Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Generic rule content from file: TOKYOCORE Wiper: Raw MBR Overwrite via \\.\PhysicalDrive0
Detects potential exploitation attempts targeting WordPress sites, specifically identifying unauthenticated REST API batch requests that attempt to forge posts with post_status 'parse' and post_type 'request' while including self-referential post_parent cycles. This pattern is associated with recent vulnerabilities enabling remote code execution.
Bulk file-write activity by a single process within a 1-minute window, filtered to exclude common high-volume legitimate processes (backup agents, AV scanners, installers, sync clients) and correlated with the appearance of ransom-note-style filenames or unusual/new file extensions in the same window, indicative of ransomware encryption post-RAT access.
Detects specific registry modifications indicative of the NoEscape ransomware, including changes to desktop wallpaper settings, auto-colorization preferences, and Explorer shell policies used to restrict user interaction or modify system aesthetics as part of an extortion campaign.
Detects unauthorized modification of file permissions (using icacls), transfer of ownership (using takeown), or deletion (using del) of critical Windows boot-related files such as ntoskrnl.exe, winload.exe, and bootmgr. This activity is indicative of a potential attempt to destroy system boot stability, inhibit recovery, or prepare a host for secondary stage impacts.
This rule detects incoming emails with subject lines containing keywords associated with invoice, payment, or banking detail changes. These patterns are highly characteristic of Business Email Compromise (BEC) and social engineering campaigns designed to redirect financial transactions to fraudulent accounts.
Detects the CylindricalCanine/GoldenEyeDog credential-theft pattern where the malware first kills a running browser or chat client (Chrome.exe, firefox.exe, skype.exe, 360se.exe, 360chrome.exe, QQBrowser.exe) and then, within a short window, reads/creates the associated credential/profile files (Login Data, avBackup.dat, FormData3.dat, historyUrl3.db, history3.db) on the same device.
Detects potential exploitation attempts targeting WordPress sites, specifically identifying unauthenticated REST API batch requests that attempt to forge posts with post_status 'parse' and post_type 'request' while including self-referential post_parent cycles. This pattern is associated with recent vulnerabilities enabling remote code execution.
Detects [embed] shortcode content submitted to WordPress that references invalid or anonymous local post IDs, used in the wp2shell chain to forge oEmbed cache database rows as a render-time write primitive.
Detects modifications to the Windows Registry that disable the ability for a user to change their desktop wallpaper by setting the 'NoChangingWallPaper' value within the 'ActiveDesktop' policy key to '1'. This is often associated with system tampering to enforce restricted user environments.
Detects the use of PowerShell or administrative command-line tools (net, sc) to enumerate and forcefully stop critical backup, database, and virtualization services. This behavior is commonly observed in ransomware attacks where adversaries disable security-critical or data-hosting services prior to encryption to ensure file locks are released and backups are incapacitated.
Detects files containing 3+ TOKYOCORE ransom note strings combined with 2+ C2-related strings (Tier 2 cluster overlap)
Detects the creation of a 'C:\user.png' file, which is known to be used as a marker file by NoEscape ransomware/wiper malware at the root of the system drive.
Detects the execution of processes containing command line strings associated with the NoEscape ransomware lock screen. These messages are used to intimidate victims by displaying full-screen ransom demands.
Detects unauthenticated exploitation attempts targeting WordPress sites using wp2shell techniques. The rule identifies malicious payloads attempting to leverage RSS, Navigation, or Calendar Gutenberg blocks in conjunction with the batch REST API to achieve Remote Code Execution.
Detects unauthenticated exploitation attempts targeting WordPress sites using wp2shell techniques. The rule identifies malicious payloads attempting to leverage RSS, Navigation, or Calendar Gutenberg blocks in conjunction with the batch REST API to achieve Remote Code Execution.
Detects file creation events with the .candy extension, consistent with the GigaWiper/Crucio-derived BigBang extortion module (BigBangExtortMain, bigBangSingleFileExtortion, bigBangHybridEncryption) which AES-CBC encrypts files using randomly generated, unsaved key/IV pairs across enumerated Windows logical drives before deleting the original file with os.Remove.
Detects the creation of a specific wallpaper file ('image_danger.jpg') associated with the GigaWiper malware family, which is indicative of a system defacement attempt during the destructive phase of an attack.
Detects the use of reg.exe to modify registry keys associated with Windows crash-dump settings and automatic reboot policies. Such modifications are indicative of attempts to inhibit system recovery and hinder incident response analysis, often associated with wiper malware such as GigaWiper.
This rule detects execution of specific functions or command-line arguments derived from the GigaWiper / FlockWiper malware family. These functions are associated with destructive activities such as file discovery, sorting, reading, and secure encryption or deletion of files, indicative of a wiper-style attack.
This rule detects execution of specific functions or command-line arguments derived from the GigaWiper / FlockWiper malware family. These functions are associated with destructive activities such as file discovery, sorting, reading, and secure encryption or deletion of files, indicative of a wiper-style attack.
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