Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
327 detections
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Detects Koktevrat Android RAT APK artifacts via obfuscated component class names (JyfNnJyj, GtVyayDo) and the Stage 2 package identifier com.kowo.ciligeci
Detects specific command strings ('proxy_open', 'proxy_data', 'proxy_close') associated with the Koktevrat Android RAT's tunneling functionality. The rule monitors outbound TCP traffic to identify the initiation, data transfer, and termination phases of a proxy connection, leveraging Suricata flowbits to track the state of the C2 tunnel.
Detects specific command strings ('proxy_open', 'proxy_data', 'proxy_close') associated with the Koktevrat Android RAT's tunneling functionality. The rule monitors outbound TCP traffic to identify the initiation, data transfer, and termination phases of a proxy connection, leveraging Suricata flowbits to track the state of the C2 tunnel.
Detects network communication associated with Mantax Otax Android malware, including traffic to identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure and attempts to retrieve dynamic configuration files from GitHub.
Detects evidence of persistent Android malware attempting to maintain access. It identifies the execution of a hidden Go-based daemon masquerading as a shared library in temporary storage, silent reinstallation of malicious APKs using package installer flags, and automated re-granting of accessibility services to bypass user interaction requirements.
Detects unauthorized programmatic invocation of ADB pair or connect commands by an Android application. This activity is indicative of the RatHat malware family attempting to abuse Accessibility Services and Wireless Debugging to self-pair with the local ADB daemon, thereby bypassing the Android application sandbox.
Detects the RatHat Android malware attempting to perform a UI overlay attack by requesting the SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission while specifically targeting payment application packages, such as WeChat (com.tencent.mm) and Alipay (com.eg.android.AlipayGphone), to capture sensitive credentials.
Detects unauthorized programmatic invocation of ADB pair or connect commands by an Android application. This activity is indicative of the RatHat malware family attempting to abuse Accessibility Services and Wireless Debugging to self-pair with the local ADB daemon, thereby bypassing the Android application sandbox.
Detects the RatHat Android malware attempting to perform a UI overlay attack by requesting the SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission while specifically targeting payment application packages, such as WeChat (com.tencent.mm) and Alipay (com.eg.android.AlipayGphone), to capture sensitive credentials.
Detects execution of commands used to modify critical Android system settings, such as enabling accessibility services, developer options, or wireless debugging. These commands are commonly associated with the use of the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) to facilitate unauthorized device control, persistence, or configuration changes indicative of malicious activity or post-exploitation.
Detects the usage of Android Debug Bridge (ADB) commands associated with wireless debugging, such as pairing or connecting to devices over a network. This behavior can be used by an adversary to gain remote access to an Android device or manage it remotely.
Detects modifications to Android secure settings to enable accessibility services, often used by malware to intercept user input, monitor screen content, or perform unauthorized actions.
Detects HTTP POST requests from Android devices identified as RatHat malware, specifically targeting exfiltration of sensitive data including credentials, cipher keys, and ADB certificate/key uploads via the malware's C2 API.
This rule detects network traffic patterns associated with the Koktevrat Android RAT, specifically identifying periodic TLS beacons (heartbeats) destined for known C2 domains (streams-tv.lol and stream-plus.lat). The behavior suggests the use of Android's AlarmManager to schedule recurring callbacks to the C2 infrastructure.
This rule detects network traffic patterns associated with the Koktevrat Android RAT, specifically identifying periodic TLS beacons (heartbeats) destined for known C2 domains (streams-tv.lol and stream-plus.lat). The behavior suggests the use of Android's AlarmManager to schedule recurring callbacks to the C2 infrastructure.
Detects known Koktevrat Android RAT campaign APK artifacts by published SHA-256 hashes and associated package name string
Detects outbound network communication patterns (DNS lookups and TLS SNI traffic) associated with the Koktevrat Android RAT. The rule monitors for connections to known malicious domains used for command-and-control (C2) operations.
Detects outbound network communication patterns (DNS lookups and TLS SNI traffic) associated with the Koktevrat Android RAT. The rule monitors for connections to known malicious domains used for command-and-control (C2) operations.
Detects outbound network communication patterns (DNS lookups and TLS SNI traffic) associated with the Koktevrat Android RAT. The rule monitors for connections to known malicious domains used for command-and-control (C2) operations.
Detects Koktevrat Stage 2 Android RAT component (com.kowo.ciligeci) that unpacks the RC4-encrypted uoN.css/uoN.apk payload using the RC4 key iOZ
Detects Koktevrat Android RAT APK artifacts via obfuscated component class names (JyfNnJyj, GtVyayDo) and the Stage 2 package identifier com.kowo.ciligeci
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