Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a large volume of file write, rename, or creation operations within a single minute by a single process, concurrently with the creation of files containing common ransomware keywords (e.g., 'readme', 'decrypt', 'how_to'). This behavior is characteristic of ransomware encryption activities.
This rule detects a sequence of suspicious events related to the 'ENCFORGE' threat actor or toolset. It monitors for evidence of initial access (via validation/code API calls), command and control communication (to specific IP/port), and destructive impact, correlating these activities within a 4-hour window on the same host.
Detects the ENCFORGE locker malware, associated with the JADEPUFFER campaign, which specifically targets AI/ML-related files such as model checkpoints, vector databases, and training data for the purpose of malicious encryption or destruction.
Detects shell/install scripts that deploy an XMRig-based Monero cryptominer, consistent with the install script planted on the LeakySensey git repository server
Detects the use of the native Windows utility cipher.exe with the /w flag executed from the command prompt. The /w switch instructs cipher to remove data from available unused disk space, which is a technique often used by threat actors to hinder forensic recovery of deleted files.
Detects the use of the native Windows utility cipher.exe with the /w flag. This command is designed to overwrite free disk space with random data to sanitize it and make previously deleted files irrecoverable. While this is a legitimate administrative feature, adversaries may utilize it as a form of anti-forensics or to perform data destruction.
Detects the use of the native Windows utility cipher.exe with the /w flag. This command is designed to overwrite free disk space with random data to sanitize it and make previously deleted files irrecoverable. While this is a legitimate administrative feature, adversaries may utilize it as a form of anti-forensics or to perform data destruction.
Detects the execution of the 'reagentc.exe' utility with the '/disable' argument. This command is used to disable the Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), which is a common post-compromise activity performed by ransomware and other malware to prevent system recovery and hinder incident response efforts.
Detects the execution of 'reagentc.exe' with the '/disable' flag, which is used to disable the Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE). Adversaries often perform this action as part of an attempt to inhibit system recovery during ransomware operations or other destructive attacks.
Detects the execution of the Windows cipher.exe utility with the /w flag, which is used to overwrite free space on a volume to permanently delete data, a common technique for anti-forensics and data destruction.
Detects the execution of the Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) management tool, reagentc.exe, with the '/disable' flag. This action disables the built-in system recovery features, which is a common tactic used by adversaries to prevent system restoration after data destruction or ransomware attacks.
Detects Settra ransomware binaries characterized by naming conventions including '_win64.exe', which create 'RESTORE_FILES.txt' ransom notes and use '.locked' or '.locked_wip' file extensions for encrypted data.
Detects the execution of reagentc.exe with the /disable command-line argument, which is used to disable the Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE). Adversaries use this technique to inhibit system recovery and prevent users or automated systems from restoring the operating system to a known good state after an attack, such as data destruction or encryption.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by correlating three distinct events: the execution of a suspicious, potentially obfuscated binary (matching a specific naming pattern of _win64.exe) from an untrusted location (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads), followed by a high volume of file modifications or renames with specific ransomware-related extensions (.locked), and the dropping of a known ransom note file (RESTORE_FILES.txt) within a short 15-minute time window.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by correlating three distinct events: the execution of a suspicious, potentially obfuscated binary (matching a specific naming pattern of _win64.exe) from an untrusted location (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads), followed by a high volume of file modifications or renames with specific ransomware-related extensions (.locked), and the dropping of a known ransom note file (RESTORE_FILES.txt) within a short 15-minute time window.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by correlating three distinct events: the execution of a suspicious, potentially obfuscated binary (matching a specific naming pattern of _win64.exe) from an untrusted location (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads), followed by a high volume of file modifications or renames with specific ransomware-related extensions (.locked), and the dropping of a known ransom note file (RESTORE_FILES.txt) within a short 15-minute time window.
Detects phishing attempts leveraging SendGrid infrastructure to send emails that impersonate well-known financial brands. The detection looks for emails with authentication checks passing (SPF/DKIM/DMARC) where the sender domain is suspicious (e.g., .asia or .com not matching the brand) and the volume of such messages suggests an automated campaign.
Detects unauthorized attempts to modify, delete, or truncate backup configuration files and data directories associated with cPanel, WHM, and Plesk environments. This rule monitors for common file manipulation commands (e.g., rm, mv, truncate) targeting sensitive paths like /etc/acronis, /etc/cpanel/backups, and other backup-related directories, excluding actions performed by authorized service accounts.
Detects outbound network traffic from internal hosts to the known MoneroOcean mining pool over TLS (port 443). This behavior is indicative of XMRig or other cryptomining software communicating with a mining pool to exchange job data, often a sign of unauthorized resource hijacking.
Detects network traffic consistent with the download of XMRig cryptocurrency miner release tarballs from GitHub, typically used in malicious deployment scenarios including automated cron-triggered installations.
Detects the deployment and activity of SilkParasite-associated Linux threats, including XMRig cryptocurrency miner shell scripts and standalone Meterpreter agents. The rule also captures the execution of a custom Python fleet-scanning tool used to interact with exposed Redis instances for unauthorized command execution and infrastructure management.
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