Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,407 detections
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Detects when common user-facing applications (such as web browsers or Windows Explorer) spawn command-line interpreters (cmd, powershell, pwsh, wt) using encoded commands or execution policy bypass flags, followed quickly by the same shell process writing a potentially executable or script file into a user-writable path.
Detects the loading of an unsigned or non-standard DLL into the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process, correlated with the same device registering that DLL as a Security Package or Authentication Package via the Windows Registry or API.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks that pipe log files into cmd via conhost --headless, often associated with BITTER PapRAT activity, optionally accompanied by curl staging within 10 minutes.
Detects the DarkVigil workflow where SGTool.exe invokes SogouComMgr.exe with specific parameters to trigger biz_helper.exe, which subsequently side-loads a malicious libcef.dll library from the biz_center component directory.
Detects behavioral patterns where built-in Windows downloaders and living-off-the-land binaries such as certutil, BITSAdmin, curl, or PowerShell WebClient are used to download content or communicate with a known C2 IP while writing files into sensitive directories like ProgramData or AppData.
Detects the execution of wevtutil.exe to clear TerminalServices-LocalSessionManager and/or TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManager operational logs, which is a technique used by adversaries to hide remote access and session activity.
Detects instances where rundll32.exe spawns a common sacrificial host process (such as dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, svchost.exe, OpenWith.exe, or AtBroker.exe) with suspicious command-line parameters, followed by remote memory injection activities targeting that same spawned process within a 10-minute window.
Detects the creation of a DLL file in user-writable directories (such as ProgramData, AppData, Temp, or Users Public) by specific sacrificial host processes (such as dllhost.exe, werfault.exe, svchost.exe, openwith.exe, or atbroker.exe), followed shortly by the execution of that dropped DLL using rundll32.exe from the same host process context.
Detects a sequence where a process writes 7z.dll into a temporary directory followed by rundll32.exe loading or referencing that same DLL path, excluding legitimate 7-Zip utility executions.
Detects a sequence where a registry run key is written with rundll32 and SetCodecs, followed shortly by a modification to the corresponding StartupApproved\Run key with specific data indicating approval or persistence setup.
Detects hosts connecting to the Puppet Certificate Authority (CA) enrollment endpoint on port 8140 that are not known provisioning systems or established agents.
Detects PowerShell execution spawned by WmiPrvSE.exe (remote WMI execution) with command lines referencing Veeam backup database elements, stored credentials, and DPAPI decryption, indicative of credential theft via tools like NetExec.
Detects when Microsoft Defender exclusions are added via registry modifications or PowerShell/MpPreference commands targeting broad system paths (such as C:\ProgramData, C:\Windows, Temp) or the AhsayCBS service process cbssvcX64.exe, which can indicate defense evasion attempts.
Detects execution of CertEnrollCtrl.exe from a non-system path (indicating potential DLL side-loading), which subsequently spawns a command shell (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) and executes Active Directory reconnaissance tools such as nltest.exe, whoami.exe, net.exe, or findstr.exe.
Detects a network relay pattern where a host accepts an inbound internal connection on the Adaptix BeaconTCP default bind port (9000) and correlates it with the same process subsequently establishing outbound connections to public IP addresses over standard web or DNS ports (80, 443, 53).
Detects a behavioral chain associated with CopperDragon activity, combining admin account creation or modification mentioning admin$, Lanman service configuration for autostart, inbound TCP port 445 firewall rule creation via netsh, and modification of the LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy registry key.
Detects the persistence stage of an obfuscated JScript loader (such as ScreenConnect loaders). Identifies wscript.exe or cscript.exe writing or executing helper scripts in AppData staging folders and registering delayed scheduled tasks using the Task Scheduler COM API or schtasks fallback.
The following analytic detects excessive usage of the `sc.exe` service utility on a host machine.
It uses distinct process GUIDs to count `sc.exe` executions in 15-minute windows and flags a window when its count is greater than five and at or above the host's average window count plus three standard deviations.
This behavior can be associated with ransomware, cryptocurrency miners, and other malware attempting to create, modify, delete, or disable services, including security services.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to manipulate critical services, leading to system compromise or disruption of security defenses.
It uses distinct process GUIDs to count `sc.exe` executions in 15-minute windows and flags a window when its count is greater than five and at or above the host's average window count plus three standard deviations.
This behavior can be associated with ransomware, cryptocurrency miners, and other malware attempting to create, modify, delete, or disable services, including security services.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to manipulate critical services, leading to system compromise or disruption of security defenses.
IOC sweep for the Optimizely supply chain attack distributing Coruna/DarkSword, covering Defender XDR tables only (DeviceNetworkEvents, DeviceEvents and DeviceFileEvents). Matches remote URLs and hosts, DNS query responses, and IOC IPs against the attacker domains and IPs, and matches file SHA256 hashes against the known malicious samples. Companion to the Sentinel lake/auxiliary tables query, which covers CommonSecurityLog and DnsEvents. Keeps a 14-day lookback in the query body.
IOC sweep for the Optimizely supply chain attack distributing Coruna/DarkSword, covering Sentinel lake/auxiliary tables only (CommonSecurityLog and DnsEvents). Matches firewall/proxy URLs and destination hosts, DNS query names, and IOC IPs against the attacker domains and IPs, using boundary-safe domain matching. Companion to the Defender tables query, which covers Defender network, DNS and file events and the file hashes. The query has no time filter in its body: set the time picker or API timespan to 14 days.
The following analytic detects instances where a Dynamic Link Library (DLL) is loaded from a temporary directory on a Windows system. Loading DLLs from non-standard paths such as %TEMP% is uncommon for legitimate applications and is often associated with adversary tradecraft, including DLL search order hijacking, side-loading, or execution of malicious payloads staged in temporary folders. Adversaries frequently leverage these directories because they are writable by standard users and often overlooked by security controls, making them convenient locations to drop and execute malicious files. This behavior may indicate attempts to evade detection, execute unauthorized code, or maintain persistence through hijacked execution flows. Detection of DLL loads from %TEMP% can help surface early signs of compromise and should be investigated in the context of the originating process, user account, and potential file creation or modification activity within the same directory.
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