Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects shell/install scripts that deploy an XMRig-based Monero cryptominer, consistent with the install script planted on the LeakySensey git repository server
Detects the deletion of volume shadow copies using common Windows administrative utilities including vssadmin.exe, wmic.exe, diskshadow.exe, or through PowerShell WMI/CIM cmdlets. This behavior is frequently associated with ransomware and data destruction attacks aiming to prevent system recovery.
This rule detects potentially malicious activities aimed at credential harvesting and system recovery inhibition. It monitors for the execution of vssadmin.exe with arguments to list shadow copies (often a precursor to deletion) or references to DPAPI master keys in command lines. Additionally, it identifies unauthorized processes attempting to access sensitive browser-based credential files (e.g., Login Data, Cookies, key4.db) from standard browser installation paths, specifically excluding legitimate browser and update processes.
This rule detects potentially malicious activities aimed at credential harvesting and system recovery inhibition. It monitors for the execution of vssadmin.exe with arguments to list shadow copies (often a precursor to deletion) or references to DPAPI master keys in command lines. Additionally, it identifies unauthorized processes attempting to access sensitive browser-based credential files (e.g., Login Data, Cookies, key4.db) from standard browser installation paths, specifically excluding legitimate browser and update processes.
Detects outbound email replies concerning invoices or payments sent by a user shortly after performing a device-code authentication flow, indicative of an ARTSender proxy attack where the attacker hijacks an existing email conversation to conduct Business Email Compromise (BEC).
This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving the manipulation of Windows services using 'sc.exe' to stop or delete services, combined with the forceful termination of 'svchost.exe' processes via 'wmic.exe'. This pattern is often associated with adversaries attempting to disable security tools, logging agents, or other defensive mechanisms on an endpoint.
Detects potential Business Email Compromise (BEC) related to 'Phantom Deal' fraud. The rule identifies email threads where a user receives an urgent request for proof of payment (MT103/UETR) within 72 hours of an email discussion involving both wire transfer/payment keywords and M&A/deal context.
This rule detects email-based business fraud (BEC) targeting the organization, specifically looking for executive impersonation paired with financial lure terminology and sender domain mismatches. It utilizes both a blocklist of known fraudulent sender indicators (domains and addresses) and a heuristic approach analyzing discrepancies between the envelope sender domain and the header sender domain combined with executive titles in display names and invoice-related keywords.
Detects the execution of known remote monitoring and management (RMM) software often abused by threat actors following social engineering attempts, such as helpdesk impersonation, to establish persistence and remote access prior to deploying ransomware.
Detects incoming emails to finance or accounts payable aliases that contain urgent payment-related keywords and suspicious patterns, such as subject lines including dollar amounts or emails where the Reply-To address domain differs from the Sender domain. This activity is highly indicative of BEC fraud attempts targeting payment redirection.
Detects potential Qilin ransomware binaries following Cisco FMC-based intrusion by UAT-11988. Source intel provides only name-level attribution (no sample hash/byte IOC for the payload), so this is tightened to a valid PE, a plausible ransomware-payload size band, and >=2 occurrences of the family string -- a bare single 'Qilin' substring in an arbitrary PE (e.g. an unrelated app, build path, or AV/report string) is not sufficient to alert on alone.
This rule detects a high volume of SCTP traffic targeted at internal systems, characterized by mass endpoint creation. This behavior is indicative of an exploit attempt against the 'sctp_diag' kernel component (CVE-2026-74469), which can lead to an out-of-bounds (OOB) write condition, potentially resulting in system instability or denial of service.
Detects file-related operations (creation, modification, renaming, or deletion) performed on files containing 'acronis' or 'backup' in their path, executed by a process associated with Acronis, running under highly privileged system contexts (root or SYSTEM). This activity is indicative of potential unauthorized manipulation or disabling of backup software, commonly seen in ransomware attacks to inhibit recovery.
Detects signs of email bombing by monitoring for critical thresholds in mail server queue size, transfer latency, or a significant spike in SMTP connection attempts targeting individual mailboxes. This activity often aims to disrupt email service availability, bury critical alerts, or facilitate social engineering attacks.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity where multiple critical processes (such as database engines or email clients) are terminated in a short time frame, correlated with a high volume of file creation or modification events on the same device. This behavior is indicative of destructive activity, such as ransomware encrypting data stores or disabling defensive software.
Detects a process that has established a connection to the Telegram Bot API subsequently performing a large volume of file deletions across multiple folders within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a remote-controlled destructive attack, such as the deployment of a wiper malware (e.g., HEAVYGRAM or CHOSEN BRICK) triggered via Telegram C2 commands.
Detects the use of net.exe to stop critical system services commonly associated with ransomware operations, such as volume shadow copies, security services, and Windows update services, to facilitate data encryption or prevent system recovery.
Detects the presence of OpnKey ransomware-specific configuration strings related to size-tiered file encryption settings in process command lines. These indicators suggest the execution of a binary with hardcoded logic to categorize files for encryption based on their size.
Detects the execution of REAgentC.exe with the /disable command-line argument. This utility is used to manage the Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE). Adversaries often disable WinRE to prevent system recovery and impede incident response, often as a prelude to data destruction or ransomware attacks.
Detects the execution of reagentc.exe with the /disable flag, which is used to disable the Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE). This activity is often performed by ransomware actors prior to data encryption to prevent system recovery and hinder incident response.
Detects a suspicious sequence of system utility executions (reagentc.exe, diskpart.exe, ipconfig.exe, and cipher.exe) originating from a single parent process within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of ransomware attempting to inhibit system recovery and perform anti-forensic actions.
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