Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects Adblock.dll used by Docro Hijacker to bypass Chrome Secure Preferences HMAC-SHA256 integrity checks and register infected browser UUID via vendralo[.]info
Detects Adblock.dll used by Docro Hijacker to bypass Chrome Secure Preferences HMAC-SHA256 integrity checks and register infected browser UUID via vendralo[.]info
Detects the use of bcdedit.exe to disable automatic system recovery features, a common technique used by ransomware and other malware to prevent automated restoration of the operating system after compromise.
Detects the execution of vssadmin.exe or WMIC.exe with commands intended to delete Volume Shadow Copies. This behavior is commonly associated with ransomware attempting to prevent system restoration by deleting local backups.
Detects command-line execution containing 'Processes.KillRunningProcesses', a string characteristic of the OpnKey ransomware builder configuration, suggesting an intent to terminate critical processes to facilitate encryption.
Detects the presence of OpnKey ransomware-specific configuration strings related to size-tiered file encryption settings in process command lines. These indicators suggest the execution of a binary with hardcoded logic to categorize files for encryption based on their size.
Detects high-frequency file creation, modification, or renaming activity involving files with the specific '.df_win' extension, likely indicative of mass encryption activity or automated ransomware behavior. The rule excludes known backup and security software processes to reduce noise.
Detects high-frequency file creation, modification, or renaming activity involving files with the specific '.df_win' extension, likely indicative of mass encryption activity or automated ransomware behavior. The rule excludes known backup and security software processes to reduce noise.
Detects DragonForce ransomware note (readme.txt) referencing known DragonForce Tor negotiation/blog onion addresses
Detects repeated attempts to delete Volume Shadow Copies using WMIC. This is a common technique used by ransomware and other malware to prevent system recovery and inhibit forensic investigations. The rule filters out known backup agents and service accounts and identifies patterns where multiple distinct deletions occur within a 5-minute window.
Detects repeated attempts to delete Volume Shadow Copies using WMIC. This is a common technique used by ransomware and other malware to prevent system recovery and inhibit forensic investigations. The rule filters out known backup agents and service accounts and identifies patterns where multiple distinct deletions occur within a 5-minute window.
Detects high volumes of file renaming activities involving files with the .df_win extension. This pattern is often indicative of ransomware-like behavior where mass renaming occurs as part of an encryption process, impacting multiple directories.
Detects high volumes of file renaming activities involving files with the .df_win extension. This pattern is often indicative of ransomware-like behavior where mass renaming occurs as part of an encryption process, impacting multiple directories.
Detects high-value wire transfers (>= €600,000) directed to beneficiaries in Hong Kong that contain suspicious memo or description fields related to confidential acquisitions or professional service retainers, potentially indicating business email compromise (BEC) or fraudulent financial activity.
Detects high-value wire transfers (>= €600,000) directed to beneficiaries in Hong Kong that contain suspicious memo or description fields related to confidential acquisitions or professional service retainers, potentially indicating business email compromise (BEC) or fraudulent financial activity.
Detects forged NDA documents used in Phantom Deal fake acquisition fraud, requiring corroborating secrecy-clause language and M&A-fraud-specific wire-transfer/payment phrasing alongside impersonated advisory brands
Detects forged NDA documents used in Phantom Deal fake acquisition fraud, requiring corroborating secrecy-clause language and M&A-fraud-specific wire-transfer/payment phrasing alongside impersonated advisory brands
Detects forged Citibank payment confirmation/account statement PDFs used in Phantom Deal BPC fraud to falsely demonstrate wire transfer progress; requires combination of bank branding with fraud-specific SWIFT/routing/CTA artifacts
Detects forged NDA documents used in Phantom Deal M&A fraud campaign, requiring co-occurrence of impersonated advisory firm branding, secrecy-clause language restricting communication to personal channels, and M&A-fraud-specific wire/payment indicators rather than secrecy-clause phrasing alone
Detects forged NDA documents used in Phantom Deal M&A fraud campaign, requiring co-occurrence of impersonated advisory firm branding, secrecy-clause language restricting communication to personal channels, and M&A-fraud-specific wire/payment indicators rather than secrecy-clause phrasing alone
This rule monitors for inbound external emails where the sender requests private communication (e.g., 'private email' or 'personal address') in combination with keywords related to sensitive business topics like M&A, legal, or urgent financial transactions. This pattern is characteristic of Business Email Compromise (BEC) or social engineering attempts designed to move sensitive conversations outside of monitored corporate channels.
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