Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a 'force-push' operation in a Git repository where the pushed commit is not cryptographically signed. This behavior is often indicative of repository tampering, such as overwriting commit history to remove audit trails, hide malicious code injection, or facilitate unauthorized repository modifications.
Detects the use of the native Windows utility 'wbadmin.exe' to delete the system backup catalog or system state backups. This activity is a common indicator of ransomware or other destructive attacks aiming to inhibit system recovery by preventing administrators from restoring data from existing backups.
This rule detects potentially malicious outbound email activity sent through Microsoft Graph or Exchange APIs using unknown or infrequently seen client applications. It identifies scenarios where these applications send emails containing financial keywords (e.g., 'invoice', 'wire transfer'), which is a common indicator of Business Email Compromise (BEC) and 'EvilTokens' style mail-vault activity where attackers intercept or inject themselves into existing financial threads.
Detects the use of legitimate Windows administrative utilities (vssadmin.exe, wmic.exe, wbadmin.exe) to delete volume shadow copies or backup catalogs. This behavior is a common tactic employed by ransomware actors to inhibit system recovery and prevent restoration of encrypted data.
Detects the use of the Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line (WMIC) utility to delete individual Volume Shadow Copy (VSS) snapshots. This technique is commonly used by ransomware families to inhibit system recovery by preventing users from restoring files from shadow copies.
Detects the rapid termination of multiple critical processes (security, database, backup, and office applications) consistent with the kill list behavior exhibited by DragonForce ransomware. The rule monitors for a pattern of three or more unique processes from a defined list being terminated on the same host within a 5-minute window, a common precursor to file encryption.
Detects instances where a process running as 'root' modifies files within an Acronis-related directory. This specifically alerts when the modifying process is not identified as a known, authorized Acronis backup service, potentially indicating unauthorized tampering with backup archives or configuration files.
Detects high-volume deletion or recycling of files within OneDrive or SharePoint for a specific user, which may indicate malicious activity such as data destruction, ransomware, or unauthorized data exfiltration staging.
Detects bulk file deletion activities (three or more files deleted or moved to the recycle bin) within SharePoint or OneDrive by a specific user within a 30-minute window, which may indicate malicious activity or data destruction.
Detects a process that has established a connection to the Telegram Bot API subsequently performing a large volume of file deletions across multiple folders within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a remote-controlled destructive attack, such as the deployment of a wiper malware (e.g., HEAVYGRAM or CHOSEN BRICK) triggered via Telegram C2 commands.
Detects a process that has established a connection to the Telegram Bot API subsequently performing a large volume of file deletions across multiple folders within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a remote-controlled destructive attack, such as the deployment of a wiper malware (e.g., HEAVYGRAM or CHOSEN BRICK) triggered via Telegram C2 commands.
Detects a process that has established a connection to the Telegram Bot API subsequently performing a large volume of file deletions across multiple folders within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a remote-controlled destructive attack, such as the deployment of a wiper malware (e.g., HEAVYGRAM or CHOSEN BRICK) triggered via Telegram C2 commands.
Detects executable files containing XOR-obfuscated strings associated with BabylonRAT capabilities, including browser credential theft, keylogging, HOSTS file manipulation, DDoS, and remote dynamic API resolution. This rule identifies patterns commonly used to evade static analysis.
Detects attempts to inhibit system recovery by deleting volume shadow copies or modifying backup/boot recovery configurations. The rule monitors for the execution of vssadmin, wmic, wbadmin, and bcdedit with flags known to facilitate system recovery inhibition, often observed as a precursor to ransomware activity.
This rule detects the execution of the HTSPnew.Exe ransomware payload, associated with a trojanized HTS DLL, and subsequent ransomware-related file operations, such as the creation of .krsid encrypted files and the dropping of a Korean-language ransom note (README_KRSID.Txt).
Detects the KRSID Rust-based ransomware binary by matching against known file hashes or by identifying specific command-line arguments and embedded file/log indicators commonly used by the malware.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by monitoring for specific file naming patterns associated with known ransom notes (.krsid, README_KRSID.Txt) and the execution of suspicious processes (HTSPnew.Exe, UBPUpdater.exe).
Detects a suspicious correlation where a host reports a confirmed exploit attempt followed by a high volume of file modifications (encryption behavior) within a single hour. This short dwell time is a strong indicator of automated or AI-orchestrated ransomware deployments.
Detects unauthorized file operations (creation, modification, or renaming) against the Windows hosts file located at C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts. This is a common technique used by attackers to redirect network traffic, hijack domains, or disrupt communications to security services. The rule excludes common system processes known to perform legitimate maintenance on this file.
This rule detects email-based business fraud (BEC) targeting the organization, specifically looking for executive impersonation paired with financial lure terminology and sender domain mismatches. It utilizes both a blocklist of known fraudulent sender indicators (domains and addresses) and a heuristic approach analyzing discrepancies between the envelope sender domain and the header sender domain combined with executive titles in display names and invoice-related keywords.
Detects shell/install scripts that deploy an XMRig-based Monero cryptominer, consistent with the install script planted on the LeakySensey git repository server
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