Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
696 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
332
134
106
55
25
Contributors
115
100
66
62
55
Categories
136
129
107
104
84
Platforms
324
178
85
83
80
Products / Services
134
112
104
52
47
MITRE Techniques
18,114
15,633
12,576
8,388
6,214
696
CVEs
2
2
2
2
1
IDS Classtypes
48
29
11
7
6
IDS Protocols
66
20
11
6
3
Detects successful or failed logon attempts originating from IP addresses identified as associated with botnets, C2 infrastructure, or proxies by threat intelligence feeds. This indicates potential malicious activity or compromised accounts.
Detects a potential S3 bucket hijacking attempt where a bucket is deleted by one AWS account and subsequently recreated by a different AWS account within a 30-minute window. This behavior could indicate an attempt to intercept cross-account replication or misdirected data flows.
This rule detects activities associated with a specific malicious browser extension, including the presence of its files on disk, execution of browsers with the extension ID in the command line, and network connections to known malicious or typosquatted domains (perplexity-ai.online, extension.tilda.ws) used for C2 or exfiltration.
Detects modifications to Azure AD domain federation settings or authentication methods that could indicate attempts to establish persistent access or bypass authentication controls (e.g., golden SAML attacks, domain-level backdoors). The rule monitors for successful operations related to domain federation, authentication changes, and domain management, excluding known administrative actions from internal Microsoft domains.
Detects malicious msimg32.dll files associated with the Bumblebee loader by identifying unique, randomized, dictionary-derived strings within the PE file version resource metadata. These strings serve as a known signature for Bumblebee builders, often used to trojanize MSI installers.
Detects responses from vLLM (or similar services) that leak a Python Imaging Library (PIL)/Pillow heap address through BytesIO exception text. This indicates Stage 1 of the CVE-2026-22778 ASLR bypass vulnerability, where memory addresses are exposed, which could be used by an attacker to bypass Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR). The rule looks for specific error messages containing '_io.BytesIO object at 0x' followed by a hexadecimal address.
Detects the execution of a process named 'packet_edit_meme' on Linux systems, which is often indicative of specific malware or unauthorized tool usage.
Detects anomalous device network activity involving 5G-specific protocol ports (e.g., GTP-U, SIP). The rule aggregates unique port usage per device over 1-hour intervals to identify potential network reconnaissance, scanning, or unauthorized control plane communication.
Detects command lines consistent with ArachneC2 implant generation and hardening options.
Detects execution of the Velociraptor binary (velociraptor.exe) running with SYSTEM privileges while not being launched by the expected services.exe process. This often indicates potential unauthorized use or manual deployment of the tool, bypassing standard management procedures.
Identifies network connections to algorithmically generated Cloudflare Workers domains used by Kali365, specifically targeting the `-s-account.workers.dev` format. This pattern is indicative of phishing campaigns, potentially for credential harvesting or token replay.
Detects node.exe spawning powershell.exe as a child process, consistent with malicious npm postinstall lifecycle hooks used by the PostCSS typosquatting campaign (postcss-minify-selector-parser / postcss-minify-selector). The attack chain decrypts an AES-256-GCM blob at runtime and executes a PowerShell downloader stage.
Detects the PostCSS typosquatting campaign VBScript bootstrapper (update.vbs) using cmd.exe to extract dll.zip via tar, then launching the renamed Python executable chost.exe with loader.py to initialize the Windows RAT payload. This rule correlates two distinct process events: a wscript.exe initiated cmd.exe process executing 'tar -xf dll.zip', followed by a 'chost.exe' process executing 'loader.py' on the same device and account within a 5-minute window.
This rule monitors network logs (proxy, web gateway, and DNS) to detect connections to a curated list of known malicious domains associated with phishing, credential harvesting, and malware delivery infrastructure.
Detects SEO poisoning pages with hidden keywords to manipulate search rankings
Detects core indicators of Grixba malware, including the persistence path of GT_NET.exe in the Public Music directory, the loading of the associated malicious CoreScanner module (inf_g.dll), staging of reconnaissance output files, and the use of GT_NET.exe to perform network lateral movement via WMI/WinRM ports.
Detects network activity associated with the ROOTBOY actor, specifically identifying internal devices communicating with known malicious command and control (C2) IP addresses and subsequently attempting to access specific suspicious domains or URLs linked to the actor's infrastructure.
Detects modifications to Azure AD domain federation settings or authentication methods that could indicate attempts to establish persistent access or bypass authentication controls (e.g., golden SAML attacks, domain-level backdoors). The rule monitors for successful operations related to domain federation, authentication changes, and domain management, excluding known administrative actions from internal Microsoft domains.
This rule monitors for security alerts related to Azure AI services, specifically detecting credential theft attempts and LLM jailbreak attempts that have been blocked or detected by Azure's built-in content filtering mechanisms.
Detects modifications to Azure AD domain federation settings or authentication methods that could indicate attempts to establish persistent access or bypass authentication controls (e.g., golden SAML attacks, domain-level backdoors). The rule monitors for successful operations related to domain federation, authentication changes, and domain management, excluding known administrative actions from internal Microsoft domains.
ClickFix style social engineering cluster delivering Mistic and ModeloRAT
Page 7 of 34