Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule correlates a user logging in from a new ISP and immediately navigating to HR/Payroll URIs (specifically Workday or ADP) to modify direct deposit data. The detection logic joins Azure AD sign-in events with Cloud App Security events, filtering for interactive logins and page accesses to specific HR/Payroll URLs containing 'direct-deposit'. It also excludes known corporate IP addresses and requires the HR/Payroll access to occur within 30 minutes of the login.
This rule detects potential ransomware lateral movement patterns by correlating specific network connection attempts (SMB/RDP/RPC) with the observed creation of files having the '.prinzeugen' extension on the same host within a 2-hour window. This behavior is indicative of a ransomware strain propagating across the network and performing encryption.
Detects the 'lambsys' malware terminating competing cryptocurrency miner processes (such as xmrig, kinsing, or watchdog) using process termination commands (pkill, kill, killall) from a non-root shell. The detection further correlates this activity with the launch of a new miner binary from temporary directories and subsequent outbound network connections to common mining pool ports.
Detects persistence mechanisms used by the lambsys/procq cryptominer. It identifies two specific behaviors: 1) Correlation of non-root process execution (isp.sh, lambsys, procq) followed within 120 seconds by modifications to cron configuration files (e.g., /etc/cron.d/, /var/spool/cron/crontabs/) containing suspicious command-line patterns or mining pool references. 2) Direct detection of crontab -e invocations using heredoc redirection (<<) to install persistence payloads that match known miner dropper patterns and mining pool endpoints.
Detects unauthorized or suspicious use of virtualization management tools (e.g., esxcli, vim-cmd, PowerShell cmdlets for vSphere/Hyper-V) to perform disruptive actions such as powering off VMs, removing snapshots, or modifying firewall configurations. The rule excludes activity originating from standard management processes and trusted VMware/Microsoft signed processes.
Detects unauthorized or suspicious use of virtualization management tools (e.g., esxcli, vim-cmd, PowerShell cmdlets for vSphere/Hyper-V) to perform disruptive actions such as powering off VMs, removing snapshots, or modifying firewall configurations. The rule excludes activity originating from standard management processes and trusted VMware/Microsoft signed processes.
Detects the use of a renamed SysInternals Sdelete, which is something an administrator shouldn't do (the renaming)
Detects the deletion of local shadow copies using vssadmin, WMI, PowerShell, or wbadmin, a common tactic employed by ransomware to prevent system recovery.
Detects the creation or modification of Azure Storage Account management policies that include rules configured to delete blobs, snapshots, or versions in less than 30 days. This behavior may indicate an attempt at data destruction or unauthorized cleanup of cloud storage objects.
Detects service-control activity stopping security, backup, database, or virtualisation services to unlock files and reduce resistance.
Detects instances where a specific identity or caller triggers Azure Function or Logic App workflows at a high volume (more than 50 successful invocations within a 5-minute window). This threshold may indicate automated exploitation, potential brute-force attempts on API endpoints, or a misconfigured/malfunctioning service causing excessive resource usage.
Detects the creation or modification of Azure Storage Account management policies that include rules configured to delete blobs, snapshots, or versions in less than 30 days. This behavior may indicate an attempt at data destruction or unauthorized cleanup of cloud storage objects.
Detects instances where a specific identity or caller triggers Azure Function or Logic App workflows at a high volume (more than 50 successful invocations within a 5-minute window). This threshold may indicate automated exploitation, potential brute-force attempts on API endpoints, or a misconfigured/malfunctioning service causing excessive resource usage.
This rule detects a pattern of network shared folder access followed by the execution of known ransomware executables ('servertool.exe', 'encrypt.exe') within a 45-minute window. This behavior is indicative of ransomware preparing to encrypt data on network shares.
This rule detects various stages of a cryptojacking campaign, as described by Microsoft, involving initial access via autorun.dll sideloading, silent MSI installations, execution of RuntimeHost.exe from suspicious locations, scheduled task creation for persistence, .NET process hollowing, Windows Defender exclusions, and persistence via Startup folder shortcuts and Registry Run keys. The campaign leverages ScreenConnect for remote access and .NET utilities for process hollowing, ultimately leading to GPU mining cryptojacking.
Detects the modification of Azure Storage account management policies where the 'daysAfterModificationGreaterThan' condition is set to 7 days or less, specifically including a 'delete' action. This could indicate an attempt by an adversary to shorten the lifecycle of data for rapid, automated, and potentially malicious data destruction within Azure Blob Storage.
This rule correlates multiple low-to-medium confidence signals across file, process, network, and registry events to detect potential ransomware activity. The rule identifies suspicious behaviors including mass file renames, creation of known ransom note file types in multiple directories, shadow copy deletion via system utilities, disabling of antivirus and security monitoring, large archive staging, unauthorized outbound network connections, and suspicious process injection. Alerts are generated based on the aggregation and frequency of these signals, indicating a high probability of ransomware-related malicious activity.
Detects suspicious activities within a Veeam backup environment, including unauthorized process spawning by Veeam services, LSASS memory access, destruction of backup catalogs or restore points via PowerShell, and unauthorized access to Veeam database files by non-Veeam processes.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by identifying a combination of three distinct behaviors occurring on a single endpoint within a short window: high-volume file modifications (indicative of file encryption), deletion of system recovery resources (e.g., volume shadow copies, backup catalogs), and high-frequency network activity (indicative of data exfiltration). The rule uses cross-event correlation to reduce false positives by requiring all three signals to be present.
IoT botnet malware family used for DDoS and proxy infrastructure
High-velocity ransomware-as-a-service with aggressive leak-site extortion
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