomware.
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