Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
696 detections
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Detects Node.js initiating connections over port 2222. This is used by the Miasma botnet as a fallback C2/SSH channel when standard ports are blocked.
Detects known malicious file hashes associated with Miasma/Mini Shai-Hulud malware, as well as suspicious npm-lifecycle behaviors including binding.gyp shell execution, runtime staging of the Bun engine, and suspicious Bun-related downloads from GitHub.
Detects the execution of files with names commonly associated with malicious campaigns or masquerading, specifically 'COU_ITR-1_to_4_AY2026-27.exe' and 'Mixed Reality.exe'. This rule alerts on process start events involving these specific image names, capturing command-line details and process lineage for further analysis.
This rule detects potential container escape attempts utilizing Linux system calls such as 'unshare' or 'clone' with flags indicative of namespace manipulation (CLONE_NEWUSER, CLONE_NEWNET). It also detects the execution of suspected malicious binaries or traffic manipulation tools associated with 'packet_edit_meme' or 'act_pedit' activities, which are common in Linux-based exploitation scenarios.
This rule detects network connections or process command lines containing a specific URL pattern often used by short-lived malware downloaders. The pattern includes paired tokens, numeric ticks, and a signature timestamp, indicating a potential malware distribution ecosystem.
Detects automated scripts generating large volumes of text or markdown documents in corporate sync folders (OneDrive/SharePoint) designed to flood the AI indexer with poisoned recommendations.
Detects Node.js initiating network connections over port 2222. This activity is associated with the Miasma botnet, which uses port 2222 as a fallback C2/SSH channel when standard ports are blocked.
This rule detects network connections or process command lines containing a specific URL pattern often used by short-lived malware downloaders. The pattern includes paired tokens, numeric ticks, and a signature timestamp, indicating a potential malware distribution ecosystem.
Detects a small Go-based scanner, identified by its renamed executable 'go.exe', when launched with command-line arguments indicative of broad network scanning activities such as CIDR range specifications (/16, /24), service discovery, or exploit module usage. This behavior is often associated with initial access or reconnaissance phases by adversaries.
Detects inbound messages whose subject closely matches the campaign's reported stolen client data extortion wording. The rule looks for specific keywords like 'lost', 'confidential', 'data', 'clients' (all present) and 'very important', 'important', 'client data' (any present) in the email subject, specifically for inbound emails that are either the first contact or have no threat types identified.
Correlates browsers encountering a certificate error (invalid issuer) for a major cloud provider due to DNS redirection.
Detects suspicious NPM package installations that may indicate typosquatting or supply chain compromise attempts. The rule looks for `npm install` or `npm add` commands with package names containing special characters (@, ^, ~) and common prefixes used in typosquatting (typosquatting-, common-, util-), while excluding 'json' to reduce false positives. A high count of such installations within an hour from a single user and computer is flagged.
This rule detects network connections to Azure infrastructure (azurewebsites.net) that utilize specific API paths associated with the MiniJunk C2 framework. The paths include '/api/app/check', '/api/app/update', and '/api/app/comment', which are indicative of command and control beaconing activity.
Detects network activity associated with the ROOTBOY actor, specifically identifying internal devices communicating with known malicious command and control (C2) IP addresses and subsequently attempting to access specific suspicious domains or URLs linked to the actor's infrastructure.
Detects successful outbound network connections to common botnet-associated remote ports (6667, 6697, 8006, 27374, 27375). The rule aggregates these connections by device to identify endpoints communicating with multiple distinct remote IP addresses, a behavior often indicative of botnet participation or command and control activity.
Detects anomalous device network activity involving 5G-specific protocol ports (e.g., GTP-U, SIP). The rule aggregates unique port usage per device over 1-hour intervals to identify potential network reconnaissance, scanning, or unauthorized control plane communication.
Detects downloads of CVE exploit proof-of-concept code
This rule detects DNS queries to known dynamic DNS providers, which can be indicative of Command and Control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries often use dynamic DNS services to maintain persistent access to compromised systems, as the IP addresses of their C2 servers may change frequently. The rule specifically looks for queries containing domains like duckdns.org, no-ip.com, ddns.net, hopto.org, zapto.org, and sytes.net.
Detects creation of cloud accounts for establishing attack infrastructure
Detects access to underground markets selling initial access to compromised networks
Detects malware using Pastebin as a dead drop resolver for C2 config
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