Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a sequence of commands characteristic of the Stealer/1.0 malware, involving the systematic disabling of security features including Windows Defender, Firewall, UAC, System Restore, Windows Recovery Environment, SafeBoot, and the deletion of Volume Shadow Copies as a precursor to destructive data operations.
Detects the use of the Windows 'diskpart' utility combined with a script or command execution containing 'clean all', which performs a destructive multi-pass overwrite of disk data structures to render it irrecoverable. This behavior is typically associated with malicious data destruction or wiping activities.
Detects the execution of vssadmin.exe to delete volume shadow copies or attempts to clear recovery-related directories such as SoftwareDistribution or Windows.old. This behavior is indicative of ransomware or destructive activity aimed at inhibiting system recovery.
Detects the use of 'bootsect.exe' with parameters specifically designed to overwrite the Master Boot Record (MBR) and the targeting or modification of 'winload.efi', which is indicative of destructive boot-level attacks or bootkit deployment attempts.
Detects Direct Send spearphishing impersonating internal roles (IT/Finance/Procurement) with business-themed lures targeting leadership/finance titles. Rewritten: removed a non-functional sender/recipient substring check and a broken EmailPostDeliveryEvents join that made the rule rarely fire; anchored detection to the actual Direct Send signature (null envelope + domain match) and a direct IdentityInfo join; standardized auth-failure parsing to match the other rules in this set.
Detects Direct Send spearphishing impersonating internal roles (IT/Finance/Procurement) with business-themed lures targeting leadership/finance titles. Rewritten: removed a non-functional sender/recipient substring check and a broken EmailPostDeliveryEvents join that made the rule rarely fire; anchored detection to the actual Direct Send signature (null envelope + domain match) and a direct IdentityInfo join; standardized auth-failure parsing to match the other rules in this set.
This rule detects potential cryptocurrency mining activity where known miner executables (specifically XMRig) or malicious scripts/processes are masquerading as or being spawned by 'LockAppHost.exe' or 'LockAppHost14a02b.exe'. It also monitors for subsequent attempts by these processes to terminate security-related tasks or establish persistence via registry run keys.
This rule detects suspicious activity associated with JSCeal proxy handlers. It identifies Node.js or Electron processes running from non-standard, user-writable directories (such as AppData, ProgramData, or Temp folders) that actively delete or modify browser cookie files within standard web browser profile paths, often indicative of session hijacking or data tampering.
This rule detects suspicious activity associated with JSCeal proxy handlers. It identifies Node.js or Electron processes running from non-standard, user-writable directories (such as AppData, ProgramData, or Temp folders) that actively delete or modify browser cookie files within standard web browser profile paths, often indicative of session hijacking or data tampering.
Detects anomalous TLS traffic directed at Binance or Bybit domains where the server certificate issuer is not from a known trusted certificate authority. This behavior is indicative of a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) proxy interception, often associated with tools like JSCeal attempting to inspect or modify encrypted traffic to financial services.
Detects anomalous TLS traffic directed at Binance or Bybit domains where the server certificate issuer is not from a known trusted certificate authority. This behavior is indicative of a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) proxy interception, often associated with tools like JSCeal attempting to inspect or modify encrypted traffic to financial services.
This rule detects unauthorized modification of the desktop wallpaper registry key to an empty string, typically used for desktop defacement or disruptive activity, followed by a system parameter refresh to apply the changes immediately. It monitors for the use of reg.exe to clear the wallpaper registry value and rundll32.exe to invoke the User32.dll UpdatePerUserSystemParameters function, which forces the Windows shell to refresh desktop settings.
Detects Adblock.dll used by Docro Hijacker to bypass Chrome Secure Preferences HMAC-SHA256 integrity checks and register infected browser UUID via vendralo[.]info
Detects high volumes of file renaming activities involving files with the .df_win extension. This pattern is often indicative of ransomware-like behavior where mass renaming occurs as part of an encryption process, impacting multiple directories.
Detects file system operations targeting common user directories and specific file extensions (.bak, .backup, .locked) often associated with data exfiltration, staging, or ransomware activity.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving the manipulation of Windows services using 'sc.exe' to stop or delete services, combined with the forceful termination of 'svchost.exe' processes via 'wmic.exe'. This pattern is often associated with adversaries attempting to disable security tools, logging agents, or other defensive mechanisms on an endpoint.
Detects Direct Send spearphishing impersonating internal roles (IT/Finance/Procurement) with business-themed lures targeting leadership/finance titles. Rewritten: removed a non-functional sender/recipient substring check and a broken EmailPostDeliveryEvents join that made the rule rarely fire; anchored detection to the actual Direct Send signature (null envelope + domain match) and a direct IdentityInfo join; standardized auth-failure parsing to match the other rules in this set.
Detects instances where a user account performs a device configuration change (such as updating compliance policies) followed by a potentially destructive operation (Wipe, Retire, or Delete) on the same device or entity within a 6-hour window. This behavior often suggests unauthorized administrative activity or a malicious insider attempting to disable security controls before removing access or destroying data.
Detects the presence of a malicious HAProxy binary (version 2.8.12) that has been recompiled with an embedded 'ted' plugin. The plugin is designed to intercept and manipulate web traffic, as evidenced by specific strings related to pipe file handling, logging, and registration operations found within the binary.
Detects instances where Microsoft Copilot memory content (identified by hash) remains identical before and after a significant account security event, such as a password reset or session revocation. This behavior suggests that an adversary may have injected malicious or persistent data into the user's Copilot memory, which survives standard account remediation actions.
Detects the use of reg.exe to modify a Windows Run registry key to execute a destructive 'format C:' command upon system startup, indicative of wiper-style malware activity.
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