Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
490 detections
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The following analytic identifies modifications to the registry path .wav\\OpenWithProgIds, associated with the Snake Malware campaign. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel to detect changes in this specific registry location. This activity is significant because Snake's WerFault.exe uses this registry path to decrypt an encrypted blob containing critical components like the AES key, IV, and paths for its kernel driver and loader. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to load and execute Snake's kernel driver, leading to potential system compromise and persistent access.
Detects execution of esxcli syslog configuration commands where the command
itself is reconstructed at runtime from hex escape sequences, octal escape sequences, an
awk BEGIN block, or a Python chr()-based decoder before being reset against loghost.
CrowdStrike cataloged this pattern across 21 ESX BusyBox obfuscation techniques used to
hide 'esxcli system syslog config set --reset=loghost' from cleartext shell log review.
Threat actors including SCATTERED SPIDER, BlackBasta, Royal/BlackSuit, and Akira use this
to sever centralized log forwarding from a compromised ESXi host immediately before
encrypting the datastore.
itself is reconstructed at runtime from hex escape sequences, octal escape sequences, an
awk BEGIN block, or a Python chr()-based decoder before being reset against loghost.
CrowdStrike cataloged this pattern across 21 ESX BusyBox obfuscation techniques used to
hide 'esxcli system syslog config set --reset=loghost' from cleartext shell log review.
Threat actors including SCATTERED SPIDER, BlackBasta, Royal/BlackSuit, and Akira use this
to sever centralized log forwarding from a compromised ESXi host immediately before
encrypting the datastore.
The following analytic detects the execution of "wevtutil.exe" with parameters to disable event logs. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because disabling event logs is a common tactic used by ransomware to evade detection and hinder forensic investigations. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to operate undetected, making it difficult to trace their activities and respond effectively to the incident.
The following analytic identifies modifications in the registry to disable Windows Defender's real-time behavior monitoring. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths associated with Windows Defender settings. This activity is significant because disabling real-time protection is a common tactic used by malware such as RATs, bots, or Trojans to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to execute code, escalate privileges, or persist in the environment without being detected by antivirus software.
The following analytic detects modifications to the registry that disable the CMD prompt application. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically looking for changes to the "DisableCMD" registry value. This activity is significant because disabling CMD can hinder an analyst's ability to investigate and remediate threats, a tactic often used by malware such as RATs, Trojans, or Worms. If confirmed malicious, this could prevent security teams from using CMD for directory and file traversal, complicating incident response and allowing the attacker to maintain persistence.
The following analytic detects the use of the Windows binary attrib.exe to hide files or directories by marking them with specific flags. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line arguments that include the "+h" flag. This activity is significant because hiding files can be a tactic used by attackers to conceal malicious files or tools from users and security software. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to persist in the environment undetected, potentially leading to further compromise or data exfiltration.
The following analytic identifies attempts to disable Windows Defender
real-time behavior monitoring via PowerShell commands. It detects the use of specific
`Set-MpPreference` parameters that disable various security features. This activity
is significant as it is commonly used by malware such as RATs, bots, or Trojans
to evade detection by disabling antivirus protections. If confirmed malicious, this
action could allow an attacker to operate undetected, leading to potential data
exfiltration, further system compromise, or persistent access within the environment.
real-time behavior monitoring via PowerShell commands. It detects the use of specific
`Set-MpPreference` parameters that disable various security features. This activity
is significant as it is commonly used by malware such as RATs, bots, or Trojans
to evade detection by disabling antivirus protections. If confirmed malicious, this
action could allow an attacker to operate undetected, leading to potential data
exfiltration, further system compromise, or persistent access within the environment.
The following analytic detects the use of `fltMC.exe` to unload the Sysmon driver, which stops Sysmon from collecting data. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) logs, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because disabling Sysmon can blind security monitoring, allowing malicious actions to go undetected. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to execute further attacks without being logged, leading to potential data breaches, privilege escalation, or persistent access within the environment.
This analytic detects the execution of the ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor command via PowerShell Script Block Logging.
The ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor command is part of the AADInternals toolkit, which is used primarily for security testing and administrative tasks in Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) environments.
This particular command is designed to create a "backdoor" in a federated Azure AD domain.
When executed, ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor modifies the federation settings of a domain by adding or changing the federation configuration to allow an attacker to control the authentication process.
This manipulation enables the creation of security tokens that can impersonate any user within the Azure AD tenant.
Consequently, this allows an attacker to bypass Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), escalate privileges, and maintain persistent access to the Azure AD environment.
The ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor command is part of the AADInternals toolkit, which is used primarily for security testing and administrative tasks in Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) environments.
This particular command is designed to create a "backdoor" in a federated Azure AD domain.
When executed, ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor modifies the federation settings of a domain by adding or changing the federation configuration to allow an attacker to control the authentication process.
This manipulation enables the creation of security tokens that can impersonate any user within the Azure AD tenant.
Consequently, this allows an attacker to bypass Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), escalate privileges, and maintain persistent access to the Azure AD environment.
The following analytic detects a suspicious registry modification that disables the Lock Computer feature in Windows. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\DisableLockWorkstation" with a value of "0x00000001". This activity is significant because it prevents users from locking their screens, a tactic often used by malware, including ransomware, to maintain control over compromised systems. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to sustain their presence and execute further malicious actions without user interruption.
The following analytic detects a suspicious registry modification that disables the logoff feature on a Windows host. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model to identify changes to specific registry values associated with logoff functionality. This activity is significant because it can indicate ransomware attempting to make the compromised host unusable and hinder remediation efforts. If confirmed malicious, this action could prevent users from logging off, complicate incident response, and allow attackers to maintain persistence and control over the affected system.
The following analytic detects the modification of the Windows registry to disable the Notification Center on a host machine. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically looking for changes to the "DisableNotificationCenter" registry value set to "0x00000001." This activity is significant because disabling the Notification Center can be a tactic used by RAT malware to hide its presence and subsequent actions. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to operate stealthily, potentially leading to further system compromise and data exfiltration.
The following analytic detects suspicious registry modifications that disable the shutdown button on a user's logon screen.
It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths associated with shutdown policies.
This activity is significant because it is a tactic used by malware, particularly ransomware like KillDisk, to hinder system usability and prevent the removal of malicious changes.
If confirmed malicious, this could impede system recovery efforts, making it difficult to restart the machine and remove other harmful modifications.
It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths associated with shutdown policies.
This activity is significant because it is a tactic used by malware, particularly ransomware like KillDisk, to hinder system usability and prevent the removal of malicious changes.
If confirmed malicious, this could impede system recovery efforts, making it difficult to restart the machine and remove other harmful modifications.
The following analytic detects the clearing of Windows event logs by identifying Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log event 104. This detection leverages Windows event logs to monitor for log clearing activities. Such behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to cover tracks after malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this action could hinder forensic investigations and allow attackers to persist undetected, making it crucial to investigate further and correlate with other alerts and data sources.
The following analytic detects the shutdown of the Windows Event Log service by leveraging Windows Event ID 1100. This event is logged every time the service stops, including during normal system shutdowns. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate attempts to cover tracks or disable logging. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could hide their activities, making it difficult to trace their actions and investigate further incidents. Analysts should verify if the shutdown was planned and review other alerts and data sources for additional suspicious behavior.
The following analytic identifies the modification of security permissions
on files or directories using tools like icacls.exe, cacls.exe, or xcacls.exe. It
leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific
command-line executions. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) and coinminer scripts to evade detection and
maintain control over compromised systems. If confirmed malicious, this behavior
could allow attackers to hinder investigation, impede remediation efforts, and maintain
persistent access to the compromised environment.
on files or directories using tools like icacls.exe, cacls.exe, or xcacls.exe. It
leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific
command-line executions. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) and coinminer scripts to evade detection and
maintain control over compromised systems. If confirmed malicious, this behavior
could allow attackers to hinder investigation, impede remediation efforts, and maintain
persistent access to the compromised environment.
The following analytic detects the disabling of an AutoLogger session or one of its providers, by identifying changes to the Registry values "Start" and "Enabled" part of the "\WMI\Autologger\" key path. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel to monitor specific registry paths and values. This activity is significant as attackers and adversaries can leverage this in order to evade defense and blind EDRs and log ingest tooling. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to conceal their activities, making it harder to detect further malicious actions and maintain persistence on the compromised endpoint.
The following analytic detects the disabling of Hypervisor-protected Code Integrity (HVCI) by monitoring changes in the Windows registry. It leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel, specifically focusing on registry paths and values related to HVCI settings. This activity is significant because HVCI helps protect the kernel and system processes from tampering by malicious code. If confirmed malicious, disabling HVCI could allow attackers to execute unsigned kernel-mode code, potentially leading to kernel-level rootkits or other severe security breaches.
The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry key "AuthenticationLevelOverride" within the Terminal Server Client settings. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel to identify changes where the registry value is set to 0x00000000. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to override authentication levels for remote connections, a tactic used by DarkGate malware for malicious installations. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain unauthorized remote access, potentially leading to data exfiltration or further system compromise.
The following analytic detects a suspicious modification to the Windows registry that changes the auto-update notification setting to "Notify before download." This detection leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on specific registry paths and values. This activity is significant because it is a known technique used by adversaries, including malware like RedLine Stealer, to evade detection and potentially deploy additional payloads. If confirmed malicious, this modification could allow attackers to bypass security measures, maintain persistence, and exploit vulnerabilities on the target host.
The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable toast notifications. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\PushNotifications\\ToastEnabled*" with a value set to "0x00000000". This activity is significant because disabling toast notifications can prevent users from receiving critical system and application updates, which adversaries like Azorult exploit for defense evasion. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to operate undetected, leading to prolonged persistence and potential further compromise of the system.
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