Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of the 'encrypter-linux-x86' binary on Linux systems, specifically looking for command-line arguments indicative of file encryption activity (-e or --esxi). This binary name is frequently associated with ransomware targeting virtualized environments.
Detects unauthenticated exploitation attempts targeting WordPress sites using wp2shell techniques. The rule identifies malicious payloads attempting to leverage RSS, Navigation, or Calendar Gutenberg blocks in conjunction with the batch REST API to achieve Remote Code Execution.
Detects the use of built-in Windows utilities, specifically 'wmic.exe' and 'vssadmin.exe', to delete volume shadow copies. This is a common technique used by ransomware and other malware to prevent system recovery and impede incident response efforts.
This rule monitors for suspicious Git command-line activity that may indicate an attempt to rewrite commit history or force push changes while bypassing verification checks. It detects specific patterns including the execution of 'temp_auto_push.bat', force amending of commits with '--no-verify', and forced pushing with '--no-verify'. These actions are commonly associated with code tampering or the rapid deployment of unauthorized changes to a repository.
Detects execution/staging of the GodDamn ransomware encrypter binary encrypter-windows-gui-x86.exe from user profile Downloads or Music folders, or matching the known encrypter hash
Detects the execution of the NoEscape ransomware DISKWRITER component by matching known file hashes associated with the wiper malware.
This YARA rule detects files associated with the Agenda (Qilin) ransomware by searching for specific string patterns within the binary, such as hardcoded ransom note contents, Rust language artifacts, and an onion domain used for command-and-control or negotiation. It also validates the file as a Windows executable.
Detects DNS queries targeted towards specific '2miners.com' solo mining pool subdomains (e.g., solo-zeph.2miners.com, solo-rvn.2miners.com). Such activity is often associated with unauthorized cryptocurrency mining (cryptojacking) performed on compromised systems.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by monitoring for high-frequency file rename events (more than 50 in a single dataset aggregation) or file renames resulting in the specific extension '.God8Damn'. Such patterns are highly characteristic of ransomware encrypting local or network files.
Detects a process creating files named 'README.TXT' or 'README.txt' across three or more distinct directories. This behavior is a common indicator of ransomware activity, where an adversary drops ransom notes in multiple folders to maximize visibility after encrypting files.
Detects the presence of known ransomware extortion note file names on endpoints or communication attempts with associated extortion contact email addresses in email logs.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized database manipulation of the 'xadmin' platform, including suspicious administrative role modifications and deletions. It also monitors for suspicious Python script execution involving the 'bcrypt' library, which can be used to generate or verify password hashes in potentially malicious scripts.
This rule detects activities characteristic of the 'Gentleman' ransomware, including the creation of a specific ransom note file ('README-GENTLEMAN.txt'), attempts to tamper with Windows Defender security preferences, and the destruction of system recovery artifacts such as Volume Shadow Copies and various system logs/prefetch files.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by monitoring for high-frequency file renaming operations combined with the presence of specific file extensions often associated with encryption and the concurrent creation of ransom note files (e.g., 'README.TXT').
Detects the use of reg.exe to modify registry keys associated with Windows crash-dump settings and automatic reboot policies. Such modifications are indicative of attempts to inhibit system recovery and hinder incident response analysis, often associated with wiper malware such as GigaWiper.
Detects the execution of a potential file encryption utility that uses command-line flags ('enc'/'dec', '-k'/'-i'/'--keyfile') in conjunction with a 'key.txt' file. This pattern is characteristic of custom encryption tools used by threat actors to encrypt files on a system.
Detects the execution of a potential file encryption utility that uses command-line flags ('enc'/'dec', '-k'/'-i'/'--keyfile') in conjunction with a 'key.txt' file. This pattern is characteristic of custom encryption tools used by threat actors to encrypt files on a system.
Detects the use of bcdedit.exe and reagentc.exe to disable Windows system recovery and boot failure remediation, a common technique used by malware to inhibit system restoration after a destructive or ransomware attack.
Detects the use of bcdedit.exe and reagentc.exe to disable Windows system recovery and boot failure remediation, a common technique used by malware to inhibit system restoration after a destructive or ransomware attack.
Detects potential disk wiping activity by identifying the enumeration of physical disk drives via WMI queries combined with command-line arguments indicative of destructive wiping tools, such as functions related to unallocating drives or writing random data.
Detects the execution of XMRig cryptocurrency miner or network connections to known mining pool endpoints associated with XMRig, masquerading as or originating from the legitimate Windows process 'fontdrvhost.exe'. This behavior indicates potential resource hijacking.
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