Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a sequence of activity involving the use of the MySQL 'AES_ENCRYPT' function followed by a 'DROP TABLE', 'DROP SCHEMA', or 'DROP DATABASE' command on the same host within a 30-minute window. This behavior is consistent with extortion tactics, such as the JADEPUFFER campaign, where attackers encrypt sensitive database records and delete the original tables to compel ransom payments.
Detects the ScreenConnect remote access binary spawning suspicious child processes often associated with lateral movement, system reconnaissance, or anti-forensics activity (such as deleting shadow copies, modifying boot configuration, or using administrative tools for remote command execution). This behavior is highly indicative of an adversary abusing legitimate RMM software to execute post-exploitation commands.
Detects the use of native Windows utilities (vssadmin, wbadmin, bcdedit, wmic) to delete volume shadow copies, backup catalogs, or disable system recovery features. This behavior is a common precursor to or component of ransomware encryption operations intended to prevent system recovery.
Detects the creation of multiple or specific file locks that deviate from standard naming conventions, often associated with wiper malware attempting to overwrite files or fill disks by creating locking files as part of their destructive payload.
Detects the execution of native Windows administrative utilities (vssadmin, wmic, bcdedit, wbadmin) used by the Monkey ransomware C++ variant to delete volume shadow copies, clear the backup catalog, and disable system recovery boot policies. This activity is a characteristic precursor to data encryption.
Detects potential database ransomware activity by correlating the usage of AES_ENCRYPT for record modification, followed by the dropping of tables and the insertion of ransom notes containing specific contact keywords (e.g., bitcoin, proton mail) within database queries or system logs.
Detects a potential destructive activity pattern involving the staging of a payload in a non-standard directory (utilizing a directory name with a trailing space) followed by a burst of file deletions on the same device. This behavior is indicative of a secondary destructive payload execution, often associated with disk-wiping malware.
Detects a potential destructive activity pattern involving the staging of a payload in a non-standard directory (utilizing a directory name with a trailing space) followed by a burst of file deletions on the same device. This behavior is indicative of a secondary destructive payload execution, often associated with disk-wiping malware.
Detects a potential destructive activity pattern involving the staging of a payload in a non-standard directory (utilizing a directory name with a trailing space) followed by a burst of file deletions on the same device. This behavior is indicative of a secondary destructive payload execution, often associated with disk-wiping malware.
Detects shell/install scripts that deploy an XMRig-based Monero cryptominer, consistent with the install script planted on the LeakySensey git repository server
Detects file and process activity associated with the Hermes ransomware, specifically targeting the presence of 'SOUL.md' files, '.hermes' file paths, and the 'HERMES_DISABLE_SAFETY=1' command-line argument.
Detects a specifically malformed IPv6 Routing Header (type 0) with a 'segments_left' value of 255 preceding an Authentication Header (AH). This signature targets an exploit pattern known as 'DirtyAH6', which aims to trigger a remote kernel crash or potential remote code execution on vulnerable systems by manipulating IPv6 header processing.
This rule detects a high volume of SCTP traffic targeted at internal systems, characterized by mass endpoint creation. This behavior is indicative of an exploit attempt against the 'sctp_diag' kernel component (CVE-2026-74469), which can lead to an out-of-bounds (OOB) write condition, potentially resulting in system instability or denial of service.
This rule detects a high volume of SCTP traffic targeted at internal systems, characterized by mass endpoint creation. This behavior is indicative of an exploit attempt against the 'sctp_diag' kernel component (CVE-2026-74469), which can lead to an out-of-bounds (OOB) write condition, potentially resulting in system instability or denial of service.
Detects the deletion of volume shadow copies using common Windows administrative utilities including vssadmin.exe, wmic.exe, diskshadow.exe, or through PowerShell WMI/CIM cmdlets. This behavior is frequently associated with ransomware and data destruction attacks aiming to prevent system recovery.
This rule detects potentially malicious activities aimed at credential harvesting and system recovery inhibition. It monitors for the execution of vssadmin.exe with arguments to list shadow copies (often a precursor to deletion) or references to DPAPI master keys in command lines. Additionally, it identifies unauthorized processes attempting to access sensitive browser-based credential files (e.g., Login Data, Cookies, key4.db) from standard browser installation paths, specifically excluding legitimate browser and update processes.
This rule detects email-based business fraud (BEC) targeting the organization, specifically looking for executive impersonation paired with financial lure terminology and sender domain mismatches. It utilizes both a blocklist of known fraudulent sender indicators (domains and addresses) and a heuristic approach analyzing discrepancies between the envelope sender domain and the header sender domain combined with executive titles in display names and invoice-related keywords.
Detects rapid, non-interactive ransomware-like behavior characterized by system reconnaissance followed by automated bulk file deletion of model/data files (e.g., .ckpt, .pt). The rule identifies campaigns where discovery, lateral movement or automated execution, and destructive impact occur within a 3-hour window without any interactive user login evidence.
Detects the execution of a local git force-push operation, which is a technique used by an adversary to overwrite existing repository tags or branches during a software supply chain compromise or repository takeover scenario.
Detects the use of the built-in Windows 'cipher.exe' utility with the '/w' flag, which is used to securely overwrite free space on a disk, a technique often used by adversaries for anti-forensics or data destruction to prevent file recovery. The rule specifically alerts on execution from command-line environments (cmd.exe) where the command output is redirected to null, often used to hide the progress or output of the wiping process.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by correlating three distinct events: the execution of a suspicious, potentially obfuscated binary (matching a specific naming pattern of _win64.exe) from an untrusted location (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads), followed by a high volume of file modifications or renames with specific ransomware-related extensions (.locked), and the dropping of a known ransom note file (RESTORE_FILES.txt) within a short 15-minute time window.
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