Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This query visualises total emails with Phish (BEC) Impersonation detections by Detection Technology
This detection identifies the presence of the default AzureHound user-agent string within Microsoft Graph Activity logs and NonInteractive SignIn Logs. AzureHound is a tool used for gathering information about Azure Active Directory environments, often employed by security professionals for legitimate auditing purposes. However, it can also be leveraged by malicious actors to perform reconnaissance activities, mapping out the Azure AD infrastructure to identify potential vulnerabilities and targets for further exploitation. Detecting its usage can help in identifying unauthorized access attempts and preemptively mitigating potential security threats to your Azure environment.
This query visualises user submissions where admin also performed 'mark and notify' action on the submission
This analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104, where WMI performs an event query to list running processes or services. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to capture and analyze script block text for specific WMI queries. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by malware and APT actors to map security applications or services on a compromised machine. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to identify and potentially disable security defenses, facilitating further compromise and persistence within the environment.
The analytic detects a PowerShell script that enumerates camera devices on the targeted host. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging, specifically looking for commands querying Win32_PnPEntity for camera-related information. This activity is significant as it is commonly observed in DCRat malware, which collects camera data to send to its command-and-control server. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to gather sensitive visual information from the host, potentially leading to privacy breaches or further exploitation.
Detects potential malicious JavaScript obfuscated using the JSFireTruck technique, characterized by the repeated use of characters like [], (), !, and +. This rule looks for the presence of multiple distinct characters from the core JSFireTruck set within web response bodies.
Detects potential malicious JavaScript obfuscated using the JSFireTruck technique, specifically looking for the combination of core JSFireTruck characters and checks for document.referrer, often used to target traffic from search engines.
Detects potential malicious JavaScript obfuscated using the JSFireTruck technique, specifically looking for the combination of core JSFireTruck characters and checks for document.referrer, often used to target traffic from search engines.
Detects when a DNS zone transfer failed.
'Discover all critical ports from a list having rules like 'Any' for sourceIp, which means that they are opened to everyone. Critial ports should not be opened to everyone, and should be filtered.'
Roasting
KQL
Detect Active Directory LDAP queries that search for Kerberoasting (SPNs) or accounts with Kerberos preauthentication not required from Azure ATP, and try to get the process initiated the LDAP query from MDATP.
Replace 389 on line 5 with LDAP port in your environment
Replace true on line 6 to false if you want to include Nt Authority process
This LDAP query cover Rubeus, Kerberoast, BloodHound tools
Replace 389 on line 5 with LDAP port in your environment
Replace true on line 6 to false if you want to include Nt Authority process
This LDAP query cover Rubeus, Kerberoast, BloodHound tools
This query helps hunting for possible device code Phishing attempts
'This hunting query will alert on any Impossible travel activity in correlation with mailbox permission tampering followed by account being added to a PIM managed privileged group.
Ensure this impossible travel incident with increase of privileges is legitimate in your environment.'
Ensure this impossible travel incident with increase of privileges is legitimate in your environment.'
'Detects potentially malicious Visual Studio Code (VSCode) extensions installed on a users system, which threat actors might use to control devices and exfiltrate personal information.
Ref: https://blog.checkpoint.com/securing-the-cloud/malicious-vscode-extensions-with-more-than-45k-downloads-steal-pii-and-enable-backdoors/'
Ref: https://blog.checkpoint.com/securing-the-cloud/malicious-vscode-extensions-with-more-than-45k-downloads-steal-pii-and-enable-backdoors/'
Suspicious Git Clone
Sigma
Detects execution of "git" in order to clone a remote repository that contain suspicious keywords which might be suspicious
Detects usage of the "Import-Module" cmdlet to load the "Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.dl" DLL. Which is often used by attackers to perform AD enumeration.
'This content is employed to correlate with Microsoft Defender XDR phishing-related alerts. It focuses on instances where a user successfully connects to a phishing URL from a non-Microsoft network device and subsequently makes successful sign-in attempts from the phishing IP address.'
Detects Crassus, a Windows privilege escalation discovery tool, based on PE metadata characteristics.
"This Kusto (KQL) hunting query detects blob-enumeration or file-spraying behaviour in Azure Storage by:
- Aggregating requests into time-bound sessions with row_window_session().
- Defining a "user" as the combination of AccountName | UserAgentHeader, which is tolerant of rapid IP rotation.
- Raising an alert when, within any single session:
- The actor touches at least 10 distinct objects, and
- At least 50 % of those requests return an HTTP 4xx/5xx status, and
- Each object is accessed exactly once ("touch-once" pattern typical of enumeration).
All tuning knobs (look-back window, session gap, thresholds, authentication type) are exposed at the top of the query.
Be sure to validate the query against both benign and malicious samples in your own environment before relying on it for production detection.
Reference: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/microsoftdefendercloudblog/protect-your-storage-resources-against-blob-hunting/3735238"
- Aggregating requests into time-bound sessions with row_window_session().
- Defining a "user" as the combination of AccountName | UserAgentHeader, which is tolerant of rapid IP rotation.
- Raising an alert when, within any single session:
- The actor touches at least 10 distinct objects, and
- At least 50 % of those requests return an HTTP 4xx/5xx status, and
- Each object is accessed exactly once ("touch-once" pattern typical of enumeration).
All tuning knobs (look-back window, session gap, thresholds, authentication type) are exposed at the top of the query.
Be sure to validate the query against both benign and malicious samples in your own environment before relying on it for production detection.
Reference: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/microsoftdefendercloudblog/protect-your-storage-resources-against-blob-hunting/3735238"
'The query looks for source code files being modified immediately after a build process is started. The purpose of this is to look for malicious code injection during the build process.
More details: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/azure-sentinel/monitoring-the-software-supply-chain-with-azure-sentinel/ba-p/2176463'
More details: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/azure-sentinel/monitoring-the-software-supply-chain-with-azure-sentinel/ba-p/2176463'
This query searches for a string pattern detected in evasive PowerShell usage. Jupyter or SolarMarker will iterate on this pattern multiple times to read data and call additional processes. This query is not fully specific to Jupyter or SolarMarker, and will also return other malicious malware, but is unlikely to return false positives.
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